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ABSTRACT 
 
When a government official defends a case before an international court, 
whose interest should he/she be representing?  In today’s era of expanding 
international treaties that give standing to individual claimants, international courts 
review the actions of different government actors through the yardsticks of 
international law.  The state is not unitary; alleged victims can bring international 
claims against various government entities including the executive, the legislature, 
the administrative branch, and the judiciary.  Yet, the international legal defense of 
government actions is in the hands of the executive power. This paper focuses on 
the consequences of this centralization for inter-branch politics.  It explores the 
lessons learned in US constitutional law concerning the role that executive power 
plays in defending the interests of the federal government before the Supreme 
Court, and compares them with the experience of Latin American executives in 
litigating cases before the Inter-American Court of Human Rights (IACtHR).  
 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
International judicial proceedings are structured so that governments speak 
to courts with one voice.1  And in most, if not every state, the executive branch is 
                                                            
1  Section 2 of Article 7 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties crystalized 
the custom in international law of assuming that the State is represented by a single voice 
mostly commonly expressed by the executive power in the form of Heads of State, Heads of 
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this voice. 2   Judicial proceedings typically do not allow other branches or 
government officials to participate in the process. Yet, the governments of many 
democracies, just as in the United States, operate under a system of formal 
separation of powers and independent administrative agencies. State interests are 
composed of a plethora of agendas formulated by diverse government actors.3  In 
judicial proceedings the state may still be treated as a unit, but in practice the vast 
majority of contemporary states are not close to “unitary.”4  Moreover, international 
courts have moved beyond resolving exclusively inter-state conflicts involving 
boundary disputes or war-related settlements.5  International judicial proceedings 
today give individuals standing to bring claims that question the exercise of public 
power at the domestic level.6  Presidents, legislative bodies, domestic courts, and 
government agencies take actions that can be considered contrary to international 
                                                            
Government, and Ministers of Foreign Affairs. (“In virtue of their functions and without 
having to produce full powers, the following are considered as representing their State: a) 
Heads of State, Heads of Government and Ministers for Foreign Affairs, for the purposes of 
performing all acts relating to the conclusion of a treaty.”), Vienna Convention on the Law 
of Treaties, Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, art. 7, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 
331 [hereinafter Vienna Convention]. See also Mary Ellen O’Connell & Leonore VanderZee, 
The History of International Adjudication, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL 
ADJUDICATION 40, 46-60 (Oxford Univ. Press, 1st ed. 2014). When the Permanent Court of 
International Justice, the first permanent international adjudicative body, was designed in 
1920, the rules of its proceedings assumed that when the representative of the state appears 
before the court he/she would be defending the interest of the “state/nation.” See Karen J. 
Alter, The Multiplication of International Courts and Tribunals After the End of the Cold 
War, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL ADJUDICATION 63, 63–87 (Oxford Univ. 
Press, 1st ed. 2014). The international courts that have followed since then have replicated 
this general organization of the proceedings. Cesare P.R. Romano, Progress in International 
Adjudication: Revisiting Hudson’s Assessment of the Future of International Courts, in 
PROGRESS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 433, 433–50 (Russell Miller & Rebecca Bratspies eds. 
2008); ADVISORY COMMITTEE OF JURISTS, DOCUMENTS PRESENTED TO THE COMMITTEE 
RELATING TO EXISTING PLANS FOR THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A PERMANENT COURT OF 
INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE 379 (1920).  
2   Vienna Convention, supra note 1, Art. 7;  Cesare P.R. Romano, A Taxonomy of 
International Rule of Law Institutions, 2 J. INT'L. DISPUTE SETTL. 241, 275 (2011); MANLEY 
O. HUDSON, INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNALS: PAST AND FUTURE 128 (1944). 
3  Erwin N. Griswold, The Office of the Solicitor General-Representing the Interests 
of the United States before the Supreme Court, 34 MO. L. REV. 527, 530 (1969) (stating how 
Solicitor General Erwin Griswold’s experience in the office was a “vivid realization of how 
disparate the government’s legal interest have become.”). 
4  By unitary I make reference to the idea that States behave like single units, as 
opposed to being composed of different actors, sectors, agencies, regions, etc.  
5  O’Connell & VanderZee, supra note 1, at 47–48; Alter, supra note 1, at 64; 
HUDSON, supra note 2, at 18–31; Romano, supra note 1, at 438. 
6  KAREN J. ALTER, THE NEW TERRAIN OF INTERNATIONAL LAW: COURTS, POLITICS, 
RIGHTS 107–08 (Princeton Univ. Press 2014); Benedict Kingsbury et al., The Emergence of 
Global Administrative Law, LAW CONTEMP. PROBL. 15, 56–57 (2005). 
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law and are subject to challenge before a supranational court. 7  Yet, only the 
presidents have the power to defend these actions.  The officers who represent the 
country have to decide how to put all those interests together and their litigation 
strategies could leave some of those voices without a defense.  
The primary claim of this paper is that the authority to argue the 
international legality of government acts before international courts has an 
important national political dimension rooted in present-day divisions of power 
between an executive and other government actors.  Executives can use their 
authority to present claims in court in the name of the government to try to 
maximize their power or advance their policy agenda.  They can downplay certain 
arguments or decline to defend certain acts at the expense of other branches’ 
interests. 
The system of supranational human rights adjudication in Latin America 
offers an opportunity to study the political tensions that emerge among branches 
when the authority to present arguments in court is in the hands of the executive 
power.  For a few years now, the IACtHR has been acting as a supranational 
constitutional court that seeks to impose an ius constitutionale commune on the 
region.8  Part of this expansion includes an assertion of judicial supremacy that has 
transformed it into a politically consequential court for the exercise of governmental 
power at the domestic level.  The IACtHR gives direct orders to domestic courts, 
and leaves the acts of other government actors without legal effects.9  In other 
words, it is assuming similar functions to the ones performed by supreme or 
constitutional courts.10  The court has used the American Convention of Human 
Rights as an exemplar to which constitutional rights and doctrines in the region 
                                                            
7  ALTER, supra note 6, at 112; Daniel C. Esty, Good Governance at the Supranational 
Scale: Globalizing Administrative Law, 115 YALE L. J. 1490, 1501–02 (2006); Stephan 
Schill, International Investment Law and Comparative Public Law: An Introduction, 22 EUR. 
J. INT'L L. 909, 919–20 (2010). See generally Gus Van Harten & Martin Loughlin, Investment 
Treaty Arbitration as a Species of Global Administrative Law, 17 EUR. J. INT'L L. 121 (2006); 
GUS VAN HARTEN, INVESTMENT TREATY ARBITRATION AND PUBLIC LAW 147–48 (1st ed. 
2007); Kingsbury et al., supra note 6. The United States has also faced international cases 
dealing with acts of different government authorities. See e.g.,Ted Cruz, Defending US 
Sovereignty, Separation of Powers, and Federalism in Medellin v. Texas, 33 HARV. J. L. PUB. 
POL'Y 25 (2010). 
8  Ariel E. Dulitzky, An Inter-American Constitutional Court-The Invention of the 
Conventionality Control by the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, 50 TEX. INT'L L.J. 
45, 68 (2015); Armin von Bogdandy, Ius Constitutionale Commune en América Latina: Una 
Mirada a un Constitucionalismo Transformador, 34 Rev. Derecho del Estado 3, 30 (2015); 
EDUARDO F. MAC-GREGOR & ALFONSO H. GARCIA, DIÁLOGO JURISPRUDENCIAL EN 
DERECHOS HUMANOS ENTRE TRIBUNALES CONSTITUCIONALES Y CORTES INTERNACIONALES 
350–51(Tirant lo Blanch 2013). 
9  Thomas M. Antkowiak, Remedial Approaches to Human Rights Violations: The 
Inter-American Court of Human Rights and Beyond, 46 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 351, 355–
87(2008); Gerald L. Neuman, Bi-Level Remedies for Human Rights Violations, 55 HARV. 
INT'L L. J. 323, 325 (2014). 
10  Dulitzky, supra note 8, at 46. 
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should be compared.  In this process of expansion, the most affected branch has 
been the local judiciary.  
To address the political impact of judicial proceedings, this paper builds 
on US literature about socio-legal traditions and comparative constitutional 
politics.11  It analyzes the adjudicatory systems from the perspective of the politics 
behind the legal process, of the parties involved in it, and how this shapes the way 
the system operates.12  The literature in US constitutional law on the different 
political variables that surround the Department of Justice’s (DOJ) defense of the 
legal actions and interpretations of the executive branch before the Supreme Court 
offers analytical tools that can be deployed to help understand similar phenomena 
in international proceedings.13  At the heart of this US constitutional debate lies the 
question of whether the President can be said to represent the interests of the entire 
government, or even the entire executive branch. The officers at the DOJ may be 
some of the most qualified legal experts, but “knowledge of the law does not equate 
to knowledge of the interests of the United States.”14  In both the domestic US 
proceedings and the international proceedings we can focus on the way that 
executives present legal arguments in court and review which branches benefit.15  
                                                            
11  See e.g., Marc Galanter, Why the "Haves" Come out Ahead: Speculations on the 
Limits of Legal Change, 9 L. SOC. REV. 95 (1974); KEITH E. WHITTINGTON, POLITICAL 
FOUNDATIONS OF JUDICIAL SUPREMACY: THE PRESIDENCY, THE SUPREME COURT, AND 
CONSTITUTIONAL LEADERSHIP IN U.S. HISTORY 1–28 (2007); CONSEQUENTIAL COURTS: 
JUDICIAL ROLES IN GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE (Diana Kapiszewski et al. eds., 2013) [hereinafter 
CONSEQUENTIAL COURTS]. 
12  Galanter, supra note 11; WHITTINGTON, supra note 11; CONSEQUENTIAL COURTS, 
supra note 11. 
13  Seth P. Waxman, Defending Congress, 79 N.C. L. REV. 1073, 1073, 1076 (2001); 
Griswold, supra note 3, at 531; Griffin B. Bell, The Attorney General: The Federal 
Government’s Chief Lawyer and Chief Litigator, or One among Many? 46 FORDHAM L. REV. 
1049, 1066 (1978); Todd Lochner, The Relationship between the Office of Solicitor General 
and the Independent Agencies: A Reevaluation, 49 VA. L. REV. 549 (1993); Neal Devins & 
Saikrishna B. Prakash, The Indefensible Duty to Defend, 112 COLUM. L. REV. 507 (2012); 
Neal Devins, Political Will and the Unitary Executive: What Makes an Independent Agency 
Independent?, 15 CARDOZO L. REV. 273, 275–78 (1993) [hereinafter Devins, Political Will 
and the Unitary Executive]; Neal Devins, Unitariness and Independence: Solicitor General 
Control over Independent Agency Litigation, 82 CAL. L. REV. 255 (1994) [hereinafter 
Devins, Unitariness and Independence]; Neal Devins & Michael Herz, The Uneasy Case for 
Department of Justice Control of Federal Litigation, 5 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 558 (2002) 
[hereinafter Devins & Herz, The Uneasy Case for Department of Justice Control of Federal 
Litigation]; Neal Devins & Michael Herz, The Battle That Never Was: Congress, the White 
House, and Agency Litigation Authority, 61 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 205, 208–15 (1998) 
[hereinafter Devins & Herz, The Battle That Never Was]; Amanda Frost, Congress in Court, 
59 UCLA L. REV. 914 (2012); Tara Leigh Grove & Neal Devins, Congress’s (Limited) Power 
to Represent Itself in Court, 99 CORNELL L. REV. 571 (2014).  
14  Lochner, supra note 13, at 572. 
15  By having a monopoly over the defense, executive powers can play for long-term 
results—for decisions that have an impact on the internal distribution of power—rather than 
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A comparative analysis of the Inter-American system and US 
constitutional proceedings offers new answers to academic debates on the 
separation of powers, the expansion of judicial supremacy, and the relations 
between supranational and domestic courts.  For comparative constitutional law 
scholars who focus on the development of judicial supremacy, the findings 
presented in this paper confirm research showing that political actors promote the 
expansion of judicial supremacy as a way to advance their own agenda.16  Courts 
become politically consequential institutions because other government branches 
benefit from having a judicial body translate constitutional provisions into 
guidelines for public life. 17   This paper adds to this literature by finding that 
domestic political actors can also use the expansion of supranational adjudication 
to limit the work of domestic judges. 18   This finding controverts the seminal 
literature on judicial dialogues.19  Most studies on this subject suggest that the 
existence of supranational judicial bodies helps domestic judiciaries become more 
independent and enhance their role in governance at the domestic level. 20  
                                                            
for outcomes in favor of the state/federal government in each particular case.  Bell, supra 
note 13, at 1056; Waxman, supra note 13, at 1074–76.  
16  RAN HIRSCHL, TOWARDS JURISTOCRACY: THE ORIGINS AND CONSEQUENCES OF THE 
NEW CONSTITUTIONALISM 35 (2007) [hereinafter HIRSCHL, TOWARDS JURISTOCRACY]; Ran 
Hirschl, From Comparative Constitutional Law to Comparative Constitutional Studies, 11 
INT'L J. CONST. L. 1, 5–7 (2013) [hereinafter Hirschl, From Comparative Constitutional Law 
to Comparative Constitutional Studies]; Ran Hirschl, The New Constitutionalism and the 
Judicialization of Pure Politics Worldwide, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 721, 721–23 (2006); 
WHITTINGTON, supra note 11, at 230–84; MARTIN M. SHAPIRO, COURTS: A COMPARATIVE 
AND POLITICAL ANALYSIS (1981) [hereinafter SHAPIRO, COURTS]; Martin Shapiro, Judicial 
Review in Developed Democracies, 10 DEMOCRATIZATION 7 (2003) [hereinafter Shapiro, 
Democracies].  
17  HIRSCHL, TOWARDS JURISTOCRACY, supra note 16, at 100–48; Hirschl, From 
Comparative Constitutional Law to Comparative Constitutional Studies, supra note 16, at 1; 
CONSEQUENTIAL COURTS, supra note 11, at 67–92. 
18  CONSEQUENTIAL COURTS, supra note 11, at 289–93: J.H.H. Weiler, The 
Transformation of Europe, 100 YALE L. J. 2403 (1991). 
19  The first articles on judicial dialogues were written by Anne-Marie Slaughter, A 
Global Community of Courts, 44.1 HARV. INT'L L. J. 191 (2003); Laurence R. Helfer & Anne-
Marie Slaughter, Toward a Theory of Effective Supranational Adjudication, 107 YALE L. J. 
273 (1997); Karen J. Alter, Explaining National Court Acceptance of European Court 
Jurisprudence: A Critical Evaluation of Theories of Legal Integration, THE EUROPEAN 
COURTS AND NATIONAL COURTS 228 (1998). For the contemporary views that build on the 
literature see ALTER, supra note 6, at 112; see generally Paul B. Stephan, Courts on Courts: 
Contracting for Engagement and Indifference in International Judicial Encounters, 100 Va. 
L. Rev. 17, 110 (2014); Vicki C. Jackson, CONSTITUTIONAL ENGAGEMENT IN A 
TRANSNATIONAL ERA (Oxford Univ. Press 2010). 
20  CONSEQUENTIAL COURTS, supra note 11, at 24; J.H.H. Weiler, A Quiet Revolution: 
The European Court of Justice and Its Interlocutors, 26 COMP. POL. STUD. 510, 523 (1994); 
Helfer & Slaughter, supra note 19, at 282–84; Walter Mattli & Anne-Marie Slaughter, Law 
and Politics in the European Union: A Reply to Garrett, 49 INT'L ORG. 183 (1995); Anne-
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According to this literature, supranational courts such as the European Court of 
Justice or the European Court of Human Rights have made it difficult for domestic 
political actors to “retaliate” against domestic judges for expanding their powers.21  
The findings of this paper also show that the way the system operates today 
upends the original impetus for the Inter-American system of human rights. In the 
1980s, Latin America was slowly abandoning authoritarian regimes in which 
executives and military governments had abused their powers.22  The designers of 
the new constitutions—NGOs, academics, and officials—were highly influenced 
by the European experience and by US legal liberal academics of the 1970s.23  
Following the same logic of the European-centered literature, they believed that the 
constitutionalization of international human rights treaties and the creation of the 
IACtHR would help domestic judges become more independent, and prevent 
executive power from expanding again. The experience of the IACtHR presented 
here reveals a different story—one in which the interests of the international court, 
under certain circumstances, align with those of domestic executive actors to 
control the domestic judiciary.  The judicial proceeding before the IACtHR and the 
centralization of the defense of the state are tools that allow these actors to restrain 
local judges.  
The organizational plan of the paper is as follows.  Section I details the 
theories of US constitutional adjudication that discuss the advantages and 
disadvantages of centralizing the defense of the government into a single voice.24  
Section II analyzes the consequences for inter-branch politics of this centralization. 
The parallel of this story in the international context is the subject of the next two 
sections.  Section III begins with an assessment of the contours of the Inter-
American System of Human Rights and shows how its Court is assuming some of 
the functions the US Supreme Court performs. The focus narrows in Section IV to 
the cases in which the executives have decided not to defend acts of other 
                                                            
Marie Burley & Walter Mattli, Europe Before the Court; A Political Theory of Legal 
Integration, 47 (Winter) INT'L ORG. 41, 42 (1993). 
21  CONSEQUENTIAL COURTS, supra note 11, at 24. 
22  Diana Kapiszewski & Matthew M. Taylor, Doing Courts Justice? Studying 
Judicial Politics in Latin America, 6 PERSP. POL. 741, 741 (2008); ROBERTO GARGARELLA, 
LATIN AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONALISM, 1810-2010: THE ENGINE ROOM OF THE CONSTITUTION 
148–49 (2013); Javier Couso, The Transformation of Constitutional Discourse and the 
Judicialization of Politics in Latin America, CULTURES OF LEGALITY: JUDICIALIZATION AND 
POLITICAL ACTIVISM IN LATIN AMERICA 141 (2010). 
23  Jorge L. Esquirol, The Fictions of Latin American Law (Part I), 1997 UTAH L. REV. 
425, 464 (1997) [hereinafter Esquirol, The Fictions of Latin American Law (Part I)]; Jorge 
L. Esquirol, Continuing Fictions of Latin American Law, 55 FLA. L. REV. 41, 51 (2003) 
[hereinafter Esquirol, Continuing Fictions of Latin American Law]; Diego Eduardo & López 
Medina, Teoría Impura del Derecho : la Transformación de la Cultura Jurídica 
Latinoamericana, 4 CRITERIO JURIDICO 273 (2004); David M. Trubek, The “Rule of Law” in 
Development Assistance: Past, Present and Future, THE NEW LAW AND ECONOMIC 
DEVELOPMENT: A CRITICAL APPRAISAL (2006); Couso, supra note 22, at 156. 
24  This paper does not focus on the constitutional grounds of the centralization for the 
legal defense government programs and actions.  
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government branches or to downplay their defenses.  This Section gives three 
concrete cases of study that exemplify this phenomenon: the Caracazo case in 
which the incoming President, Hugo Chavez Frias, recognized in the proceeding 
the full responsibility of the state and used the decision of the IACtHR to begin a 
series of domestic prosecutions against the previous political regime;25 the Last 
Temptation of Christ case in which the executive of Chile declined to defend the 
content of the constitution and the doctrines of the domestic supreme court, and as 
a consequence invited the IACtHR to order the state to modify domestic 
constitutional order;26 and the Artavia v. Costa Rica case in which the IACtHR, as 
a way to force compliance with its remedies, ordered reinstatement of an executive 
decree that had previously been declared as unconstitutional by the supreme court 
of Costa Rica.27  The concluding Section assesses the contribution of doing a 
comparative analysis between the US constitutional system of adjudication and the 
IACtHR’s proceedings.  
 
 
II. SPEAKING WITH ONE VOICE BEFORE THE US SUPREME COURT 
 
The view that the executive branch is the most adequate branch to speak 
on behalf of the government is often linked to the separations of powers doctrine. 
According to historical accounts, the US founding fathers’ intention was to place a 
single president at the head of the executive branch in order to ensure both its vigor 
and political accountability.28  There are many ways in which the unitariness of the 
executive is reflected in the powers of the president, but one is of stark importance 
for our analysis. As part of the White House’s duty to execute the law, the defense 
of the federal government before the Supreme Court is done by an officer in the 
executive branch, the Solicitor General of the United States.29  When the DOJ was 
created in 1870, there was a clear intention to centralize the legal activity of the 
federal government into one office.30  The debates in Congress at that time show 
                                                            
25  Caracazo v. Venezuela, Merits, Reparations, and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. 
H.R. (ser. C) No. 58, ¶ 2 (Nov. 11, 1999) [hereinafter Caracazo Merits]. 
26  “The Last Temptation of Christ” (Olmedo-Bustos et al.) v. Chile, Merits, 
Reparations, and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 73, 18 (Feb. 5, 2001) 
[hereinafter The Last Temptation of Christ Merits]. 
27  Artavia Murillo y Otros ("In vitro fertilization") v. Costa Rica, Monitoring 
Compliance with Judgment, Order of the Court, “Desarrollo del Caso,” ¶ 13 (Inter-Am. Ct. 
H.R.  Feb. 26, 2016), http://www.corteidh.or.cr/tablas/fichas/artaviamurillo.pdf [hereinafter 
Artavia Monitoring Compliance] (available only in Spanish). 
28  MARK V. TUSHNET, THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A 
CONTEXTUAL ANALYSIS 94 (2015). This at least was Alexander Hamilton’s position in 
Federalist No. 70, where he defends the unitariness needed in the executive power in order 
to ensure energy, efficiency, and accountability in the federal government. THE FEDERALIST 
NO. 70, 423–24 (Alexander Hamilton).  
29  Bell, supra note 13, at 1050–60; Officer of the Solicitor General: General 
Functions, 28 C.F.R. §§ 20–21 (2000). 
30   Bell, supra note 13, at 1053.  
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that centralization was perceived as a way to make the government’s legal affairs 
more efficient, reduce expenses, and especially to “insure that the federal 
government spoke with one voice in its view of and adherence to the law.”31  
Four common contemporary arguments are made in literature in favor of 
centralizing the defense of the government in one department.32  First, it is argued 
that centralization helps avoid conflicting arguments from all the government actors 
involved.33  Second, the executive is in the best position to determine the “long-
range interest of the United States.”34  This point assumes that the interests of the 
other agencies or powers are more parochial and individual.35  Third, the DOJ can 
serve both as a mediator of interagency disputes and as a gatekeeper of cases for the 
Supreme Court.36  In sum, the Attorney General can help to filter disputes and 
thereby aid the highest court. 37   Lastly, centralization in the executive power 
benefits the entire federal government and its branches because the DOJ can build 
a reputation and litigation expertise that will result in more beneficial decisions.38  
In this view, the Solicitor General is not only an individual lawyer representing a 
client, but also a repeat player who has an “institutional relationship of a continuing 
nature” with the Court.39  This is positive in the long-term, even if the Solicitor 
General must at times decide not to defend the interest of some governmental actors 
in order to preserve it.40   
Contemporary arguments against centralization are given by federal 
agencies and Congress, which feel that at times their interests are not being 
represented well or even taken into consideration.  Congress has written letters to 
                                                            
31   Bell, supra note 13, at 1053; Griswold, supra note 3, at 529–30.  
32  George F. Fraley III, Note, Is the Fox Watching the Henhouse: The 
Administration’s Control of FEC Litigation Through the Solicitor General, 9 ADMIN. L. J. 
AM. U. 1215, 1255–56 (1995) (Fraley in addition to the four advantages also argues that the 
"expertise of the Solicitor general in Supreme Court litigation benefits the agency it 
represents." In this point, as it will be discussed in the article, international litigation departs, 
since at the international level the conflicts that arise are between branches of government 
and not between agencies of the same branch."); Lochner, supra note 13, at 572.  
33  Lochner, supra note 13, at 571; Bell, supra note 13, at 1058, 1060.  
34  Bell, supra note 13, at 1059–60; Lochner, supra note 13, at 571; Griswold, supra 
note 3, at 528, 535.  
35  Lochner, supra note 13, at 572; Bell, supra note 13, at 1058–59.  
36  Bell, supra note 13, at 1058; Waxman, supra note 13, at 1076–77.  
37 Bell, supra note 13, at 1060–61; Griswold, supra note 3, at 535.  
38  Bell, supra note 13, at 1061–62.  
39  Griswold, supra note 3, at 534.  
40  Id. (according to Griffin Griswold, the Solicitor General “must make a rather 
difficult judgment: What should he ask the Court to decide; how much ought he to prevail 
upon; what will be the effect of a particular position or decision in the case, not only upon 
the government’s interest, narrowly considered, but upon the values and principles that 
underlie and animate our system and upon the development of the law in general. These are 
considerations which rarely enter into the professional processes of private litigation, but 
they are factors which must always be carefully considered by the Office of the Solicitor 
General.”) 
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the DOJ complaining about the “lackluster and unenthusiastic”41 defense of federal 
legislation and deploring the practice of defending the interest of the executive over 
those of the other branches of government.42  As Griffin Bell, a former Attorney 
General, explained, “the DOJ’s efforts to ensure uniformity in government litigating 
postures can constitute a real threat to them.”43 
The following subsections make the case that the DOJ has developed 
certain practices to try to mediate the conflicting interests of the federal branches, 
but that the President always retains the upper hand in defining the litigation 
strategies in those cases in which he has a special interest. Yet, this has not 
prevented the Supreme Court from hearing arguments in favor of other branches of 
government. In many cases members of Congress have presented amicus briefs 
expressing opposing views to the ones presented by the DOJ. Moreover, private 
litigants, when arguing against actions taken by the President, have based part of 
their claims on the fact that the actions needed congressional approval or that the 
powers belonged to Congress.  
  
 
A. Litigation Strategies to Represent Inter-Branch Interests 
 
There are different ways in which conflicting views among the 
Administration, Congress, and the federal agencies can be manifested in the DOJ’s 
litigation strategies.  For example, the Solicitor General might present a brief on 
behalf of the United States, but the DOJ might also submit an amicus brief with a 
different position more aligned with the executive’s interest.  The Solicitor General 
might decide not to appeal a case where an agency is involved or even petition for 
a writ of certiorari to the Supreme Court, leaving the agency’s interests without an 
opportunity to be considered by the highest court.44  The Solicitor General might 
                                                            
41  Waxman, supra note 13, at 1082 n. 35 (citing the remarks of Sen. James Abourezk 
regarding the Solicitor General’s defense of the Voting Rights Act). 
42  Id. at 1082 (documenting the statements against Solicitor General Bork and his 
defense in Buckley v. Valeo).  
43  Bell, supra note 13, at 1058. See also CORNELL W. CLAYTON, THE POLITICS OF 
JUSTICE: THE ATTORNEY GENERAL AND THE MAKING OF LEGAL POLICY 55–56 (1992) (“The 
majority of recent Solicitors General would agree that the office owes allegiance to the 
Supreme Court as well as to the executive . . . . The court reciprocates this relationship. The 
Solicitor General provides accurate and complete representations and assistance in selecting 
meritorious cases; the Supreme Court extends to the Solicitor General special privileges and 
confidence that no other litigant enjoys. This commonality of interest between the Solicitor 
General and Supreme Court led Professor Katheryn Werdagar to describe the Solicitor 
General as the Court’s ‘ninth and a half Justice.’”) 
44  Bell, supra note 13, at 1066 (“He is also responsible for deciding whether lower 
court decisions adverse to the Government should be appealed, and whether the Government 
should file amicus curiae briefs in cases to which it is not a party.”); Griswold, supra note 3, 
at 531; Adam D. Chandler, The Solicitor General of the United States: Tenth Justice or 
Zealous Advocate?, 121 YALE L. J. 725, 725 (2011) (“Acting as the final ‘decider’ on the 
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present a brief with certain arguments on behalf of the United States, but also 
express his concerns with them in sections of the brief, such as footnotes,45 or in 
oral argument.46  
In the most extreme cases, the executive branch can decline to defend, or 
downplay certain defenses, if an act of Congress or an agency is constitutionally 
challenged. 47   For example, the Solicitor General can present the two views, 
Congress’ or the agency’s, and the President’s, signaling the Court that there is 
disagreement among branches; or, the Solicitor General actively and exclusively 
argues against the constitutionality of the congressional act. 48  Regarding the first 
                                                            
overwhelming majority of federal appeals, the Solicitor General has a vast and 
underscrutinized amount of discretion over the federal government’s legal agenda.”). 
45  Eric Schnapper, Becket at the Bar–The Conflicting Obligations of the Solicitor 
General, 21 LOY. L. REV. 1187, 1187 (arguing that in the 1983 case of Bon Jones University 
v. United States the Solicitor General’s contradictory roles were reflected when he stated, in 
a footnote to the government’s brief, his disagreement with the administration’s position). 
See also Brief for the United States at 1, Goldboto Christian Schools, Inc. v. United States, 
454 U.S. 892 (1981) (No. 81-1); Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574 (1983) (No. 
81-3); CLAYTON, supra note 43, at 54–55 (arguing that this practice started with Solicitor 
General Thomas Thatcher who would insert footnotes in the briefs to disassociate himself 
from the arguments presented by the agencies or the Justice Department as a way to “clue in 
the justices;” also an excellent example for him was the Bob Jones University where Solicitor 
General Wallace’s note was caught by the Justices as a “red light and, by an eight-to-one 
margin, rejected the administration’s argument and upheld the IRS’s position.”). 
46  Waxman, supra note 13, at 1082 n.35 (citing Solicitor General James M. Baker’s 
brief in Miles v. Graham: “The Solicitor General takes no satisfaction in presenting this 
argument for the consideration of the court . . . . Congress, however, has shown its 
unmistakable intention to subject these inadequate salaries to a tax.  As able counsel have 
and will argue the invalidity of the tax, it is fair to Congress—and, indeed, it is fair to this 
court—that the other view of constitutional power should be fully and fairly presented, and 
this I have endeavored to do.”). 
47  WHITTINGTON, supra note 11, at 207–10 (discussing the example of the 
Telecommunications Act of 1996 where President Clinton decided not to veto the last minute 
amendment (Communications Decency Act), and waited for the case to reach the Supreme 
Court to instruct the Department of Justice to defend the case only as long as it was 
“consistent with Supreme Court rulings in this area,” in other words it downplayed the 
defenses of the Act–Reno American Civil Liberties Union, 521 U.S. 844 (1997)); Dawn E. 
Johnsen, Presidential Non-Enforcement of Constitutionally Objectionable Statutes, 63 L. & 
CONTEMP. PROBS. 7, 13 (2000) (another example is given by Johnsen when President Clinton 
decided not to veto the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1996 that 
included a provision requiring the armed forces to discharge individuals infected with HIV, 
and instead announced that it would not defend the bill before the Supreme Court); Griswold, 
supra note 3, at 535 (“In providing for the Solicitor General, subject to the discretion of the 
Attorney General, to attend to the ‘interest of the United States’ in litigation, the statutes have 
always been understood to mean the long-range interest of the United States . . . . 
Occasionally, the Solicitor General finds it necessary to ‘confess error,’ when he concludes 
that he cannot defend a judgment in favor of the government.”).   
48  Waxman, supra note 13, at 1080–81 (giving an example of a case against 
provisions of the Medicare and Medicaid Acts that gave a special treatment to Christian 
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category of cases, presenting both positions, the White House might have been in 
disagreement with the content of the law when it was being negotiated but did not 
have the political capital to exercise his veto power. 49   In these cases, the 
Administration might have even signed and executed a law that he considered to be 
unconstitutional.50  When the case reaches the Supreme Court, the Solicitor General 
not only gives arguments defending the constitutionality of the law, but also informs 
the Court of the White House’s views questioning the statute’s constitutionality.51  
The Solicitor General can do so either in oral arguments (i.e. Oregon v. Mitchell),52 
or in two separate briefs (i.e. Buckley v. Valeo).53  
                                                            
Science nursing services in which the district court found the provisions unconstitutional, 
even though the DOJ Civil Division had defended their constitutionality, and when the 
Solicitor General had to decide on whether or not to appeal, “he considered it a bridge just 
too far to cross.”). 
49   Waxman, supra note 13, at 1079 n.14 (“Unlike a decision not to enforce a statute 
at all, the practice of ‘enforce but decline to defend’ permits the will of Congress to be 
honored in the first instance, allows the Executive Branch to make its views known to the 
Court, and ordinarily places before the court the opportunity to resolve the constitutional 
dispute between the other two branches. Some commentators, argue that the enforce-but-
decline-to-defend equilibrium represents in many cases constitutionalism at its best, because 
it forces the Executive Branch to put its money where its (constitutional) mouth is and test 
those views in the crucible of Supreme Court litigation.”).  
50  Devins & Prakash, supra note 13, at 514–15. 
51  Waxman, supra note 13, at 1081–82 (“On a rare occasion the President may sign, 
and even execute, a law he considered to be unconstitutional. When that happens, the 
Solicitor General is in an odd position.”). 
52  Id. (“In Oregon v. Mitchell, for example, Solicitor General Erwin Griswold has to 
determine whether to defend a provision of the Voting Rights Act that lowered the voting 
age to eighteen in state and local elections.  President Nixon strongly favored lowering the 
voting age, but as his signing statement reflected, he ‘believe[d] – along with most of the 
National’s leading constitutional scholars – that Congress has no power to enact [the 
eighteen-year old voting age] by simple statute.’  Griswold concluded that reasonable 
arguments could be made for the statute’s constitutionality, and he defended the voting age 
provision in the Supreme Court accordingly. He began his oral argument, however, by 
informing the Court of the views of the President and of the Department of Justice 
questioning the statute’s constitutionality and urged the Court to ‘give consideration to these 
views.’  In a close vote, the Court struck down the law. Griswold’s approach was lauded by 
some as admirable candor; it was attacked by others as half-hearted advocacy.”); 400 U.S. 
112 (1970). 
53  Waxman, supra note 13, at 1082 (“Buckley v. Valeo—the Court’s landmark 
decision on campaign finance regulation—cast Solicitor General Griswold’s successor in an 
even more unusual posture. In that case, Solicitor General Robert Bork and Attorney General 
Edward Levi filed an eighty-five page brief in the Supreme Court on behalf of the Attorney 
General and the Federal Election Commission as parties. The brief elegantly put forward the 
best First Amendment defense of the contribution and expenditure limitations of the Federal 
Election Campaign Act. Simultaneously, however, the Attorney General and Solicitor 
General filed a separate brief, also persuasive, on behalf of the Attorney General as appellee 
and the United States as amicus curiae, presenting a different, ninety-five page discussion of 
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Regarding the second type of cases, the Solicitor General declines to make 
respectable arguments defending the constitutionality of the law even when these 
are available.54  According to former Solicitor General, Seth Waxman, this typically 
occurs “in cases in which it is manifest that the President has concluded that the 
statute is unconstitutional.”55  Some of the cases that fall under this category are 
those where the president’s veto was exercised but Congress was able to override.56  
Litigation before the Supreme Court becomes a second chance for the White House 
to confront its policy views with the ones taken by the majority in Congress.57  It is 
common to find in these type of situations that the underlying conflict is not only 
policy related, but also involves the interpretation of each branches’ powers. 58  
These cases tend to leave the road open for the Supreme Court to expand its views 
because it knows that at least one other branch will agree with its interpretation.59  
Finally, another extreme position can be found in cases in which the Solicitor 
General openly “confessing error” in a case previously won by the government and 
requests the Supreme Court to overturn the lower court or its own decision.60  This 
                                                            
the First Amendment issues in a manner that ‘attempt[ed] to assist in analysis without 
pointing the way to particular conclusions’”); 424 U.S. 1 (1976). 
54  Waxman, supra note 13, at 1083  (giving first an example of a 1990 amicus brief 
filed by the United States in the Metro Broadcasting v. FCC case where instead of defending 
the constitutionality of statutory provisions regarding the regulatory preferences of the 
Federal Communications Commission; the second example he gives is brief filed by the DOJ 
in the Turner Broadcasting System, Inc. v. FCC regarding the constitutionality of the “must-
carry” provisions of the Cable Television Act of 1992). 
55  Id. (“[T]he Department of Justice has occasionally declined to make professionally 
respectable arguments, even when available, to defend a statute–typically, in cases in which 
it is manifest that the president has concluded that the statute is unconstitutional.”). 
56  Id. at 1084. 
57  Id. 
58  Id. (“[I]t is not surprising that the President and Congress occasionally find 
themselves at odds regarding the proper interpretation of their own, and each other’s, 
constitutional powers [and] [i]n that event, the Solicitor General ordinarily defends the 
President’s powers and prerogatives.”). 
59  Griswold, supra note 3, at 536. 
60  Neal Kumar Katyal, The Solicitor General and Confession of Error, 81 FORDHAM 
L. REV. 3027, 3030–31 (2012) (explaining how the confession of error is not a rare practice 
of the solicitor general: “[s]ince Taft, all Solicitors General—it doesn’t matter whether they 
are appointed by a Republican or a Democrat—have confessed error, roughly at the pace of 
two to three times per Supreme Court term.”); CLAYTON, supra note 43, at 56 (“Confession 
of error often places the Solicitor General in a delicate position. He must betray both the 
government lawyers who won the case in the lower courts and the judge whose decision the 
Solicitor General wants reversed. The practice, however, underscore the relationship between 
the Solicitor General and Court. Confessing error, Archival Cox said, ‘tests the strength of 
our belief that the office has peculiar responsibility to the Court.’ Cox took this responsibility 
so seriously that, in one antitrust suit, he amazed the Justices by arguing both sides of the 
case.”). 
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later case to some may be considered “the noblest function of the office,” but to 
others, especially judges, “is the lowest trick one lawyer can play on another.”61  
 
1. Defending Congress: Congressional Standing, Amicus Brief, and 
Private Parties 
 
As mentioned in the previous section, Congress has tried to exercise 
pressure on the DOJ to defend its interest, but the influence of the President is 
greater than the individual and divided voices of the members of Congress.  Perhaps 
the fact that Congress has been constantly divided between parties weakens its 
possibility of enhancing its voice.  It is hard to find examples in history when all 
members of the House of Representatives and the Senate have agreed on what needs 
to be defended in a particular case.  Most of the briefs presented on behalf of the 
legislative branch recognize that the positions are taken on a “majoritarian basis 
when consensus cannot be achieved.” 62  The fact remains that when the DOJ 
declines to defend an act from Congress, the only defense left available to the 
members of this body who disagree with the DOJ’s position is to file an amicus 
brief.63 
The first time Congress was forced to voice its interest in an amicus brief 
was in 1926 in Myres v. United States.64  This case involved a statute that limited 
the president’s power to remove officials in the federal government. When the 
Solicitor General declined to defend the statute, the Supreme Court appointed 
Senator George Wharton Pepper to present an amicus brief in favor of the legislative 
branch’s interest. But Chief Justice Taft concluded that the power to remove 
appointed officers is vested in the president alone. 65  According to Justice Taft, a 
contrary interpretation would not allow him to “discharge his own constitutional 
duty of seeing that the laws be faithfully executed.”66  
 Another widely cited example of a “decline to decide” situation that 
involved a separation of powers issue is INS v. Chadha.67  In this particular case, 
                                                            
61  Griswold, supra note 3, at 535–36 (“This authority is, of course, sparingly 
exercised. Confessing error is a little bit like taking medicine: its basic purpose and ultimate 
effect are highly salubrious, but it may have a bitter taste for a moment going down. Judge 
Simon Sobeloff, who is a former Solicitor General, and now a distinguished circuit judge, is 
quoted as saying: ‘when I was Solicitor General, I thought that confessing error was the 
noblest function of the office.  Now that I am a Circuit Judge, I know it is the lowest trick 
one lawyer can play on another.’ Other circuit judges who, at the urging of the government 
in their court, have delivered an opinion which the Solicitor General refused to defend, 
sometimes react somewhat more vigorously, I may add.”); Katyal, supra note 60, at 3030. 
62  Brief for the Bipartisan Legal Advisory Groups of the United States House of 
Representatives, at 3 n.*, Windsor v. United States, 833 F. Supp. 2d 394 (2012) (No. 12-
307).  
63  Waxman, supra note 13, at 1084. 
64  Id. at 1085. See also Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52 (1926). 
65  Myers, 272 U.S. at 119. 
66  Id. at 115. 
67  INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983); Waxman, supra note 13, at 1084. 
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the DOJ declined to defend the constitutionality of a provision that gave Congress 
a one-House veto over the Immigration and Naturalization Service’s decisions on 
deportable aliens.68  There, the Court sided with the executive, and held that the 
legislative act violated the standards set up by the Constitution regarding lawmaking 
and congressional authority.  In the end, the President and Attorney General 
retained their discretion to deport foreign nationals as part of its duty to execute the 
law.  
Most recently, the DOJ under the Obama administration filed a brief 
against the Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA) in United States v. Windsor, openly 
contradicting Congress’s position.69  Through the enactment of DOMA Congress 
decided to define “marriage” and “spouse” as excluding same-sex couples.70  In 
practice this act amended Chapter 1 of title 1 of the United States Code, which 
provides rules of construction for all federal legislation and regulation—including 
the tax code.71  The case arose when a widow of a same-sex couple tried to claim a 
federal estate tax exemption for surviving spouses and the Internal Revenue Service 
denied the refund based on DOMA. One of the key issues in this case discussed 
before the Supreme Court dealt precisely with the scope of Congressional standing 
when the executive decides not to defend an act of Congress.72  This was generated 
by the fact that while the case was pending in a District Court, the Attorney General 
notified the Speaker of the House of Representatives that the DOJ would no longer 
defend the constitutionality of the section of the bill that prevented same-sex 
spouses from claiming federal estate tax exemptions. 73   The Bipartisan Legal 
Advisory Group of the House of Representatives, that did not include the support 
of the Democratic Party leadership, decided then to present a brief defending 
Congress’s act.74  The lower courts permitted the congressional intervention, but 
ruled in favor of the claimant and ordered the Treasury to refund Ms. Windsor.  In 
this case, two of the questions that the Court had to decide was whether the 
                                                            
68  Waxman, supra note 13, at 1084 n.53. 
69  Laurence H. Tribe & Joshua Matz, The Constitutional Inevitability of Same-Sex 
Marriage, 71 MD. L.  REV. 471, 473 (2011). 
70  Richard Epstein, Dumb on DOMA, RICOCHET (Feb. 24, 2011), 
https://ricochet.com/archives/dumb-on-doma/; Michael Klarman, Commentary: The 
Supreme Court and marriage for same-sex couples - Part I, SCOTUSBLOG (Apr. 15, 2015), 
http://www.scotusblog.com/2015/04/commentary-the-supreme-court-and-marriage-for-
same-sex-couples-part-i/ (describing the history in the United States surrounding DOMA and 
same-sex marriage). 
71  DOMA § 2, 110 Stat. 2419 (28 U.S.C. 1738C) (“In determining the meaning of 
any Act of Congress, or of any ruling, regulation, or interpretation of the various 
administrative bureaus and agencies of the United States, the word “marriage” means only a 
legal union between one man and one woman as husband and wife, and the word “spouse” 
refers only to a person of the opposite sex who is a husband or a wife”). 
72  Devins & Prakash, supra note 13, at 508–10; Grove & Devins, supra note 13, at 
628. 
73  Devins & Prakash, supra note 13, at 508 & n.1. 
74  Brief for the Bipartisan Legal Advisory Groups of the United States house of 
Representatives, at 3 n*, Windsor v. United States, 833 F. Supp. 2d 394 (2012) (No 12-307). 
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bipartisan group had standing in the case and whether the executive branch’s 
agreement with the lower court’s decision regarding the unconstitutionality of 
DOMA deprived the Supreme Court of jurisdiction to decide the merits of the 
case. 75   In a divided opinion, the majority of the Court agreed that the US 
government retained a significant stake in the issue because it could suffer a real 
economic injury and therefore it supported its jurisdiction.  On the merits of the 
case, the Supreme Court ruled in favor of the claimant, and consequently agreed 
with the executive’s position regarding the unconstitutionality of DOMA.76  
Finally, private parties can also present arguments in favor of 
congressional power when challenging actions from the executive power.  One of 
the most famous cases where this issue was present is the 1952 case of Youngstown 
Co. v. Sawyer, also referred as the Steel Seizure Case.77  There, the Court had to 
decide whether the president’s war power as commander-in-chief of the armed 
forces included the possibility of seizing private property.78  In 1950, President 
Harry Truman sent troops to Korea without asking for a Congressional declaration 
of war. As part of the war effort, Truman created a Wage Stabilization Board to 
avoid inflation and labor disputes during the armed conflict.  The major steel 
producers disagreed with the board’s proposed wage and threated to strike.  The 
White House, through an executive order, decided to seize and operate the main 
production facilities in order to prevent dislocations in the fabrication of all 
weapons and war materials necessary for the troops in Korea.79  The owners of the 
steel mills brought a claim against the executive action and argued that the President 
lacked the power to seize their property absent a Congressional approval or an 
enumerated authority under Article II of the Constitution.80   Congress did not 
present an amicus brief in this case nor react after the President issued the executive 
order that seized the steel mills. Yet, the arguments in favor of Congress presented 
by the private litigators were an indirect defense of Congressional powers.81  The 
Court’s final decision sided with the claimants and argued that the President had 
not been authorized by the Constitution or by a Congressional act to take such 
actions.82  
Even though Congress’s power was defended in this case, it is also 
important to note that the potential for private litigants to become the defenders of 
                                                            
75  United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2684 (2013). 
76  Bethany R. Pickett, Will the Real Lawmakers Please Stand Up: Congressional 
Standing in Instances of Presidential Nonenforcement, 110 NW. U. L. REV. 439, 463 (2015); 
Frost, supra note 13, at 952; Nat Stern, The Indefinite Deflection of Congressional Standing, 
43 PEPP. L. REV. 1, 2 (2015); Daniel J. Meltzer, Executive Defense of Congressional Acts, 61 
DUKE L. J. 1183, 1195 (2011); Tara Leigh Grove, Standing Outside of Article III, 162 U. PA. 
L. REV. 1311, 1343 (2013); Grove & Devins, supra note 13, at 596; Abner S. Greene, 
Interpretive Schizophrenia: How Congressional Standing Can Solve the Enforce-but-Not-
Defend Problem, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 577, 577 (2012). 
77  Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 578, 582 (1952). 
78  Id. 
79  Id. at 583. 
80  Id. at 587–89. 
81  Id. at 588–89. 
82  Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 588–89. 
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Congress’s powers is contingent on the strategy that serves the private actors best 
interest.  The fact that at times private actors can use a separation of powers defense 
does not entail that Congress will always be defended or that its agenda will be 
reflected in the private actor’s defense.  The private litigators at the end do not have 
to consult Congress or prepare a joint defense with its member when drafting their 
arguments.  In these cases, the defense of Congress is a byproduct of the defense of 
private interest, not an end in and of itself.   
 
 
III. POLITICAL EFFECTS OF THE CENTRALIZATION OF THE 
LEGAL DEFENSE OF GOVERNMENT ACTS 
 
The previous section explained how the US system of constitutional 
adjudication centralizes the legal defense of the interest of the state in one branch 
of government, the tensions that emerge, and its manifestations in the litigation 
strategies of the DOJ.  Even though Congress or the agencies can participate in the 
adjudicatory process by voicing their concerns in amicus briefs, and even though 
private parties can also present arguments in their favor, the executive has ultimate 
control of the official position of the government. This branch can decide to decline 
to defend an act from another branch if it serves its interest.  The following section 
seeks to explain the political effects of this executive power.  It reviews the judicial 
proceeding from the eyes of the players and how they can shape the way 
constitutional adjudication develops.  
Regardless of whether a judicial body is international or national, its 
decisions are not only the result of the judge’s interpretation, but also reflections of 
the litigation process, the parties involved in it, and the political context in which 
they operate.  Judicial orders depend partly on the arguments brought by the parties 
and are somewhat controlled by them.  A bad defense or a mild argument in 
constitutional adjudication can be considered as invitations for judicial expansion. 
What is defended is in itself a strategic choice by the parties who tend to be repeat 
players;83 especially if we consider that the political actor that is affected by the 
decision is not the party defending the actions but rather another government 
branch.  As mentioned in the introduction, there is a troubling assumption in the 
constitutional and international adjudicatory system that it is always in the interest 
of the defending party to make the best arguments available.  Yet when it comes to 
defending governments in the contemporary constitutional and international 
regimes, many institutions are involved but not all of them participate in a given 
case. 
The idea that litigation strategies explain the decisions rendered by courts 
builds on American socio-legal traditions that view litigation as an opportunity for 
participants to gain advantages.84  Courts and rules are just one part of the story. 
What the parties win or lose, even by losing the case, is the other part of the power 
                                                            
83  Galanter, supra note 11, at 98. 
84  Id. at 99–100. 
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of litigation.85  It is an analytical switch from reviewing how the law is drafted and 
applied to how the characteristics of the parties affect how the legal system works.86  
Under this approach winning a case might not always be in the best interest for the 
litigating party.87   
 
 
A. Executives Using Judicial Supremacy to Expand their Powers. 
 
According to political scientist and judicial historian Professor Keith 
Whittington, what has made the US Supreme Court a politically consequential 
institution is its assertion of judicial supremacy.88  This is the power to be the 
ultimate actor to define “effective constitutional meaning such that other 
government officials are bound to adhere not only to the Court’s disposition of a 
specific case but also to the Court’s constitutional reasoning.”89  Judicial review is 
the power to refuse to give force to an act of other government actors in the context 
of a particular case.90  Judicial supremacy “requires deference by other government 
officials to the constitutional dictates of the Court, even when other government 
                                                            
85   Galanter, supra note 11, at 113–14. 
86  Alvaro Santos, Carving out Policy Autonomy for Developing Countries in the 
World Trade Organization: The Experience of Brazil and Mexico, 52 VA. J. INT'L L. 551, 572 
(2012). 
87  Id. at 571–77 (discussing the same approach with WTO cases where states seek to 
change the international rule that would reflect its interest, even if they lose the particular 
case).  
88  WHITTINGTON, supra note 11, at 6–7 (“The concept of judicial supremacy does not 
focus on the specific act of review itself. Judicial supremacy refers to the ‘obligation of 
coordinate officials not only to obey that [judicial] ruling but to follow its reasoning in future 
deliberations.’  A model of judicial supremacy posits that the Court does not merely resolve 
particular disputes involving the litigants directly before them or elsewhere in the judicial 
system. It also authoritatively interprets constitutional meaning.  For the judicial supremacist, 
the Court defines effective constitutional meaning such that other government officials are 
bound to adhere not only to the Court’s disposition of a specific case but also to the Court’s 
constitutional reasoning.  Judicial supremacy requires deference by other government 
officials to the constitutional dictates of the Court, even when other government officials 
think that the Court is substantively wrong about the meaning of the Constitution and in 
circumstances that are not subject to judicial review.  Judicial supremacy asserts that the 
Constitution is what the judges say it is, not because the Constitution has no objective 
meaning or that courts could not be wrong but because there is no alternative interpretive 
authority beyond the Court.  As Justice Robert Jackson once ironically noted to somewhat 
different effect, ‘We are not final because we are infallible, but we are infallible only because 
we are final.’”). 
89  Id.  
90  Id. at 6 (“The doctrine of judicial review refers to the authority of a court, in the 
context of deciding a particular case, to refuse to give force to an act of another governmental 
institution on the grounds that such an act is contrary to the requirements of the 
Constitution.”). 
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officials think that the Court is substantively wrong about the meaning of the 
Constitution and in circumstances that are not subject to judicial review.” 91   
Using historical examples, Whittington argues that the expansion of 
judicial supremacy was made possible by the acquiescence of other government 
officials who benefited from having the Supreme Court impose particular 
constitutional understandings on the legislative branch or state governments. 92  
According to his analysis, the Supreme Court’s assertion of judicial supremacy has 
helped the executive to maintain political coalitions and face complications for 
political action created in a system of fragmented power.93  This is clear in what 
Wittington classifies as “preemptive presidencies.” 94   These are oppositional 
presidents who face strong political obstacles and have a hard time asserting their 
authority to define the content of the Constitution in order to advance their policy 
objectives.95  Lacking the political capital to do so, they “borrow from the authority 
of the courts in order to hold off their political adversaries . . . . [R]ather than 
challenge judicial authority, these presidents have often bolstered judicial authority 
and then sought to align themselves with the courts against Congress.”96  
This is where the monopoly over the defense of the state as described in 
the previous section is key.  As mentioned above, one political tool available to the 
Administration is its control of the official position of the federal government on 
the issues being discussed in the federal courts.97  The President might reach a 
compromise with Congress on certain policy issues, but then downplay certain 
defenses and hope that the Supreme Court might be more sympathetic with his 
position and strike down the sections that he had to approve in the compromise but 
was never really committed to.98  Moreover, the White House can instruct the DOJ 
to decline to defend the act of Congress or the agency arguing that it considers the 
defense as constitutionally questionable, sending a clear signal to the Court that it 
can expand its judicial supremacy powers.99  For the reasons expressed in the 
                                                            
91   WHITTINGTON, supra note 11, at 7. 
92  Id. 
93   Id. at 27. 
94  Id. at 195. 
95  Id.  
96  WHITTINGTON, supra note 11, at 195. 
97  Id. at 196. 
98  Id. at 206–09 (using the example of Clinton’s position to the CDA in the 
telecommunications reform). The CDA was a section of the Bill that Clinton disapproved of 
but had to agree to in order to pass the rest of the legislation, and when it eventually reached 
court, the DOJ even considered not appealing the decision but downplayed the defenses.  Id. 
The case eventually was decided by the Supreme Court in Reno v. American Civil Liberties 
Union.  521 U.S. 844 (1997) (striking down the particular sections of the telecommunications 
act). 
99  Devins & Prakash, supra note 13, at 510. If the DOJ had the obligation to always 
make the best argument before the Supreme Court, regardless of the President’s opinion or 
whether the act originated in another branch, Congress and the DOJ bureaucracies would 
benefit. Id. The latter would expand its authority and independence from the White House, 
and the former would make sure that its interests are always being defended.  Id.  
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previous section, the possibility of voicing Congress’ concerns via an amicus brief 
does not have the same strength in the constitutional adjudicative process as using 
the institutional relationship and prestige built by the DOJ with the Court. Repeat 
players have advantages over the one-time shooter. 100   Under Whittington’s 
political reading of constitutional adjudication, one could argue that the authority 
of US judicial supremacy has not been exclusively a consequence of doctrinal 
formalistic interpretations; but it rather exists because other political actors have 
had reasons of their own to recognize it.101 
 
 
B. Adjudication as an Instrument of Political Coalitions 
 
The constitutional interplay between executive and judicial powers in the 
United States is not unique in the world.  According to comparative studies, the 
general trend in constitutional democracies is for the highest courts to become 
politically consequential institutions.102  Beyond resolving disputes or enforcing 
laws, they are playing an expanded role in governance.103  By judicial role I make 
reference here to the functions they play in politics, governance, and society.104  
Martin Shapiro, for example, identifies at least four sociopolitical roles that high 
courts play in governance: 105  (1) they resolve disputes, which translates into 
maintaining order; (2) they legitimize government law and policies, and control 
local authorities, police, and bureaucrats; (3) they can legitimize the existing 
systems of economic power by enforcing contractual rules, property rights, and in 
some cases protect monopolies (of state companies, unions, etc.); and (4) through 
interpretation they become lawmakers.106   
All of these sociopolitical roles share a common element: high courts can 
act as agents of dominant political coalitions. 107   By enacting legislation and 
amending constitutions, these coalitions create a set of constitutional 
understandings of how to distribute power among themselves. 108   Such 
constitutional understandings are not static.  The US examples described above and 
the studies by comparative constitutional law scholars show that judges can slightly 
modify the political leaders’ agenda through legal interpretation when pushed to do 
                                                            
100  Galanter, supra note 11. 
101  WHITTINGTON, supra note 11, at 26, 285. 
102  See generally CONSEQUENTIAL COURTS, supra note 11. 
103  Id. at 6. The term “role” used in this context is not intended to be a reference to 
judicial roles in connection to the way judges reason in particular cases. In jurisprudential 
terms judges can have a legalistic/formalistic role (adhere to the text and precedents); an 
activist role (prioritizing flexibility and substantive justice); or a deferential role (to the 
democratically elected powers or specialized agencies).  
104  Id. at 3. 
105  SHAPIRO, COURTS, supra note 16. 
106  CONSEQUENTIAL COURTS, supra note 11, at 3–4. 
107  Id. at 4; HIRSCHL, TOWARDS JURISTOCRACY, supra note 16. 
108  HIRSCHL, TOWARDS JURISTOCRACY, supra note 16, at 3. 
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so by new political coalitions or social pressures.109  Examples of the influence 
judges can have on political coalitions’ constitutional understandings are their 
faculty of defining the powers of each branch of government; breaking deadlocks, 
and forcing bureaucracies to comply with statutory or constitutional law.   
This does not mean that judges will always align with the reconstructive 
agenda proposed by an incoming coalition. In many cases, judges were nominated 
by the preexisting political regime.110  Moreover, judicial changes are limited by a 
set of characteristics of the legal process: (1) the legal culture of the state, the 
constitutional texts, and precedents control part of their reasoning, and departing 
from them is not an easy task;111 (2) judges also have a set of preconceptions guided 
by their own political, professional and philosophical commitments;112 and (3) 
assertive courts are conscious of the political and social backlash to their 
decisions.113  
Then why would the legal process be an adequate avenue to try to change 
a preexisting constitutional understanding?  Law, as opposed to politics, has certain 
characteristics that insulate the judiciary from fully defending the existing regime’s 
understandings. 114   For instance, judges have to work with statutory and 
precedential bases of discretion. They “cannot readily afford to ignore the long-term 
                                                            
109   HIRSCHL, TOWARDS JURISTOCRACY, supra note 16, at 3; TOM GINSBURG & TAMIR 
MOUSTAFA, RULE BY LAW: THE POLITICS OF COURTS IN AUTHORITARIAN REGIMES 207–34 
(2008); Tom Ginsburg et al., Judicial Review in New Democracies: Constitutional Courts in 
Asian Cases, 3 NAT'L TAIWAN U. L. REV. 143 (2008); CONSEQUENTIAL COURTS, supra note 
11, at 4 (“Traditionally, courts are expected to faithfully enforce the laws, not make or change 
them, for in principle law is to be made by political leaders, embodying those leader’s policy 
preferences.  However, as both established and newer democracies have empowered courts 
to declare laws and executive orders unconstitutional, there has been a marked increase in 
courts’ potential to assume new roles—to make new law and apply law in new ways.  When 
courts play these new roles in ways that depart from political leaders’ preferences, they can 
exert a significant, independent, and distinctively judicial influence on broad realms of public 
policy, redistributing political authority.”).  
110  CONSEQUENTIAL COURTS, supra note 11, at 5; WHITTINGTON, supra note 11. 
111  DUNCAN KENNEDY, A CRITIQUE OF ADJUDICATION (1997); Alexandra Huneeus et 
al., Cultures of Legality: Judicialization and Political Activism in Contemporary Latin 
America, CULTURES OF LEGALITY: JUDICIALIZATION AND POLITICAL ACTIVISM IN 
CONTEMPORARY LATIN AMERICA 3, 3–25 (2013) [hereinafter Huneeus, Cultures of Legality]; 
Alexandra Huneeus, Judging from a Guilty Conscience: The Chilean Judiciary’s Human 
Rights Turn, 35 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 99, 99 (2010) [hereinafter Huneeus, Judging from a 
Guilty Conscience]. 
112  Lisa Hilbink, The Origins of Positive Judicial Independence, 64 WORLD POL. 587, 
587 (2012); Duncan Kennedy, Towards an Historical Understanding of Legal 
Consciousness: The Case of Classical Legal Thought in America, 1850-1940, 3 RESEARCH 
L. & SOC. 3 (1980) [hereinafter Kennedy, Towards an Historical Understanding of Legal 
Consciousness]; Duncan Kennedy, Three Globalizations of Law and Legal Thought: 1850–
2000, THE NEW LAW AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 19 (2006). 
113  CONSEQUENTIAL COURTS, supra note 11, at 5; ALEC STONE SWEET, THE JUDICIAL 
CONSTRUCTION OF EUROPE (2004). 
114  WHITTINGTON, supra note 11, at 167.  
578 Arizona Journal of International & Comparative Law      Vol. 34, No. 3        2017 
 
and wide-ranging implications of its decisions affecting the current occupant of a 
government office.”115  Hence, even if they are part of the dominant constitutional 
understanding that the incoming President opposes, they know that setting 
precedent that widely restricts the exercise of power could eventually backfire once 
the dominant coalition regains the control of the administration.116  
 A number of commentators on judicial politics have identified that in new 
or restored democracies the “winds” that force courts to become politically 
consequential institutions are stronger than in well-settled democracies.117  Pressure 
is placed on the highest courts to define the abidingness to the laws and 
constitutional understandings of the replaced political regimes.  Moreover, the 
institutions and legislation that provide immunities to former members of the 
coalitions are questioned in court.  Accordingly, “judges face a choice between 
ruling for regime stalwarts or challengers, between strengthening or weakening 
aspirations for constitutional democracy, and between entrenching the interest and 
values for incumbent or of new majorities.”118  In the eyes of the incoming political 
coalitions, judges become bystanders too or perpetrators of the crimes committed 
by the previous regime.119  In the same vein, judges can be used to advance legal or 
policy incentives that the political coalitions find difficult to impose on their own 
either due to the preexisting constitutional constrains or to lack of political 
capital.120  Yet, the winds might not be enough to persuade the court to modify the 
preexisting constitutional understandings. 121   
According to Diana Kapiszewski, Gordon Silverstein, and Robert A. 
Kagan, the national institutional and political structures such as the constitutional 
design or the scope of judicial institutions have to be in place to allow the change.122  
Moreover, the self-perception or legal consciousness of the judiciary matters in 
terms of the incentives and individual motives to adopt a new constitutional 
                                                            
115  WHITTINGTON, supra note 11, at 169. 
116  Id. at 168. 
117  CONSEQUENTIAL COURTS, supra note 11, at 21 (“[A change in role] is determined 
by multiple and interacting opportunities and risks, generated by structural factors and short-
term political currents and winds, and ultimately on the skill and capacity of the judges who 
confront these challenges and embrace (or ignore) these opportunities.”). 
118  Id. at 8. 
119  Huneeus, Cultures of Legality, supra note 111, at 10. 
120  CONSEQUENTIAL COURTS, supra note 11, at 14 (“Political scientists often point out 
that constitutional decisions in which high courts ‘make policy’ are not necessarily or even 
usually countermajoritarian. Judges take legal or policy initiatives that political leaders 
support but find difficult to launch on their own owing to constitutional restrictions or 
political constraints”); Mark A. Graber, The Nonmajoritarian Difficulty: Legislative 
Deference to the Judiciary, 7 STUD. AM. POL. DEV. 35 (1993). See generally GORDON 
SILVERSTEIN, LAW’S ALLURE: HOW LAW SHAPES, CONSTRAINS, SAVES, AND KILLS POLITICS 
(2009).  
121  CONSEQUENTIAL COURTS, supra note 11, at 19–20. 
122  Id. 
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understanding. 123  In the same vein, the internal struggle among the members of the 
highest courts might impede the institution from adopting them.124  In states that 
adopt democracy for the first time or that restore democracy after an authoritarian 
regime, it is not enough that the political forces in the face of divided government 
invite the courts to restructure the constitutional understandings; all of the above 
mentioned factors can resist such an effort.  
In the case of Latin America, after the fall of the authoritarian regimes in 
the late 1980s and early 1990s, the region experienced several episodes where the 
incoming presidency faced opposition from the previous political coalition. Former 
coalitions might maintain control over the bureaucracies, the judiciaries, or 
congress.125  Transitions to democracy do not imply that the pre-existing regime 
disappears fully.  In many cases key government players were confirmed by the 
previous political coalitions.  In fact, in a region where most of the governments of 
the transitions reached power opposing the excesses of presidentialism and the 
control of the executive power of courts and congress, the traditional instruments to 
stir preexisting institutions are difficult to employ.126  For example, an incoming 
president who tries to force the highest court, through appointment procedures or 
through budget constraints, to adopt an expansion of presidential powers can be 
politically attacked for using the same instruments that the overthrown military 
junta or semi-dictator president used in the past. 
Note the paradox that Latin America represents for our comparative 
analysis. Both the US and the Latin American experience show scenarios of 
fragmented governments, with institutions that respect the preexisting 
constitutional understandings. However, in the United States, the president can 
borrow the powers of the Supreme Court in order to advance his agenda. This 
benefits the Supreme Court because it reaffirms its judicial supremacy, and benefits 
the executive because it gives the expansion of presidential powers a judicial 
legitimacy. As we will see in the next sections, in the case of Latin America, many 
of the highest courts have resisted the winds of change. Due to the historical and 
political context of the region, it has become difficult for the incoming president to 
convince the highest courts to modify the preexisting regime. Yet, in the case of 
Latin America there is still one open avenue that the president could take. The next 
sections will show how the proceedings before the IACtHR can become an 
instrument to achieve the same reconstructive goal without having to bear the 
political costs of being accused of expanding presidential powers.127  
 
                                                            
123   CONSEQUENTIAL COURTS, supra note 11, at 21; Kennedy, Towards an Historical 
Understanding of Legal Consciousness, supra note 112, at 10; Abram Chayes, The Role of 
the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1281 (1976); Abram Chayes, Public 
Law Litigation and the Burger Court, 96 HARV. L. REV. 4 (1982). 
124  CONSEQUENTIAL COURTS, supra note 11, at 21.  
125  Huneeus, Judging from a Guilty Conscience, supra note 111. 
126  GARGARELLA, supra note 22. 
127  Id. (explaining how even with the constitutional reforms that empowered the 
judiciary and that constitutionalized human rights treaties, hyper-presidentialism is still 
present in the region).  
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IV. THE INTER-AMERICAN SYSTEM 
 
This section examines how Latin America executive powers use the Inter-
American System of Human Rights’ litigation process to bypass local judiciaries 
and legislative bodies.  In a way, Latin American presidents confronting cases 
before the IACtHR regarding acts of previous governments or of other powers face 
choices similar to those faced by the US executive when determining the 
government’s position for the Supreme Court.  
I begin this section’s inquiry by highlighting that presidents in this region 
have a monopoly over the defense of their states before international tribunals.  
Most Latin American countries are presidential or semi-presidential systems of 
government that maintained the US constitutional formula of giving full control of 
foreign affairs to the executive branch.128  The common practice in litigation before 
the IACtHR is for the state to appoint the sitting ambassador in Costa Rica as the 
initial agent of the government.129  As the case progresses, states usually appoint an 
                                                            
128  GARGARELLA, supra note 22. 
129  Although the rules of procedure of the Court do not specify that the Agent of the 
State must be from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs or another executive branch official, the 
common practice has been to nominate as an Agent of State someone from the executive 
power or a special counsel designated by the Executive power. See e.g.,  The Last Temptation 
of Christ Merits, supra note 26, ¶ 23  (“On May 27, 1999, the State appointed Edmundo 
Vargas Carreño, Chilean Ambassador to Costa Rica, as its agent and indicated that it would 
receive notifications at the Chilean Embassy in Costa Rica”);  Radilla Pacheco v. Mexico, 
Merits, Reparations, and Costs, Judgement, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 209, ¶ 6 & n.5 
(Nov. 23, 2009) (“The following appeared at this hearing . . . . for the State: Fernando Gómez-
Mont, Secretary  of the Interior of Mexico; Daniel Francisco Cabeza de Vaca Hernández, 
Sub-secretary of Legal Issues and Human  Rights of the Secretariat of the Interior; Juan 
Manuel Gómez-Robledo Verduzco, Sub-secretary of Multilateral  Issues and Human Rights 
of the Foreign Affairs Secretariat; José Luis Chávez García, Attorney General of Military  
Justice of the National Defense Secretariat; Pablo Ojeda; Coordinator of Advisors of the 
Secretary of the Interior; María Carmen Oñate Muñoz, Ambassador of the Mexican Embassy 
in Costa Rica, Secretariat of Foreign Affairs; Alejandro Negrín Muñoz, General Human 
Rights and Democracy Director of the Secretariat of Foreign Affairs; Jaime Antonio López 
Portillo Robles Gil, Human Rights Director of the National Defense Secretariat; Ricardo 
Trejo Serrano, General Director of Criminal Procedures of the Attorney General of the 
Republic; Guillermo Leopoldo Mendoza Argüello, Representative of the 5th Section of the 
General Staff of the National Defense Secretariat; Francisca Méndez Escobar, Head of the 
State Department and In Charge of Economic, Political, Legal, and Press issues, Mexican 
Embassy in Costa Rica, and José Ignacio Martín del Campo, Case Director of the Secretariat 
of Foreign Affairs”);  Atala Riffo & Daughters v. Chile, Merits, Reparations, and Costs, 
Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 239, ¶ 6 & n.9 (Feb. 24, 2012)  (“The State 
appointed Mr. Miguel Angel Gonzalez [Ambassador of Chile in Costa Rica] and Ms. Paulina 
Gonzalez Vergara [Undersecretary at the Ministry of Justice of Chile] as Agents);  La Cantuta 
v. Peru, Merits, Reparations, and Costs Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 162, ¶¶ 
19, 32 (Nov. 29, 2006) (“On September 29, 2006, during its LXXII Regular Session, the 
Court held the public hearing which had been summoned (supra para. 23), and at which there 
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additional agent or advisor from the ministry of foreign affairs.130  The envoy might 
be another member of the foreign service who specializes in international litigation, 
a special advisor of the ministry of foreign affairs, or the attorney general office.131  
At the end the control of the defense is on the hand of governmental entities that are 
part of the executive branch.132  
All communications between the state and the Court are channeled through 
and conducted by the ministry of foreign affairs of the state and its embassy in Costa 
Rica.  Considering this fact, my working hypothesis is that when the case deals with 
acts of other authorities or previous governments, such as judicial decisions or 
legislation passed by congress, the executive can decide if it is in its interest to allow 
other governmental actors to participate in the proceedings.  There is no procedural 
mechanism in which the court could directly communicate its decisions, hear the 
testimony, or receive arguments from other government actors not recognized by 
the agents of the state in the case.  This was particularly clear in the cases of Artavia 
v. Costa Rica,133 and the Last Temptation of Christ v. Chile.134  
From this perspective, perhaps one of the most important differences 
between the US national and the international adjudicatory system is that in the 
former Congress and federal agencies could still voice their concerns in the 
proceeding through an amicus brief or private litigants could present arguments that 
favor the underrepresented branch. 135  In the international system, other branches 
of government without the consent of the central government cannot present briefs 
and victims do not frame their claims as a separation of power issue, but rather as 
violations of the state as a unit.136  In the majority of the cases, it is the sole 
                                                            
appeared . . . for the State: Ivan Arturo Bazar-Chacon [Deputy Attorney General for 
Supranational Affairs of the Ministry of Justice of Peru], Agent, and Alberto Gutierrez-La 
Madrid, Ambassador of Peru in Costa Rica”);  Artavia Murillo et al. (“In vitro fertilization”) 
v. Costa Rica, Merits, Reparations, and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 
257, ¶ 8 (Nov. 28, 2012) (“The State appointed Ana Lorena Brenes Esquivel, Attorney 
general, as its Agent and Magda Ines Rojas Chaves, Depute Attorney General, as co-agent”) 
[hereinafter Artavia Merits];  Fontevecchia and D`Amico v. Argentina, Merits, Reparations, 
and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 238, ¶ 4 & n.6 (Nov. 29, 2011) (only 
available in Spanish). 
130  Supra note 129. 
131  Id. 
132  Id. 
133  See infra Section V.D.  
134  See infra Section V.C.  
135  Waxman, supra note 13, at 1085 (discussing the power of agencies and Congress 
to present amicus briefs in the US context); Bell, supra note 13, at 1060; Lochner, supra note 
13, at 551; Devins & Prakash, supra note 13, at 571–72; Devins, Political Will and the 
Unitary Executive, supra note 13; Devins, Unitariness and Independence, supra note 13; 
Devins & Herz, The Uneasy Case for Department of Justice Control of Federal Litigation, 
supra note 13, at 579; Devins & Herz, The Battle That Never Was, supra note 13; Frost, 
supra note 13, at 914; Grove & Devins, supra note 13.; Myers, 272 U.S. at 52; Chadha, 462 
U.S. at 919; Windsor, 833 F. Supp. 2d at 394. 
136  This follows from the same logic of Article 7 of the Vienna Convention, which  
only recognizes delegates as representing the State when they are the Heath of State, Heads 
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prerogative of the executive to determine the legal position of the state, regardless 
of the fact that the violation might have originated in an act of the legislative body, 
a decision of the judiciary, or policies of local authorities.  It is not unusual to find 
declarations of the representatives of the state in the proceedings in which they 
concede that a judicial decision or a law passed by Congress is in fact a violation of 
an international human rights treaty, and then invite the Court to move to the 
remedies stages.137  My contention is that these acceptances are not necessarily out 
of a human rights commitment; rather, they are motivated by the executive benefits 
of imposing a policy he could not have imposed at the domestic level due to political 
or legal constraints.  This is consistent with statistics presented by Professor 
Alexandra Huneeus, which show how executive powers in Latin America have been 
more willing to comply with the decisions of the IACtHR than the domestic 
legislative or judicial powers.138  
In at least five cases reviewed in the next Section, local executives at the 
time of the defense of the case agreed with the agenda pushed by the supranational 
court and allowed it to be intrusive.139  A Court’s expansion gave the executive the 
pretext to impose an agenda that domestically could have been harder to achieve 
with political parties or social opposition.  Moreover, the cases are an example of 
the evolution of the Court into a more politically consequential court at the domestic 
level through its reasoning: the Caracazo v. Venezuela case took place in the early 
stages of the expansive moment of the Court;140 the Last Temptation of Christ v. 
Chile case was one of the first cases in which the Court ordered a State to modify 
its constitution on issues not related to amnesties;141 and the Artavia v. Costa Rica 
case offers the opportunity to review the latest effort of the Court to make its 
remedies more expansive at the domestic level and to modify the way domestic 
constitutional courts reason about rights.142 
Before moving to the concrete cases, the following subsections are 
intended to describe how the IACtHR has evolved from a judicial mechanism to 
                                                            
of Government and Ministers for Foreign Affairs—all of them traditionally corresponding to 
the executive branch. They can be considered as representing the state in question only if 
these authorities give appropriate full powers to other branches of government. Vienna 
Convention, supra note 1, Art. 1. Amicus briefs in the system are allowed in certain judicial 
procedures, but they have not been used by branches of government. They have mostly been 
presented by academic institutions individuals or NGOs. 
137  See infra Sections V.B, V.C, V.D. 
138  Alexandra Huneeus, Courts Resisting Courts: Lessons from the Inter-American 
Court’s Struggle to Enforce Human Rights, 44 CORNELL INT'L L. J. 493, 508–09 (2011).  
139  See infra Sections V.B, V.C, V.D. Other cases not covered within where the Court 
was over intrusive in its orders are Barrios Altos v. Peru, Merits, Reparations, and Costs, 
Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 83 (Sept. 3, 2001); Almonacid Arellano et al. v. 
Chile, Merits, Reparations, and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 154 (Sept. 
26, 2006). See also  Dulitzky, supra note 8, at 54 (critiquing the Court’s over expansive 
remedies jurisprudence). 
140  See infra Section V.B.  
141  See infra Section V.C. 
142  See infra Section V.D.  
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avoid diplomatic intervention from Western powers in the region to a court that 
analogizes its role to the powers of a constitutional court. The IACtHR has become 
politically consequential at the domestic level.143  Subsection A describes the bases 
of its operation and its connection with the American Convention on Human Rights. 
Subsection B then analyzes the transformation of the Court into an international 
body that reasons as a supranational constitutional court. Subsection B focuses on 
the political context that motivated the change. At the end of the Section, the reader 
will be able to identify clearly how the Court depicts its functions and the type of 
jurisprudence that it has created in order to support its constitutional role. 
 
 
A. Intro to the Operation of the IACtHR 
 
1. The Origins: Sovereignty First.  
 
The idea of creating an Inter-American Court is older than the 1969 
American Convention of Human Rights (the “Convention”), and it even predates 
the creation of the European Court of Human Rights.144  Contrary to what some 
commentators assume, Latin American countries were the first regional block to 
propose in 1945 a system where individuals could bring claims against states for 
rights violations.145  The origins of the institution also show a stark contrast with 
                                                            
143  Dulitzky, supra note 8; Antônio Augusto Cançado Trindade, Co-Existence and Co-
Ordination of Mechanisms of International Protection of Human Rights, in 202 COLLECTED 
COURSES OF THE HAGUE ACAD. OF INT'L L. 9, 93, 99 (1987); Sergio García Ramírez, La 
Jurisprudencia de la Corte Interamericana de Derechos humanos en Materia de 
Reparaciones, in LA CORTE INTERAMERICANA DE DERECHOS HUMANOS. UN CUARTO DE 
SIGLO: 1970-2004 1, 4 (2005) (arguing that human rights treaties should be interpreted as 
living texts, and constitutions are to be interpreted in an evolutionary way; “[the IACtHR] 
fulfills an analogous role as the one from the constitutional and supreme courts under their 
own competences, this role is to fix, according to an inexorably progressive criteria—that 
systematically re-interprets, with a contemporary view, the texts written in the past, under 
different circumstances—the meaning of the supreme formulas of domestic law. This re-
interpretation of the text through progressive constructions is necessary in light of the need 
for these formulas to lead, in each new condition, the life of the nation.”). 
144  G.L. Neuman, Import, Export, and Regional Consent in the Inter-American Court 
of Human Rights, 19 EUR. J. INT'L L. 101, 102 (2008). Most commentators reviewing the 
IACtHR begin with the American Convention and how the ECtHR model influenced Latin 
America. Id.  (“The Court corresponds to the European Court of Human Rights within the 
regional system of the Council of Europe. Indeed, the drafters of the ACHR substantially 
modeled the Court and its relationship with the Inter-American Commission on Human 
Rights on the structure of the European human rights system as it existed in the 1960s.”). 
145  Kathryn Sikkink, Latin American Countries as Norms Protagonists of the Idea of 
International Human Rights, 20 GLOB. GOV. 389, 390–91 (2014) (arguing that “Latin 
American countries were protagonists of the idea of ‘international human rights’; that is, the 
idea that there should be international involvement in formulating and enforcing international 
human rights norms and law, and the related idea that there should be international 
involvement in democracy promotion.”). See also Mary Ann Glendon, The Forgotten 
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the narrative presented by the advocates of international human rights regimes that 
see in them a supranational judicial system that helps pierce state sovereignty.146  In 
fact, the system was designed to preserve the sovereign rights of the Latin American 
states.147 
The first time Latin American governments proposed such a mechanism, 
it was not considered as a way to give up sovereignty, but rather a way to reinforce 
it by precluding foreign military interventions.148  According to Tom J. Farer, at the 
end of World War II Latin American countries were very sensitive to potential 
interventions based on the diplomatic protection of US citizens abroad.149  The 
decision to promote the creation of the Inter-American institutions was a way to 
constrain expanding power of the North Americans. 150   In other words, 
“[c]ontainment was their dominating purpose” and the Organization of American 
States (OAS) institutions “were its imperfect expressions.”151  
                                                            
Crucible: The Latin American Influence on the Universal Human Rights Idea, 16 HARV. 
HUM. RTS. J. 27, 27 (2003); HUDSON, supra note 2, at 169–80, 252–53.  
146  Harold Hongju Koh, How Is International Human Rights Law Enforced, 74 IND. 
L. J. 1397 (1998); Anne-Marie Slaughter, Liberal Theory of International Law, 94 AM. J. 
INT'L L. 240, 241 (2000); Anne-Marie Slaughter, International Law in a World of Liberal 
States, 6 EUR. J. INT'L L. 538, 538; José E. Alvarez, Do Liberal States Behave Better? A 
Critique of Slaughter’s Liberal Theory, 12 EUR. J. INT'L L. 183 (2001). 
147  SAMUEL MOYN, THE LAST UTOPIA: HUMAN RIGHTS IN HISTORY 176–211 (2010) 
(identifying how non-intervention, sovereignty, and self-determination were all components 
of the early years of the human rights movement). 
148  This is clear from the reading of Resolution XL of the Act of the Inter-American 
Conference on Problems of War and Peace of 1945, which instructed the Inter-American 
Judicial Committee to present a draft Declaration that would ensure that the “international 
protection of the essential rights of man would eliminate the misuse of diplomatic protection 
of citizens abroad, the exercise of which has more than once led to the violation of the 
principles of non-intervention and of equality between nationals and aliens.” Pan-American 
Union, Inter-American Juridical Committee “Draft Declaration of the International Rights 
and Duties of Man and Accompanying Report” 40 AM. J. OF INT’L L. 93, 114–15 (1946). This 
was consistent also with the whole Inter-American System that was planned partly with the 
new expansion of the American hegemony after WWII in mind. On the one hand, the Latin 
American States wanted to curtail the expansion of the American influence, but the United 
States also wanted to maintain the Latin Americans in line to avoid the soviet influence. Tom 
J. Farer, The Changing Context of the Inter-American Relations, FUTURE INTER-AM. SYST. 
xv, xvii (1979) [hereinafter Farer, The Changing Context of the Inter-American Relations]; 
TOM J. FARER, THE UNITED STATES AND THE INTER-AMERICAN SYSTEM: ARE THERE 
FUNCTIONS FOR THE FORMS? 4 (1978) [hereinafter FARER, THE UNITED STATES AND THE 
INTER-AMERICAN SYSTEM]; Richard J. Bloomfield, Inter-American System: Does It Have a 
Future, FUTURE INTER-AM. SYST. 1, 6 (1979).  
149  FARER, THE UNITED STATES AND THE INTER-AMERICAN SYSTEM, supra note 148, at 
4–5. 
150  Id. 
151   Farer, The Changing Context of the Inter-American Relations, supra note 148, at 
xvii.  
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The envisioned formula of the Latin American delegations was to 
establish, in an international declaration, a set of rights that would fix a minimum 
standard of justice across the region.152  By doing so, the Latin American states that 
had suffered Western interventions under the pretext of diplomatic protection would 
dissuade foreigners from arguing that they were not being given a minimum 
standard of protection.153  The Final Act of the Inter-American Conference on 
Problems of War and Peace of 1945 included a declaration inviting the Council of 
Inter-American Jurists to draft an American declaration of universal rights and a 
statute for a Latin American Court of Justice that would have jurisdiction only for 
cases in which foreign nationals were involved. 154  
A year later, in 1946, the Inter-American Judicial Committee presented a 
Draft Declaration of the International Rights and Duties of Man.155  Draft Article 
XXI of the American Declaration reflected the preoccupation with the abuse of 
diplomatic protection and the intention to contain it through the creation of an 
international court:  
 
In the case of aliens alleging violation of the foregoing 
fundamental rights by the state in which they are resident, the 
compliant shall be decided first by the courts of the state itself; 
and in cases in which a denial of justice is alleged by the state of 
which the alien is national, the case, failing diplomatic settlement, 
shall be submitted to an International Court, the statute of which 
shall be included as an integral part of the instrument in which the 
present Declaration is to be adopted.156  
 
                                                            
152  According to the reports of the 1945 Conference on Problems of War and Peace, 
“A special feature of the Mexican project was the suggestion that the Declaration, ‘by 
establishing a minimum standard of civilized justice’, might do away with the necessity of 
the diplomatic protection of citizens abroad which had led frequently to the violation of the 
principle of nonintervention. To this end the project recommended the creation of an Inter-
American organ which would have the special duty of watching over the regulation and 
practical application of the principles which were to be proclaimed in the declaration.”  Pan-
American Union, Inter-American Juridical Committee “Draft Declaration of the 
International Rights and Duties of Man and Accompanying Report” 40 AM. J. OF INT’L L. 
93, 104 (1946)  
153 Id. 
154  Id. at 114–15 (1946) (containing Resolution XL adopted by the States in the Final 
Act of the Inter-American Conference on Problems of War and Peace of 1945 included the 
Mexican proposal and stated that the “[i]nternational protection of essential rights of man 
would eliminate the misuse of diplomatic protection of citizens abroad, the exercise of which 
has more than once led to the violation of principles of non-intervention and of equality 
between nations and aliens, with respect to the essential rights of man.”). 
155  Id. at 110 (discussing the administration of an international standard of 
fundamental rights). 
156  Id. at 99. 
586 Arizona Journal of International & Comparative Law      Vol. 34, No. 3        2017 
 
In 1948, the American nations met again, this time for the Ninth 
Conference in Bogota, Colombia, and adopted the OAS Charter and the American 
Declaration on Human Rights. According to the reports of the Convention, the 
delegations were divided into three postures regarding the effectiveness that the 
Declaration should have. 157   The delegates discussed heavily whether the 
Declaration should have been a traditional treaty with concrete obligations or a 
general abstract declaration, whether the protection of the rights should have been 
left to state authorities recognized by domestic constitutions or by an international 
judicial body, and whether it should have a legal guarantee to make its provisions 
enforceable.158  
A year after the Bogota Conference and the adoption of the American 
Declaration of Human Rights, the Inter-American Juridical Committee met in Rio 
de Janeiro to study a draft statute of the Inter-American Court.159  It first recognized 
the dual intention of the American Declaration to become an instrument for 
avoiding diplomatic interventions and for recognizing the international protection 
of a set of shared rights by all American States.160  The Committee then was 
compelled to recognize that the American Declaration “did not create a legal 
contractual obligation.”161  Yet, according to the Committee, it served as a “well 
defined guide” towards the aspiration of having an international protection of those 
fundamental rights.162  Under the Committee’s views, for the system to become 
effective, Latin American states needed to “radically transform their constitutional 
systems.”163  According to the Committee, the domestic constitutional systems 
would need to “adapt” to the new international jurisdiction so that the domestic and 
the international courts could operate in coordination, because they would “share” 
the function of protecting the same rights.164  
In 1948, the year when the Bogota Conference adopted the American 
Declaration, only two Latin American States had fallen victims of dictatorships: the 
Dominican Republic with General Trujillo and Honduras with Tiburcio Carias 
                                                            
157  Documento CB-445/C.VI-36 de la Comisión Sexta, Novena Conferencia 
International Americana, Informe del Relator de la Comision Sexta, at 512 (1948) 
[hereinafter Informe Relator Novena Conferencia]. 
158  Id. See also, Documento CB-147/C.VI-Sub A-4 de la Comisión Sexta, Novena 
Conferencia International Americana, Minuta de la Primera Sesion de la Subcomision A, at 
613 (1948).  
159  Inter-American Juridical Committee "Informe Al Consejo Interamericano de 
Jurisconsultos Sobre La Resolucion XXXI de La Conferencia de Bogota" (Recomendaciones 
e Informes. Documentos Oficiales.  1949–1953, 1955) 105 [hereinafter Inter-American 
Juridical Committee]. 
160  Id. at 106. 
161  Id. at 107.  
162  Id. 
163  Id. at 109.  
164  Inter-American Juridical Committee, supra note 159, at 109.  
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Andino.165  The political landscape began to change in the 1950s.  In 1959, when 
the ministers of foreign affairs met for an extraordinary session of the OAS, Fidel 
Castro had overthrown President Batista in Cuba;166 in 1954, General Stroessner 
had taken power by military force in Paraguay;167 General Gustavo Rojas Pinilla 
had successfully orchestrated a coup d’état in Colombia against President Laureano 
Gómez Castro;168 Anastasio Somoza Garcia had ruled Nicaragua under his grip 
from 1936 until his assassination in 1956;169 Argentina suffered a military coup in 
1955 to overthrow President Juan Domingo Peron;170 and in 1954, with the help of 
the US Carlos Castillo Armas in Guatemala, they orchestrated a military coup and 
ruled until his assassination three years later.171  These events dramatically changed 
the tone and issues discussed in the OAS.  Suddenly the most significant regional 
problem was the preservation of democracy and its connection with human rights 
treaties and the right of non-intervention by neighboring military States.  
 
 
2. The 1969 Structure for a New Political Context: The Rise of Military 
Coups  
 
As stated above, the rise of military dictators in the 1950s and 1960s 
changed Inter-American politics.  The incident that marked the future of the Inter-
American system and triggered a desire to create regional mechanisms that would 
ensure that states would not intervene in the affairs of their neighbors was the rise 
of General Trujillo in the Dominican Republic.172  This time the fear was not only 
of US intervention but also of dictators with nationalistic views that would try to 
disrupt democratically elected government in order to expand their presence in the 
region.173  
                                                            
165  Frank Moya Pons, The Dominican Republic since 1930, 7 CAMBRIDGE HISTORY OF 
LATIN AMERICA 509, 509 (1990); Victor Bulmer-Thomas, Honduras since 1930, 7 
CAMBRIDGE HISTORY OF LATIN AMERICA 283, 289–311 (1990). 
166  Louis A. Perez, Cuba, c. 1930–59, 7 CAMBRIDGE HISTORY OF LATIN AMERICA 419, 
452–55 (1990); Jorge Dominguez, Cuba since 1959, 7 CAMBRIDGE HISTORY OF LATIN 
AMERICA 457, 457 (Leslie Bethell ed., 1990). 
167  Paul H. Lewis, Paraguay Sine 1930, 8 CAMBRIDGE HISTORY OF LATIN AMERICA  
233, 252–66 (1991). 
168  Christopher Abel & Palacio Marco, Columbia, 1930–58, 8 CAMBRIDGE HISTORY 
OF LATIN AMERICA 587, 616–27 (1991). 
169  Victor Bulmer-Thomas, Nicaragua since 1930, 7 CAMBRIDGE HISTORY OF LATIN 
AMERICA 317, 333–44 (1990). 
170  Juan Carlos Torre & Liliana de Riz, Argentina since 1946, 8 CAMBRIDGE HISTORY 
OF LATIN AMERICA 73, 92 (1991). 
171  James Dunkerley, Guatemala since 1930, 7 CAMBRIDGE HISTORY OF LATIN 
AMERICA 221, 228–30 (1990). 
172  Moya Pons, supra note 165, at 509. 
173  KLAAS DYKMANN, PHILANTHROPIC ENDEAVORS OR THE EXPLOITATION OF AN 
IDEAL?: THE HUMAN RIGHTS POLICY OF THE ORGANIZATION OF AMERICAN STATES IN LATIN 
AMERICA (1970–1991) 53–55 (2004). 
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The incident that triggered the fear of intervention was the sponsored 
assassination attempt by General Trujillo of the Venezuelan President Romulo 
Betancourt in 1960.174  By the late 1950s, General Trujillo established a regime of 
oppression in the Dominican Republic. As a way to control domestic opposition, 
Trujillo shifted national attention to the neighboring governments, especially to 
Venezuela, and associated them with the domestic dissenters.175  President Romulo 
Betancourt was an outspoken opponent of Trujillo and its oppressive regime.176 
After the failed assassination attempt, Betancourt raised the issue at the OAS.177 
The Latin American states of the time believed that the expansion of dictators in the 
region could become a threat to the sovereignty of democratically elected 
governments and proposed to continue with the original project to create an Inter-
American Court.178 
In addition to the Court, the states created another body to spread the ideals 
of the American Declaration of Human Rights: an Inter-American Commission of 
Human Rights.179  This body was originally not authorized to examine specific 
cases but rather, had the task of spreading information and promote the 1948 
American Declaration of Human Rights. 180   This included on-site visit to the 
members of the OAS to promote the ideals of the Declaration.181  As more people 
would be acquainted with the Declaration’s content, it was believed that pressure 
would prevent dictators from emerging and disseminating fear against the 
neighboring states. As expected, the Commission’s first on-site visit was in 1961 to 
the Dominican Republic. 182   The Commission’s visit was such a success in 
reporting the situation in Trujillo’s Dominican Republic, that in 1965 it was 
expressly authorized to examine complaints or petitions regarding specific cases.183 
Notwithstanding these advancements, in the late 1960s military coups d’état kept 
expanding in the region: Argentina suffered them in 1962, 1966, and 1976; 184  Peru 
also followed the same path with the military regime of Juan Velasco Alvarado 
from 1968 to 1975; 185 and Brazil suffered a coup in 1964 against president Joao 
Giulart that would impose a military rule until 1985.186  
In this political context, the American Convention on Human Rights was 
adopted in 1969. This now binding treaty also gave life to the contemporary 
                                                            
174  DYKMANN, supra note 173, at 53–55. 
175  Id. 
176  Id. at 54–55. 
177  Id. 
178  Id. at 53–55. 
179  DYKMANN, supra note 173, at 55–57. 
180  Id. at 57–59. 
181  Id. at 57–58. 
182  Id. at 59. 
183  Id. at 59–61. 
184  Torre & Riz, supra note 170, at 115–58. 
185  Julio Cotler, Peru since 1960, 8 CAMBRIDGE HISTORY OF LATIN AMERICA 451, 
464–72 (1991). 
186  Leslie Bethell & Celso Castro, Politics in Brazil under Military Rule, 1984-1985, 
9 CAMBRIDGE HISTORY OF LATIN AMERICA 165, 165–68 (2008). 
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structure of the Inter-American System of Human Rights by establishing the 
IACtHR. The Court began its regular operations in 1980 after the Convention 
entered into force (1978) and its Statute was approved by the OAS General 
Assembly (1979).187  
According to the American Convention, the Court’s jurisdiction comprises 
“all cases concerning the interpretation and application of the provisions of [the] 
Convention that are submitted to it, provided that the States Parties to the case 
recognize or have recognized such jurisdiction.”188  In addition to disputes, the 
member states may consult the Court regarding the interpretation of the Convention, 
other human rights treaties, or the compatibility of domestic law with the 
international covenant.189  In cases where a violation of the Convention has been 
proven, the Court “shall rule that the injured party be ensured the enjoyment of his 
rights or freedom that was violated.” 190   Moreover, it can rule that the 
“consequences of the measure or situation that constituted the breach of such right 
or freedom be remedied and that fair compensation be paid to the injured” if 
appropriate.191  As will be discussed more fully in Subsection III.B.2, this power 
has been interpreted by the Court as including the possibility of ordering measures 
that will ensure the non-repetition of the violation of the right in the future; not only 
to the concrete victim in the case, but also, to other citizens of the state. This implies 
that the Court can order structural remedies to state authorities.192  The judgment of 
the Court is “final and not subject to appeal”193  and the parties according to the 
Convention “undertake to comply with the judgment of the Court in any case to 
which they are parties.” 194  The Convention is silent regarding whether the 
jurisprudence abides for the states that did not participate in the concrete case. 
In terms of structure, the Court is composed of seven Judges, all nationals 
of the OAS member states, elected by an absolute majority of its General 
Assembly.195  The judges serve for a term of six years, may be reelected once, and 
are partially renewed every three years.196  The Court requires a quorum of five 
judges for its deliberations, and only meets an average of four times a year in San 
Jose, Costa Rica for its regular sessions and twice a year for special sessions in 
                                                            
187  Organization of American States, American Convention on Human Rights, art. 33, 
Nov. 22, 1969, O.A.S.T.S. No. 36, 1144 U.N.T.S. 123.  The Court did not begin its operation 
until 1980 and did not adopt its Rules of Operation until August 1980. See Antônio Augusto 
Cançado Trindade, The Operation of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, INTER-
AMERICAN SYSTEM OF HUMAN RIGHTS 133 (1998). 
188  American Convention on Human Rights, supra note 187, art. 62, at 159.  
189  Id.   
190  Id. art. 63, at 159. 
191  Id.   
192  Antkowiak, supra note 9, at 355–57. 
193  American Convention on Human Rights, supra note 187, art. 67, at 160. 
194  Id. art. 68, at 160. 
195  Id. arts. 52–53, at 157–58. 
196  Id. art. 54, at 158. 
590 Arizona Journal of International & Comparative Law      Vol. 34, No. 3        2017 
 
different jurisdictions.197  It is not a sitting body, and by holding hearings outside 
the jurisdiction of the involved state, it is arguably highly insulated from the politics 
and pressures of local actors.  
Only the Inter-American Commission or the member states can bring cases 
before the Court.198  In cases regarding human rights violations, the victims must 
first exhaust domestic remedies and be heard by the Commission before the Court 
obtains jurisdiction. 199   In this “pre-trial,” the Commission reviews the case, 
requests information from the government of the state, ascertains the grounds of the 
petition, hears oral statements, and helps the parties reach a friendly settlement.200 
If a settlement is not reached or if the state refuses to cooperate, the Commission 
assesses whether there are enough merits to bring the case before the Court.201  
Using the analytical tools described in the previous sections—thinking of 
the parties, the procedure and the strategies—the above mentioned structural and 
procedural elements allow us to identify certain trends regarding actors and issues 
involved in all the cases.  The fact that the victims have to exhaust all available local 
remedies before bringing the case to the Commission places judicial powers on the 
“accused stand” regardless of the issue being discussed.  Either the local judges 
were unable to properly address the victim’s claims, or the judicial system with its 
actions or omissions actively violated the rights of the accused.  Judges become 
bystanders or perpetrators in the majority of cases.  Secondly, as stated above the 
executive through its ministry of foreign affairs is always the coordinating authority 
in the defense of the case.  Regardless of where and how the violation occurred, the 
executive branch decides the defense’s arguments, chooses which government 
actors can participate in the proceedings, and decides if the state will offer 
reparation to the victims.  In every case, the judiciary and the executive are always 
involved in one way or another.  Hence, the focus in the next section is on how the 
litigation of human rights cases in the region and the decisions of the IACtHR affect 
domestic judicial-executive relations. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                            
197  See Inter-American Court of Human Rights, Session Dates, CORTE 
INTERAMERICANA DE DERECHOS HUMANOS, http://www.corteidh.or.cr/index.php/en/court-
today/fechas-de-sesiones (last visited Sept. 9, 2017); American Convention on Human 
Rights, supra note 187, art. 56, at 158 (“Five judges shall constitute a quorum for the 
transaction of business by the Court”). 
198  American Convention on Human Rights, supra note 187, art.  61, at 159 (“Only 
the State Parties and the Commission shall have the rights to submit a case to the Court.”). 
199  Id. art. 46–48, at 156 (“[R]emedies under domestic law have been pursued and 
exhausted . . . . The Commission shall consider . . .”).  
200  Id. art. 48, at 156. 
201  Id. art. 50, at 157.  
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B. Becoming a Politically Consequential Court at the Domestic Level 
 
1. The Influence of US Legal Liberalism in the New Constitutional 
Landscape  
 
The fall of authoritarian regimes in the 1990s changed the Latin American 
domestic constitutional landscape. NGOs, practitioners, governments that 
negotiated the transition, and academics fostered a change in the role played by 
constitutional law and human rights treaties.202  The movement was characterized 
by a particular view of constitutional law. Constitutions were to be regarded “as 
embodying universal principles (human rights) deemed to be above statutory law 
and susceptible to be directly applied by the judiciary, even at the cost of trumping 
the sovereign decisions of the democratically elected branches of government.”203  
Post-dictatorship-Latin-American constitutions reflected this vision. 204  
They first promulgated additional powers to constitutional courts.205  Secondly, 
they included new social, economic, cultural and civil rights.206  Third, and hand in 
hand with these two changes, they assigned human rights covenants an express 
constitutional hierarchy—some countries even placed them above it.207  
The reforms were targeted at strengthening domestic constitutional courts 
vis-à-vis the excesses of authoritarianism, traditionally exercised through the abuses 
of presidential power.208  The region was, and to a certain extent is today, still 
perceived as one where “the survival of the rule of law seems to be fundamentally 
threatened by the constant attempts of the executive to expand its powers.”209  Given 
the hyper-presidential nature of the political regimes in the region, the prescription 
in the last decades has given the courts the ability “to say ‘no’ to the executive and 
                                                            
202  Huneeus., Cultures of Legality, supra note 111, at 4 (explaining how the shift of 
ideas on the role of actors in the Latin American legal elite is key in understanding the 
political changes of the region). 
203  Couso, supra note 22, at 154 (“The works of scholars such as [Carlos] Nino, 
[Carlos] Peña, and others introduced into Latin America what Alec Stone Sweet (2000) has 
labeled ‘higher-law constitutionalism’; that is, a theory that regards the Constitution as 
embodying universal principles (human rights) deemed to be above any statutory law and 
susceptible to be directly applied by the judiciary, even at the cost of trumping the sovereign 
decisions of the democratically elected branches of government. This approach, continues 
Stones Sweet, amounts to a postmodern version of natural-law thinking.”).  
204  See generally Rodrigo Uprimny, The Recent Transformation of Constitutional Law 
in Latin America, Trends and Challenges, 89 TEX. L. REV. 1587 (2011). 
205  Huneeus, Cultures of Legality, supra note 111, at 3. 
206  Id. 
207  Id. 
208  GARGARELLA, supra note 22, at 155–62; Roberto Gargarella, Recientes Reformas 
Constitucionales en América Latina: Una Primera Aproximación, 36 DESARROLLO 
ECONÓMICO 971, 971 (1997). 
209  Siri Gloppen et al., The Accountability Function of the Courts in New 
Democracies, DEMOCRATIZATION AND THE JUDICIARY: THE ACCOUNTABILITY FUNCTION OF 
COURTS IN NEW DEMOCRACIES 1, 1 (2004). 
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make it ‘stick.’”210  In line with this constitutional transformation the region saw an 
effort from NGOs, the IACtHR, opposition parties and international agencies to 
promote an independent judiciary.211  Judicial reform in Latin America has been 
continuous since then, and in most jurisdictions, courts, including constitutional and 
supreme courts, have achieved a formal level of independence.212  Most Latin 
American judiciaries now have judicial counsels that oversee the work of judges 
and allow the pursuit of a judicial career without a political intervention. 213  In some 
jurisdictions, such as Argentina, other branches of government have very little 
authority over the courts, to the point that they are considered to be “dangerously 
removed from the will of the people,” too detached from the real political and social 
problems of the nation, and representative of an “explosive formula for new 
democracies.”214  
In addition to reforming the judiciary, Latin America has also faced a shift 
of traditional doctrinal scholarship.215  This has had an impact on the way the 
judiciary and practitioners perceive the role of judges.216  According to Eduardo 
Lopez Medina, the genealogy of a new orthodoxy of Latin American 
constitutionalism can be found in the influence of US scholars such as Ronald 
Dworkin, H.L. Hart, and John Ely, and from continental Europe Robert Alexy and 
Luigi Ferrajoli. 217  Most US scholars can be identified as liberal legal thinkers of 
                                                            
210  Gloppen et al., supra note 209, at 2. 
211  Cf. Trubek, supra note 23. 
212  ELIN SKAAR, JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE AND HUMAN RIGHTS IN LATIN AMERICA: 
VIOLATIONS, POLITICS, AND PROSECUTION 3–4 (2011). 
213  Cf. Patricio Navia & Julio Ríos-Figueroa, The Constitutional Adjudication Mosaic 
of Latin America, 38 COMP. POL. STUD. 189, 205–09 (2005) (explaining . . . and showing that 
there are natural variances among jurisdictions that employ this model, but most of them 
share similar stages in the process enabling them to stop atrocities); Hector Fix-Fierro, 
Judicial Reform in Mexico: What Next?, BEYOND COMMON KNOWLEDGE: EMPIRICAL 
APPROACHES TO THE RULE OF LAW 240, 263–65 (2011).  
214  Gloppen et al., supra note 209, at 4; Roberto Gargarella, In Search of Democratic 
Justice-What Courts Should Not Do: Argentina, 1983-2002, DEMOCRATIZATION AND THE 
JUDICIARY: THE ACCOUNTABILITY FUNCTION OF COURTS IN NEW DEMOCRACIES 132, 1 (2004). 
215  Couso, supra note 22, at 141 (“The focus on legal scholarship as a factor 
contributing to the shape of the legal cultures of Latin America derives from the conviction 
that it represents one of the most important sites for the configuration of an understanding of 
the nature, sources, and the role of the law, as well as conceptions about the judiciary and 
legal interpretation.”). 
216  Id. at 144 (“Legal scholarship in civil law countries is not merely a heuristic tool 
but—more importantly—a way of shaping the representation that legal actors maintain 
concerning the very nature of the enterprise of law. This is typically implicit because—while 
explaining the law of the country—jurists help to constitute a discourse about the very nature 
of law and of the legal system. This discourse is then transmitted to judges, legal academics, 
and litigants through the medium of legal education, which in civil law regimes makes an 
intensive use of legal scholarship as a pedagogical tool.”). 
217   Eduardo & Medina, supra note 23, at 124–25, 412–13; Miguel Carbonell, Luigi 
Ferrajoli: Teórico del Derecho y de la Democracia, MIGUELCARBONELL.COM, 
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the 1970s.218  The US liberal academics developed scholarship that praised the 
activism of the federal judiciary and particularly of the US Supreme Court during 
the tenure of Chief Justice Earl Warren. 219   For the liberal US scholars, the 
significance of the judiciary “was reinforced by the enhanced role judges were 
starting to play in the broadening field of public-law litigation.”220  These views, 
and particularly the role of the judge in public law adjudication, were key in laying 
the foundation for the new movement of Latin American constitutionalism.221  In 
Latin America, the judicial activism that US liberal scholars were trying to square 
with US democratic values was interpreted as a benchmark of judicial work for 
modern democracies.  
These scholars’ presence had an important impact on the evolution of the 
legal system because in Latin America doctrinal scholarship is a formal source of 
law quoted as a basis for the decisions of the court.222  The new Latin American 
progressive literature would argue, almost as an orthodoxy, that the new 
constitutions should not be interpreted as a set of rules that should distribute powers 
among political actors, but as: 
 
being full of principles that could, and more often than not, be 
used to limit or overcome the codified or legislated rules . . . . [I]t 
was considered more adequate for the Court to give moral or 
                                                            
http://www.miguelcarbonell.com/docencia/sobre_Ferrajoli_printer.shtml; Esquirol, The 
Fictions of Latin American Law (Part I), supra note 23, at 447.  
218  David Kennedy, Ronald Dworkin, CANON AM. LEG. THOUGHT 552, 551–57 (2006) 
[hereinafter Kennedy, Ronald Dworkin]; Trubek, supra note 23; David Kennedy, The “Rule 
of Law,” Political Choice, and Development Common Sense,  THE NEW LAW AND ECONOMIC 
DEVELOPMENT 95 (2006). 
219  Kennedy, Ronald Dworkin, supra note 218, at 551. 
220  Id. 
221  Ronald Dworkin, Hard Cases, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1057 (1975); RONALD DWORKIN, 
TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 136 (1978); Eduardo & Medina, supra note 23, at 412–13; Couso, 
supra note 22, at 165–66 (“A good indicator of the prevalence achieved in recent years by 
the new constitutional orthodoxy is the sudden popularity within Latin America’s 
constitutional academic community of three important global exponents of higher-law 
constitutionalism: Ronald Dworkin (from the Anglo-American academic world); and Robert 
Alexy and Luigi Ferrajoli (from the Continental European one). The interesting prominence 
of these authors among Latin American constitutional scholars is that it suggests that a kind 
of natural-law perspective is permeating the region.”). See generally RONALD DWORKIN, 
LAW’S EMPIRE (1986). 
222  Couso, supra note 22, at 159–60 (“This is particularly the case in a region where 
like other places with a civil law background - legal scholarship, or la doctrina, is considered 
a formal source of law, and where it plays a critical role in socializing students into the legal 
field. Not all scholarship on law carries this formal status; only scholarship that specifically 
interprets and develops legal doctrine . . . . [C]onstitutional discourse experiences a 
revolutionary transformation over the last few decades. I argue that this dramatic shift 
facilitates the introduction of processes of judicialization of politics in the region by changing 
traditional understandings of the status of legislated law and the role of courts in 
democracy.”). 
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political decisions a judiciable solution than to give predictability 
and formalism to the decisions; it was better to reach substantive 
results that were considered just and equitable than to focus on 
procedural subtleties; ‘justice’ as a concept had a specific judicial 
meaning and was more important than legality,223  
 
The “conceptual revolution” was accompanied by a particular version of 
constitutional law that promoted judicial activism, fostered the use of international 
human rights instruments, and rejected formalism.224  According to Javier Couso, 
“this paradigm shift owes much to the reception in Latin America of a global 
doctrine affirming that human rights constitute the central category of 
constitutionalism,” and that “inspiration came from the scores of Latin American 
academics who started to pursue graduate training in law in the United States in the 
late 1970s, where they were socialized by their liberal North American law 
professors into the virtues of the legendary Warren Court.”225  An important source 
of funding in the 1990s in favor of this constitutional orthodoxy came from US-
based foundations that “built a powerful network that regularly published works 
that combine constitutional theory and human rights with different aspects of the 
public interest law agenda in Latin America.”226  The effort to embrace judicial 
activism was accompanied with placing blame on traditional formalism for the 
atrocities committed under the name of the law during the authoritarian regimes.227  
                                                            
223   Eduardo & Medina, supra note 23, at 412–13 (translation by author).  
224  Couso, supra note 22, at 164–65. 
225  Id. at 163 (“Furthermore, it is also a result of the importation to the region of 
doctrines legitimizing judicial control of the constitutionality of law, either in its Continental 
European version (that is, thought the introduction of constitutional courts), or in its 
American version (which gives the power to the regular courts).  In the case of the reception 
of the European model, the borrowing was to some extent natural, as the latter had been the 
regular source of doctrinal change in Latin America. In the case of the US model of judicial 
review, the inspiration came from the scores of Latin American academics who started to 
pursue graduate training in law in the United States in the late 1970s, where they were 
socialized by their liberal North American law professors into the virtues of the legendary 
Warren Court.”). 
226  Id. at 166 (“Given this bleak diagnosis, proponents of this approach to legal action 
and teaching openly embraced the US model of constitutional discourse and practice, which 
most of them had experienced firsthand as Master of Laws LLM students.  At this point it is 
relevant to point out that the transformation of Latin America’s constitutional scholarship 
has not been confined to public law. In fact, it has affected the general outlook of legal theory. 
One example of the effect of the growing acceptance of higher-law constitutionalism is the 
decline on the degree of formalism exhibited by the judges of the region.”).  Other authors 
have expressed a skeptical view on how much foreign agency’s influence has had on the 
reform. See Fix-Fierro, supra note 213, at 231 (“It should be fairly evident from the previous 
sections that judicial reform in Mexico is not primarily the result of foreign pressures or of 
the intervention of international development agencies: neither has played a significant role 
so far.  Its roots run much deeper, and that is a source of both weakness and strength in the 
reform process.”). 
227  Couso, supra note 22, at 163. 
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In the words of Javier Couso, “the very formalism and judicial deference to 
legislated law that characterized the previous paradigm was being blamed for the 
passivity exhibited by the judiciaries in the face of the massive human rights 
violations perpetrated during the authoritarian wave.”228  
As will be analyzed in the next section, the work of the IACtHR during 
this period of expansion also reflects this influence.229  To the IACtHR, judges, and 
the advocates of judicial reform, if the region wanted to overcome the existing 
social and political problems left after the fall of the dictators, domestic legal 
systems needed judges that would reason the consequences and distributional 
effects of the law.230  This view represents a paradox for our comparative analysis. 
The experience in the US constitutional system of adjudication shows that executive 
power can also benefit from the judicial expansion in public authority.231  It is not 
necessarily true that courts will always control executives when they assert the 
power of judicial supremacy.  An “alliance” between the court and the executive 
could emerge to jointly expand their powers. 
 
 
2. The Period of Expansion  
 
In the late 1990s, while domestic judiciaries were facing a process of 
transformation, the IACtHR began to reconstruct its functions. It stopped 
functioning as a Court that would work as a complementary system to the domestic 
judicial institutions and began to operate as a supranational “constitutional” 
court.232  As opposed to a court limited to determining whether states violated 
international law, it sees itself as a court empowered to define how domestic 
authorities, including the highest courts, should exercise their constitutional 
powers.233  This effort was reflected by several jurisprudential strategies.  First, the 
Court interpreted the Convention to include rights that were not expressly 
contemplated in the text of the treaty.234  It then reinterpreted the remedies section 
                                                            
228  Couso, supra note 22, at 163. 
229  See infra Section IV.B.2. 
230  See generally Duncan Kennedy, The Hermeneutic of Suspicion in Contemporary 
American Legal Thought, 25 L. CRITIQUE 91 (2014) [hereinafter Kennedy, The Hermeneutic 
of Suspicion in Contemporary American Legal Thought]; David Kennedy, Abram Chayes, 
THE CANON OF AMERICAN LEGAL THOUGHT 605, 606 (2006) (describing how in the 1950’s 
this is the role that the US legal academia had identified in the Warren Court). 
231  See generally WHITTINGTON, supra note 11. 
232  Dulitzky, supra note 8, at 68 n.150. 
233  Ezequel Malarino, Activismo Judicial, Punitización y Nacionalización. Tendencias 
Antidemocráticas y Antiliberales de la Corte Interamericana de Derechos Humanos 
[Judicial Activism, Punitivism, and Supranationalization: Illiberal and Antidemocratic 
Tendencies of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights], SISTEMA INTERAMERICANO DE 
PROTECCION DE LOS DERECHOS HUMANOS Y DERECHO PENAL INTERNACIONAL  25, 25 (2010). 
234  See id. (giving a list of examples of rights not expressly contemplated in the 
Convention). See, e.g., Barrios Altos v. Peru, Merits, Reparations, and Costs, Judgment, 
Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 83, ¶¶ 41–44 (Sept. 3, 2001) (the prohibition of amnesties 
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of the Convention to include structural remedies and not only those involving the 
particular victim.235  Moreover, the IACtHR expanded its interpretative powers by 
modifying the rules of the Court to include the supervision of its own judgments; 
further, it expanded its power to review cases that had happened before the entry 
into force of the Convention.236  
All of these jurisprudential moves reflect a concrete intention to abandon 
its foundational logic of subsidiarity or auxiliary to domestic institutions, and adopt 
a model in which the Court signals concrete responsibilities of particular 
governmental actors, including domestic judiciaries.237  An element of this second 
stage was the transformation of the traditional principles of interpretation of 
international law to more expansive interpretations that included policy analysis and 
                                                            
for human rights violations); Almonacid Arellano et al. v. Chile, Merits, Reparations, and 
Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 154, §§ 105–29, 151–54 (Sept. 26, 2006) 
(the prohibition of amnesties against internatnional crimes, the non-prescription of 
international crimes, the prohibition on the use of the rule of non-retroactivity in criminal 
cases, the prohibition on the use of the rule ne bis in idem in cases where new evidence has 
been found after the judgment, and rights of the family victims to know the truth through a 
judicial process); Bulacio v. Argentina, Merits, Reparations, and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. 
Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 100, §§ 116–17  (Sept. 18, 2003) (the non-perscription of human rights 
violations); Alban Cornejo et al. v. Ecuador, Merits, Reparations, and Costs, Judgment, Inter-
Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 171,§ 111, (Nov. 22 2007) (the non-prescription of grave human 
rights violations);  La Cantuta v. Peru, Merits, Reparations, and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. 
Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 162, §§ 149226 (Nov. 29, 2006) (the prohibition on the use of the rule 
of non-retroactivity in criminal cases and the prohibition on the use of the rule ne bis in idem 
in cases where new evidence has been found after the judgment); Velasquez Rodriguez v. 
Guatemala, Merits, Reparations, and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 4, § 
181 (July 29, 1988) (the right of the families of the victims to know the truth); Godinez Cruz 
v. Guatemala, Merits, Reparations, and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 5, 
§191 (the right of the families of the victims to know the truth).  
235  See, e.g., Salvador Herrera Carrasco, Las Reparaciones en la jurisprudencia de la 
Corte Interamericana de Derechos Humanos, 2 GRUPO LATINOAMERICANO DE ESTUDIOS 
SOBRE DERECHO PENAL INTERNACIONAL: SISTEMA INTERAMERICANO DE PROTECCIÓN DE LOS 
DERECHOS HUMANOS Y DERECHO PENAL INTERNACIONAL TOMO  372 (2010), (“[I]t is 
important to note that the rules on remedies that the Court could order have been created via 
jurisprudence, because they cannot be found in any literal way in the text of the 
Convention.”).  The Convention never allowed expressly for such an expansive type of 
remedies.  It is the consensus of literature that they were created mainly through the 
expansion of the IACtHR´s jurisprudence. Id.  
236  See, e.g., Almonacid Arellano et al. v. Chile, Merits, Reparations, and Costs, 
Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 154 (Sept. 26, 2006). The crimes had been 
committed in 1973 and the amnesty laws had entered into force in 1978. Id. The American 
Convention for Chile entered into force in 1990.  The court argued that since the State had 
not prosecuted the alleged criminals, the violations of the victims’ rights was present in the 
time of the case; hence, it argued that it had jurisdiction since the crime was still being 
committed against the family members. Id. §§ 42–50. 
237  Neuman, supra note 9. 
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consequentialist review.238  The use of methods of interpretation that included 
policy analysis and the consequences of the implementation of the law was the very 
same type of reasoning that the constitutionalist movement of the 1990s was 
pushing for at the domestic level.  
An example of this type of reasoning is the Court’s construction of the 
principle of “effectiveness” or effet utile.239  The Court has argued that it has the 
                                                            
238 Kennedy, The Hermeneutic of Suspicion in Contemporary American Legal 
Thought, supra note 230, at 95–96 (“Doing teleological reasoning requires consideration of 
the consequences of adoption of a particular interpretation of the ambiguous norm. One 
should not choose a particular alternative unless applying it will serve its purpose in facts . . 
. . This makes teleological interpretation dramatically different from induction/deduction, at 
least in form, because the older method made a great point precisely of refusing the 
consideration of either purposes or effects. [In ‘policy analysis’, ‘balancing’, 
‘proportionality’] the gap or conflict or ambiguity in the system of norms is resolved by a 
process of ‘weighting’, which can involve any and all types of legal values, concepts, norms 
or instrumental purposes.”). 
239  The original version of the effet utile principle was created to avoid absurd textual 
interpretations in light of the treaty text.  For example, in the words of the Chile v. Peru 
tribunal of 1875 cited by these authorities, “the verb to charge has here no technical meaning 
in the absence of other stipulations, and must be taken in its usual sense . . . . If the words 
‘shall charge’ have not this meaning, they have none; and having none; there can be no 
resulting effect. Hence, according to a recognized rule of interpretation, that signification 
should be adopted which will permit the provision to operate [l´interpretation qui permit á 
use stipulation du prouder ses effects].” Award of the Chile v. Peru Tribunal, April 7 1875, 
as cited by G. Berlia, Contribution a l’Interpretation des Traites, RECUEIL DE COURS DE LA 
ACADÉMIE DE DRIOT International, (1965), pp. 306. (The same meaning was given in another 
case in the Permanent Court to Arbitration in 1910: “Because it is a principle of interpretation 
that words in a document ought not to be considered as being without any meaning if there 
is not specific evidence to that purpose and the interpretation referred to would lead to the 
consequence . . . . It is an acknowledged rule of interpretation that treaty clauses must not 
only be considered as a whole, but must also be interpreted so as to avoid as much as possible 
depriving one of them of practical effect for the benefit of others.”). Award in the Affaire des 
pecheries des cotes sptentrionales de L'atlantique. CPA, Septembre 7, 1910 as cited by G. 
Berlia, Contribution a l’Interpretation des Traites, Rcuel de Cours, 1965, pp. 306. See also 
Dionisio Anziloti, COURS DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL,Vol. I, (Paris, 1929), p.112-13. The effet 
utile principle was then connected to the Anglo-Saxon common law doctrine of implied 
powers that favored an interpretation of a text that would give powers to a particular 
institution to achieve its goals. Ludwik Ehrlich, L’Interpétation des Traités, RECUEIL DE 
COURS DE LA ACADÉMIE DE DRIOT INTERNATIONAL, Vol. IV Tome 24, (1928) p. 84-5; Charles 
de Vissicher, PROBLÈMES D’INTERPÉTATION JUDICIAIRE EN DROIT INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC, 
(Éditions A. Perdone Paris, 1963), 84-85. From these two doctrines the IACtHR created the 
principle of effet utile/effectiveness: the Court is to review the consequences of the 
enforcement and if the chosen policy is the most effective in achieving the goals of the 
Convention as defined by the IACtHR. Garrido and Baigorria v. Argentina, Merits, 
Reparations, and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 39, ¶¶ 68–74 (1998); 
Durand and Ugarte v. Peru, Merits, Reparations, and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. 
(ser. C) No. 68, ¶¶ 136–37 (Aug. 16, 2000); Castillo Peruzzi et al. v. Peru, Merits, 
Reparations, and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 50, ¶¶ 205–07 (1999); 
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power to review not only if domestic legislation is compatible with the Convention, 
but also its “effectiveness.” 240   This implies the power to order the structural 
remedies necessary to achieve that effectiveness and monitor its compliance.241  An 
example of the structural approach can be found in Barrios Altos v. Peru, a case 
where the Court departed from exclusively signaling that domestic legislation was 
incompatible with the Convention and asserted a power to directly invalidate 
domestic law.  The Court expressly stated that once domestic legislation is found 
incompatible with the Convention it “lack[s] legal effects”242 and that the scope of 
this decision is “general in nature.”243  
Recently, the Court has also stated that domestic judiciaries have an 
obligation to exercise a: “‘conventionality control’ between the domestic legal 
provisions which are applied to specific cases and the [Convention]. To perform 
this task, the [domestic] Judiciary has to take into account not only the treaty, but 
also the interpretation thereof made by the [IACtHR], which is the ultimate 
interpreter of the [Convention].” 244   This duty is in addition to traditional 
constitutionality control or judicial review within their respective jurisdictions.245  
                                                            
Suarez Rosero v. Ecuador, Merits, Reparations, and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. 
C) No. 35, ¶¶ 97–98  (1997); International Responsibility for the Promulgation and 
Enforcement of Laws in Violation of the Convention, Advisory Opinion OC-14/97, Inter-
Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) No. 14 (Dec. 9, 1994), ¶ 23. 
240  Supra note 239. 
241  Baena Ricardo v. Panama, Competence, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 
104, § III (Nov. 28, 2003); James L. Cavallaro & Stephanie Erin Brewer, Reevaluating 
Regional Human Rights Litigation in the Twenty-First Century: The Case of the Inter-
American Court 768, 781 (Harv. L. Sch. Pub. L. & Legal Theory Working Paper Series, 
Paper No. 09-31, 2008), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1404608 
(explaining that on the basis of its own interpretation of its mandate, the Court retains 
jurisdiction to monitor compliance with its judgments and issues periodic compliance orders). 
242  Barrios Altos v. Peru, Merits, Reparations, and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. 
H.R. (ser. C) No. 83, ¶  51 (Sept. 3, 2001) (finding that Amnesty Laws No. 26479 and No. 
26492 are incompatible with the American Convention on Human Rights and, consequently, 
lack legal effect). 
243  Compare id. ¶ 18 (“[T]he effects of the decision in the judgment on the merits of 
the Barrios Altos Cases are general in nature”), with Dulitzky, supra note 8, at 67 (“The 
invalidation of national norms with general effects is a typical power of a constitutional court 
exercising judicial review, not of an international tribunal determining international 
responsibility of a State.”). 
244  Almonacid Arellano et al. v. Chile, Merits, Reparations, and Costs, Judgment, 
Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 154, 124 (Sept. 26, 2006).; Dulitzky, supra note 8, at 58 (“In 
the past, the Court consistently insisted that domestic norms, including a State’s constitution, 
need to conform to the Convention. But up to Almonacid, it never required judges to directly 
apply the Convention.  It always left it to the judicial authorities’ discretion how to secure 
such compatibility.  Of course, the wide latitude simultaneously requires full compliance 
with the treaty.”). 
245  Dulitzky, supra note 8, at 70 (“In this metamorphosis of the Convention from an 
international treaty to a hierarchically superior domestic norm, the Court is asking local 
To Speak with One Voice                                                    599 
 
 
In 2006, the Court mandated that the control must be done ex-officio using the 
principle of effet utile of the Convention.246  In 2012, it continued expanding the 
content of the test by mandating local judiciaries to include it in their reparation 
stages.247  In other words, domestic high courts have a duty to use the Convention 
as the baseline of their constitutional powers, and in doing so they are bounded by 
the jurisprudence and the remedies orders of the IACtHR. If the domestic 
constitutional jurisprudence contradicts the decisions of the IACtHR, the 
supranational standard must be upheld even above the constitutional traditions of 
the highest courts. 248  
To some commentators, the Court’s expansive jurisprudence is 
ungrounded in the text of the Convention.249  The conventionality control has 
recently transformed the Convention into “a text that is very different from the one 
that the States that participated in the San Jose Conference approved.”250  The 
Court’s aggressive work has transformed it into an antidemocratic institution.251  
                                                            
tribunals to exercise both judicial review and conventionality control even if those tribunals 
are not constitutionally authorized to perform them.”). 
246  The Dismissed Congressional Employees (Aguado Alfaro et.al) v. Peru, Merits, 
Reparations, and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 158, at 128 (Nov. 24, 
2006) (“When a State has ratified an international treaty such as the American Convention, 
the judges are also subject to it; this obliges them [judges] to ensure that the effet util of the 
Convention is not reduced or annulled by the application of laws contrary to its provisions, 
object and purpose.”). 
247  Atala Riffo and Daughters v. Chile, Merits, Reparations, and Costs, Judgment, 
Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 239, at 281, 284 (Feb. 24, 2012) (dealing with the illegal use 
of the sexual orientation of a mother to determine the custody of her daughters after her 
divorce). 
248  Oswaldo Ruiz-Chiriboga, The Conventionality Control: Examples of (Un) 
Successful Experiences in Latin America, 3 INTER-AM. EUR. HUM. RTS. J. 200, 203–04 (2010) 
(arguing that “national authorities have a narrow discretion, and therefore they should carry 
out a narrow conventionality control, since the matter has been already decided by the 
IACtHR. On the contrary, in [cases that have not been decided by the IACtHR], national 
authorities have a broad margin of appreciation, and consequently they are entitled to proceed 
with a broad conventionality control.”); Humberto Nogueira Alcalá, Diálogo 
Interjurisdiccional, Control de Convencionalidad y Jurisprudencia Del Tribunal 
Constitucional En Período 2006-2011, 10 ESTUD. CONST. 57, 531–40 (2012).  According to 
Professor Ariel Dulitzky, most of these contradictions might not resolve in the long-term due 
to the requirement to exhaust domestic remedies at the local level. Ariel E. Dulitzky, An 
Inter-American Constitutional Court-The Invention of the Conventionality Control by the 
Inter-American Court of Human Rights, 50 TEX. INT'L L.J. 45, 72–73 (2015) (“[T]he Latin 
American [local] interpretation of the Convention could be consistent with, partially 
consistent with, or contradictory to current or future Inter-American case law or among other 
domestic Latin American decisions . . . the potential for intra-judicial conflict is omnipresent 
in a pluralistic system where multiple high courts and judges assert jurisdiction over the 
Convention.”). 
249  Malarino, supra note 233, at  26–27.  
250  Id. at 27–28.  
251  Id. at 29.  
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The Court has become an activist court that is aiming “judicially to modify the law 
with the intention of adapting it to the social needs of the moment (naturally, those 
social needs that are identified as desirable by the judges).”252  Moreover, the Court 
may have recognized new rights, but it also has ignored the expressly recognized 
rights in the Convention of those who are accused as perpetrators of rights 
violations.  Finally, the Court, through its jurisprudence on remedies, has invaded 
the functions of the domestic judiciaries, legislative, and executive branches.  
Regardless of the underlying flaws or merits on the doctrinal work of the 
Court, it is safe to conclude that this international body has tried to emulate 
constitutional courts. The supranational body has been aiming at domestic 
judiciaries to harness their power, and it has tried to make the Convention a 
component of the domestic legal system in which its final interpreter is the IACtHR 
itself.253  That is, the IACtHR has asserted judicial supremacy in very similar terms 
to the US Supreme Court.  It is the ultimate interpreter of how power is to be 
exercised by domestic authorities. In this effort, the highest courts are to be the 
domestic enforces of the IACtHR.   
We can conclude that the IACtHR treats the Convention in a formalistic 
way, as the highest court of the land would treat its constitution.254  Yet, there are 
no other branches with elected officials controlling its functions, nor a sovereign 
state that recognizes it as a constitutional court, or a global executive power that 
will enforce all of its decisions.  Moreover, building on the arguments described in 
previous sections, maintaining a constitutional adjudicatory system, supporting its 
institutions, and financing its task, depends ultimately on political actors.  It is 
unrealistic to assert that the survival of the Inter-American system depends solely 
on adequate legal reasoning.  Just as the maintenance of a constitutional system is 
a political task, so is the maintenance of a Conventional human rights system. 
Expansive international human rights treaties or constitutions “cannot survive if 
they are too politically costly to maintain, and they cannot survive if they are too 
distant from normal political concerns.”255  These political instruments thrive when 
they are “embraced and reenacted” by the operators of the system, such as judges, 
                                                            
252  Malarino, supra note 233, at 29. 
253  Helfer & Slaughter, supra note 19; Laurence R. Helfer & Anne-Marie Slaughter, 
Why States Create International Tribunals: A Response to Professors Posner and Yoo, CAL. 
L. REV. 899 (2005). 
254  Contrary to what some commentators argue, this doctrinal expansion is not 
exclusively an influence from the European institutions, mainly the ECtHR. It is my 
contention that to see the expansion as merely mimicking the European process is to misread 
what motivates the Court’s jurisprudence. Yes, Europe influenced some of the IACtHR’s 
substantive interpretations, but its remedies jurisprudence and the conventionality control are 
unparalleled in international adjudication. For example, the ECtHR has mainly awarded 
monetary compensations. It did not engage in other type of remedies until very recently as a 
way to reduce the number of applications. Compare  Antkowiak, supra note 9, at 355, with 
G. L. Neuman, supra note 144, at 101–123, 101–02, and L. Lixinski, Treaty Interpretation 
by the Inter-American Court of Human Rights: Expansionism at the Service of the Unity of 
International Law, 21 EUR. J. INT’L L. 585, 585–604 (2010).  
255 WHITTINGTON, supra note 11, at 26. 
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government officials, citizens, and practitioners.256  They cannot serve as guardians 
of the government’s acts if they stand outside of politics.  In the words of Keith 
Whittington, “the crucial problem is not that judicial interpretations cannot remain 
‘objective’ and ‘neutral’ and sealed off from political considerations.  The more 
fundamental problem is that the Court’s judgments will have no force unless other 
powerful political actors accept the importance of the interpretative task and the 
priority of the judicial voice.”257  Just as such an understanding is necessary at the 
domestic level, we need to understand why government officials who have no 
strings attached to the international system and can intimidate, co-opt, ignore, or 
dismantle the IACtHR, would be willing to use the Inter-American system and defer 
to the judicial authority of the Court. When the IACtHR has been able to establish 
its authority successfully, other political or judicial actors must have had reasons 
for allowing the supranational court to assert its authority. This is the subject to be 
analyzed in the next section.  
 
 
V. THE EFFECTS OF THE EXPANSION OF THE IACTHR ON 
DOMESTIC INTER-BRANCH POLITICS 
  
This paper has asserted that executives use their prerogative of being the 
official representative of the state in the IACtHR adjudicatory system and control 
which cases and arguments will be defended. For example, the executive decides 
whether the judiciary will participate in the defense of the state when the case is 
about judicial processes. The executive decides if the state will defend the acts of 
judges and prosecutors, or concede that they are insufficient and invite the 
supranational court to order domestic judges to take a different approach. Based on 
the arguments expressed in previous sections, we can conclude that when a Latin 
American state decides not to defend its case before the IACtHR, this strategy may 
invite the Court to adopt expansive measures and order policies and legislative 
changes agreeable to the executive.  
This section overviews the cases in which Latin American presidents have 
decided not to defend the state or downplay certain defenses.  The section begins 
with an overview of the domestic political contexts in which this has happened: 
mainly contexts of politically divided governments that prevent the incoming 
coalitions from modifying preexisting constitutional understandings.  It then turns 
to three cases of study involving Venezuela, Chile and Costa Rica. In these cases, 
local executives agreed with the supranational court’s agenda and allowed its 
influence.  The Court’s expansion gave the executive the pretext to impose an 
agenda that domestically could have been harder to achieve with political parties or 
social opposition. Moreover, the cases are an example of the evolution of the Court 
to a more politically consequential court at the domestic level through its reasoning. 
The Venezuelan case took place in the early stages of the expansive movement of 
the Court; the Chilean case was one of the first cases in which the Court ordered a 
                                                            
256  WHITTINGTON, supra note 11, at 26. 
257  Id. 
602 Arizona Journal of International & Comparative Law      Vol. 34, No. 3        2017 
 
state to modify its constitution on issues not related to amnesties; the Costa Rican 
case offers the opportunity to review the latest effort of the Court to make its 
remedies more expansive at the domestic level and to modify the way domestic 
constitutional courts’ reason about rights.  
 
 
A. From Opposition to Government in Power 
 
The cases in which executives have used the IACtHR to impose a 
particular political agenda are frequently cases in which the incoming government 
faces opposition from a previously dominant political coalition.  The strong 
resistance of political coalitions to new governments is not uncommon in Latin 
America where politics are highly polarized in ideological terms.258  The incoming 
governments reach power with a “reconstructive agenda,” with ambitious political 
projects that seek to articulate new ways for the government to function under a 
“progressive” understanding of the constitutional order.259  Presidents that emerged 
out of opposition parties determine that it is in their best interest to allow the 
expansion of the IACtHR’s influence. Instead of imposing a new political agenda 
expanding their own constitutional powers, and consequently reviving the 
                                                            
258  See generally Angel Oquendo, Address at Yale Latin American Seminar on 
Constitutional and Political Theory: The Politicization of Human Rights (2013). It is not 
uncommon in Latin America to find that government from the right— in favor of free market, 
neoliberal in terms of social policies, and linked to the Catholic church—are followed 
immediately by governments from the left—in favor of state intervention, popular in their 
social policies, linked to Marxist or guerilla groups of the 1970s. See Guillermo O’Donnell, 
MODERNIZATION AND BUREAUCRATIC-AUTHORITARIANISM: STUDIES IN SOUTH AMERICAN 
POLITICS, Chapter II, (international studies, University of California Berkley) (1973). See 
generally David Collier ed., THE NEW AUTHORITARIANISM IN LATIN AMERICA, (Princeton 
Univ. Press, 1980) (providing a review of the Catholic church and its role in politics); Harry 
E. Vanden & Gary Prevost, POLITICS OF LATIN AMERICA, Chapter Six, (NY, Oxford Univ. 
press, 2002) (providing a review of the use of human rights narratives by the political 
spectrum from the right and left); LUIS RONIGER & MARIO SZNAJDER, THE LEGACY OF 
HUMAN-RIGHTS VIOLATIONS IN THE SOUTHERN CONE: ARGENTINA, CHILE AND URUGUAY, Ch. 
I (Oxford. Univ. Press, 1999) (discussing how former guerilla fighters were elected to office 
in Brazil); Paulo Prada, Ex-Guerrilla on Cusp of Power in Brazil, WALL STR. J. (Sept. 30, 
2010), http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB100014240527487047910045755201713955955.  
For example, in the recent presidential election in Argentina, after the government of Nestor 
and Kristina Kirshner that was strongly in the left spectrum, and that rose into power after 
the debacle of the Menem neoliberal administration in the late 1990s, which was followed 
by the government of Macri, who is linked to the right oriented political parties in favor of 
neoliberal policies. Simon Romero & Jonathan Gilbert, In Rebuke to Kirchner, Argentines 
Elect Opposition Leader Mauricio Macri as President, N. Y. TIMES (Nov. 22, 2015), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2015/11/23/world/americas/argentina-president-election-
mauricio-macri.html. 
259  WHITTINGTON, supra note 11, at 286. In a way these governments are closer to the 
reconstructive presidencies in the United States in terms of their ambitious projects against 
the existing governing coalitions. Id. 
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sentiments of presidential authoritarianism or hyper-presidentialism—something 
that they themselves rejected when being in the opposition—they have the potential 
to impose their agendas using the IACtHR interpretative authority.260  
These incoming governments gain authority by repudiating what came 
before them; their political power emerges from their reconstructive agenda. In 
these cases, the displaced regime, which could be the one established by the military 
juntas (i.e. Chile and Argentina) or a right-neoliberal oriented government (i.e. Peru 
and Venezuela in the early 1990s), is still vibrant, popular, and resilient to 
changes.261  The opposition might have been able to win the election, but once it 
gets into power it has few initial resources to restructure preexisting governmental 
practices, structures, or policies.262  
If the previous coalition in power remained in control for long enough, 
there are high chances that the domestic judiciary and the bureaucracies will be 
reluctant to cooperate with the incoming coalition. 263  Judicial-executive relations 
are less than ideal in this context. 264  The incoming president is likely to disagree 
with the constitutional understandings of the highest court of the time. 265   If their 
                                                            
260  GARGARELLA, supra note 22 (arguing that Latin American constitutionalism has 
always been a continuous fight over the control of hyper-presidentialism, and even with the 
emergence of liberal constitutions that give additional powers to congress and the judiciary, 
the president has always retain a central position of the political process). 
261  WHITTINGTON, supra note 11, at 161 (“Not all oppositional leaders who gain power 
can claim the authority to reconstruct the inherited constitutional order. Their claims on 
political leadership are more modest and more tenuous. Unlike presidents such as Jefferson, 
Jackson, Lincoln, and Franklin Roosevelt, who stand in opposition to a vulnerable set of 
constitutional commitments ready to be toppled over, other oppositional presidents merely 
‘preempt’ a continuing partisan and political order. Such oppositional candidates may 
manage to win election, but they come to office with relatively little authority and few 
resources with which to increase their authority. The regime they oppose is still vibrant, 
popular, and resilient to pressure. Such presidents must learn to accommodate themselves to 
the dominant regime in order to be successful.”). 
262  Id. 
263  Nuno Garoupa & Maria A. Maldonado, The Judiciary in Political Transitions: The 
Critical Role of US Constitutionalism in Latin America, 19 CARDOZO J. INT'L & COMP. L. 
593, 596 (2011) (“On the other hand, the judiciary has largely been appointed, influenced, 
and dominated by the previous political regime, and has therefore been suspected of 
potentially undermining the foundations of the new democratic regime. The respect for the 
rule of law and the proper adherence of the judiciary to the new political regime create a 
conceptual and practical problem.”); Christopher J. Walker, Toward Democratic 
Consolidation? The Argentine Supreme Court, Judicial Independence, and the Rule of Law, 
18 FL. J. INT'L L. 745, 758 (2006). 
264  WHITTINGTON, supra note 11, at 161; Garoupa & Maldonado, supra note 263, at 
758. 
265  WHITTINGTON, supra note 11, at 161 (“Judicial authority to interpret the 
Constitution within the politics of opposition is likely to be secure, but the relationship 
between the Court and the president in such situations is hardly idyllic. Reconstructive 
presidents are likely to disagree with the constitutional understandings of the Court, and they 
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political power is insufficient to displace the existing understanding, it has the 
capacity to do so using its powers to control the official defense of the state in the 
Inter-American System.266 
As explained above, the role of judges in the local judicial system forms 
part of the claims in most of cases decided by the IACtHR.  In principle, victims 
must exhaust domestic remedies before bringing the case to the Inter-American 
system.  Hence, the presidents have a monopoly over the type of arguments that 
will be made at the international level regarding the domestic legal system’s 
compliance with international standards.  This prerogative is similar to the one 
found in the United States regarding the president’s influence on the DOJ in 
determining the official position of the federal government in judicial 
proceedings. 267  Instead of accommodating the existing regime, these types of 
governments have used the cases in the IACtHR to advance their agenda.  In fact, 
it is not uncommon to find in the Court’s caseload many cases that may have been 
initiated by the entering coalition when they were part of the opposition.268  It takes 
so many years for the system to process the cases that by the time they reach the 
IACtHR the incumbent government may have been the opposition when the case 
was generated and the responsible actors may no longer be in power.269 
  In sum, if the incoming presidential coalition is ambitious enough to try 
to modify the existing constitutional understanding protected by the highest court, 
it still has one way to go if its efforts fail at the domestic level. Naturally, this 
situation is also dependent on the fact that the incoming presidency is sympathetic 
with the conventional understanding of the IACtHR. If this happens, the executive 
will find ways to support the independent authority of the Court to act on those 
understandings at the domestic level.270  The different ways in which this has 
happened are: (1) a downplay of the plausible defenses by the state in the concrete 
case; (2) the open recognition of the violations in the proceedings; (3) an invitation 
to move to the remedies stages; (4) a non-defense of the domestic judicial process 
or the decisions of domestic courts; and finally; (5) in the most extreme cases, a 
non-defense of the State. These types of responses become opportunities for the 
IACtHR to display and enhance its role in restructuring what the Court considers to 
                                                            
have the ambitions and capacity to displace the judicial authority to interpret the Constitution 
with their own.”); Garoupa & Maldonado, supra note 263. 
266  WHITTINGTON, supra note 11, at 161.  
267  Id. at 196 (“The president has nearly a free hand in determining the official position 
of the federal government on issues that come before the bench. Through control over the 
Justice Department, the president can exercise significant influence over what cases are 
moved through the appellate process and what arguments are presented before the Court. In 
other words, federal government is a powerful and often successful litigant, and the president 
has almost exclusive control over that dimension of the government.”). 
268  See infra Sections V.B. and V.C. (exemplifying Venezuela and Chile). 
269  Id.  
270  WHITTINGTON, supra note 11, at 161 (“Presidents who are more sympathetic with 
the constitutional understandings of the Court are likely to find reason to support the 
independent authority of the Court to act on those understandings.”). 
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be deficient aspects of domestic legal systems.271  They are invitations from the 
executives to the supranational court to “put its stamp” on the domestic 
constitutional order.272  
When the case exclusively involves actions of the administration in power, 
the opposite might happen.  The defense of the state is a defense of the sitting 
executive and becomes a direct confrontation to the Inter-American System.273  The 
point here is that one cannot establish a priori that it will always be in the interest 
of the executive to defend the state in the international forum; to the contrary losing 
the case or giving an official recognition of a violation to the Convention might be 
the best strategy available to the executive for promoting its agenda at the domestic 
level.274  
The unfolding tensions in Latin America are consistent with the cases 
identified by Whittington regarding US “preemptive” presidencies and by 
comparative constitutional law scholars in new democracies. 275  As mentioned 
before, these types of presidencies and their political coalitions take power by 
opposing the existing regime, and carrying few partisan commitments or political 
expectations that they must satisfy with the status quo.276  Yet, in order to sway 
public policy towards their agenda, they rely on the power of the Supreme Court.277  
In reaffirming judicial supremacy over defining the constitutional understandings 
of the state, they can try to convince the Court to work in their favor.278  The 
existence of structures that guarantee fragmented political authority, such as 
democratic systems of government with formal separations of power and/or with 
divided authority between central and local governments, becomes a variable that 
helps to explain the expansion of political consequential courts. These systems tend 
to face scenarios in which it becomes difficult for political leaders to challenge 
                                                            
271  WHITTINGTON, supra note 11, at 161, at 229. (arguing that the preemptive 
presidents “create opportunities for the Court to display and enhance its own independent, 
leadership role within American constitutional development. Whether they are actively 
turning new problems over to the courts or simply expressing their willingness to live with 
whatever decisions that the Court might make, these presidents invite the Court to actively 
put its stamp on the Constitution.”). 
272  Id. 
273  See infra Section IV.B.  
274  See generally WHITTINGTON, supra note 11; Galanter, supra note 11. 
275  WHITTINGTON, supra note 11, at 164; CONSEQUENTIAL COURTS, supra note 11, at 
23 (“It is taken as a truism among public law scholars that the fragmentation of political 
authority (divided government in a separation of powers system, weak multiparty coalitions, 
or fractionalized ruling parties) decreases the likelihood that political leaders can swiftly 
nullify or reverse assertive judicial ruling, thus offering courts greater opportunity to play 
active role sin governance.”). 
276  WHITTINGTON, supra note 11, at 229 (“For preemptive presidents, who often find 
themselves at odds with Congress and standing on a fragile electoral base, picking fights with 
the judiciary would be self-defeating. The independence and supremacy of the judiciary is as 
much a strategic asset for these presidents as it is for affiliated leaders.”). 
277  Id.  
278  Id.  
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judicial power, but also to impose their own agenda. 279  The existence of politically 
divided governments offers courts an opportunity to redefine constitutional 
understandings, and consequently expand their power.  When the political forces 
are divided, judges have an opportunity to become more politically 
consequential.280  When the political forces are united behind a strong leader or a 
political movement or coalition, all the formal structural elements that fragment 
authority can be used to constrain courts. 
The following subsections will show three cases in which the executive 
used its monopoly over the defense of the state to stir domestic constitutional and 
political understanding in its favor.  The analysis will begin with an overview of the 
political contexts in which the case emerged, the constitutional provisions that 
regulate international human rights treaties, and the key legal aspects that surround 
the controversies.  The analysis will then turn to the proceedings before the Inter-
American Commission of Human Rights, how this body interacted with the state, 
and how the case was framed before the IACtHR.  The overview of the cases will 
conclude with the decisions of the IACtHR and their effects on inter-branch politics, 
particularly on the relationship between the executive and the domestic judiciary. I 
must clarify that the emphasis in the analysis of the cases will be placed on the 
parties and on the orders from the international bodies.  The section will focus on 
the actors involved, the arguments presented, and who benefits from the Court’s 
decisions. The doctrinal evolution of the rights discussed by the Court will only be 
analyzed in this context.  
 
 
B. Venezuela as a Case of Study: The Caracazo Case 
 
The case of Venezuela is an example of how constitutional and legal 
structures that are textually favorable for a good interaction with the IACtHR can 
be manipulated, using a human rights discourse, to reject the imposition of 
particular views from the San Jose Court. Before the Chavez Constitution entered 
into force in 1999, the judiciary in Venezuela tended to be very passive and played 
a limited role in the institutional arrangements of the country. After the 1999 
Constitution, the Supreme Tribunal has become a very active body, settling disputes 
among branches, restructuring social policies, and even challenging the IACtHR. 
For some commentators, it has become a politically consequential court for the 
wrong reasons to advance the particular ideological agenda of the Chavez regime.281  
                                                            
279  WHITTINGTON, supra note 11, at 229. 
280  CONSEQUENTIAL COURTS, supra note 11, at 24. Regardless of the tradition of 
independence that courts might have, which is in itself a difficult variable to measure, the 
consensus in case studies is that “fragmentation in ruling parties and coalitions appears to be 
an important factor stimulating and sustaining judicial role expansion.” Id.  
281  Garoupa & Maldonado, supra note 263, at 602–03; Lauren Castaldi, Judicial 
Independence Threatened in Venezuela: The Removal of Venezuelan Judges and the 
Complications of Rule of Law Reform, 37 GEO. J. INT'L L. 477,477–78 (2005). See generally 
ALLAN-RANDOLPH BREWER CARÍAS, DISMANTLING DEMOCRACY IN VENEZUELA: THE 
CHÁVEZ AUTHORITARIAN EXPERIMENT (2010). 
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Furthermore, the case of Venezuela shows how even a left oriented 
populist government can use the system to its advantage to dismantle previous 
political coalitions when coming into power.  A central element of this strategy is 
the power of the executive to defend the State in international proceedings.  As the 
political coalitions abandon their position as opposition groups and become the 
ruling power, then the system can be used against them. 
 
 
1. The Early Months of Chavez in Power 
 
In 1999, Hugo Chavez Frias, a former military officer who was once 
imprisoned for having led a failed coup d’état, won the presidency of Venezuela. 
He was the first president of Venezuela since 1958 that did not come from the two 
traditional parties (Copei and Acción Democratica).282  In the ten years before 
Chavez’s arrival into power these two parties tried to implement a series of 
neoliberal economic reforms in Venezuela, but the economy stagnated due to the 
fall of oil prices and production.283  Millions of Venezuelans were in poverty and 
blamed the pre-existing political coalition for it.284    President Chavez’s agenda was 
openly socialist and aimed at reforming the existing institutions and neoliberal 
policies.285   
During the first months of this presidency, Hugo Chavez held personal 
meetings with the Inter-American Commission of Human Rights.286  This was the 
first time that a sitting president in Latin America went to visit the Commission at 
its headquarters in Washington D.C., let alone a mere couple of months after taking 
office.287  After the meeting with the members of the Commission, who at that time 
were investigating crimes committed in 1989 by the previous political regime in the 
Caracazo case, President Chavez invited the Commission to do an in loco visit and 
                                                            
282  Judith Ewell, Venezuela since 1930, 8 CAMBRIDGE HISTORY OF LATIN AMERICA. 
727, 785–90 (1991) (providing a history of the distribution of power between the two main 
powers up to the early 1990s). 
283  Osmel Manzano & Francisco Monaldi, The Political Economy of Oil Production 
in Latin America, 9 ECONOMÍA 59, 86–87 (2008); DANIEL YERGIN, THE QUEST: ENERGY, 
SECURITY AND THE REMAKING OF THE MODERN WORLD 122 (2011). 
284  YERGIN, supra note 283, at 122. 
285  Daniel Hellinger, When “No” Means “Yes to Revolution”: Electoral Politics in 
Bolivarian Venezuela, 32 LAT. AM. PERSP. 8, 14 (2005); Cristóbal Valencia Ramírez, 
Venezuela’s Bolivarian Revolution: Who Are the Chavistas?, 32 LAT. AM. PERSP. 79, 84 
(2005); Carles Muntaner et al., Venezuela’s Barrio Adentro: An Alternative to Neoliberalism 
in Health Care, 36 INT'L J. HEALTH SERV. 803 (2006). 
286  Press Release, Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R., Press Release No. 24/99, Inter American 
Commission Press Release No 24/99 (1999), http://www.cidh.org/Comunicados/Spanish/
1999/Comunicado%2024-99.htm; Capítulo II Bases Jurídicas y Actividades de la Cidh 
Durante, Inter-Am. Comm'n H.R., Activity Report (1999), , https://www.cidh.oas.org/
annualrep/99span/capitulo2.htm. 
287  Supra note 285. 
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praised its work in defending human rights in the region.288  The Caracazo case 
dealt directly with decisions made by the previous President of Venezuela, Carlos 
Andres Perez (the same President that Chavez tried to remove in the failed coup 
d’état).289  The claims involved the suppression of a popular uprising against the 
structural adjustment measures ordered as part of a deal to refinance the external 
national debt.290  During the revolts, then-President Carlos Andres Perez suspended 
constitutional rights to repress riots in the major cities of Venezuela.  The measures 
included a general curfew and security operations by the National Guard and 
Army.291  The suspension of rights lasted for several weeks; by the time order was 
restored, hundreds of individuals died and an unspecified number of citizens were 
wounded, disappeared, or suffered major material losses.292  
 
 
 2. The Recognition of Responsibility before the IACtHR 
 
Chavez’ eagerness to cooperate with the system and put the previous 
regime on trial was reaffirmed a couple of months after his Washington visit when 
the Inter-American Commission brought the Caracazo case to the IACtHR. In its 
first hearing before the Court, the Chavez regime conceded all the alleged facts and 
took full responsibility for the Venezuelan government’s actions taken against the 
citizens of Caracas in 1989.293  The Chavez regime requested the Court to proceed 
to the remedies stage and offered to comply with all reparations and compensation 
orders from the Court.294  Moreover, it offered to pay compensation to the victims—
not only the ones included in the claim before the Court, but also any other victims 
or their relatives. 295   It created a special prosecution unit to continue the 
investigation against the officers responsible for the actions and filed a request 
before the Supreme Court of Venezuela to assert jurisdiction over the criminal 
                                                            
288  Supra note 285. 
289  Caracazo Merits, supra note 25, at ¶ 2.  
290  Id.  
291  Id.; Caracazo v. Venezuela, Reparations, and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. 
(ser. C) No. 95, ¶ 66.2 (Aug. 29, 2002) [hereinafter Caracazo Reparations]. 
292  Caracazo Reparations, supra note 291, ¶ 66.3 (“[A]ccording to the recount of the 
facts the official figure of 276 civilian deaths was contested by the fact that years later several 
common graves were found in the surroundings with unidentified bodies. The vast majority 
of the killings were done by the military forces and caused by random shot fires or 
extrajudicial executions.”). 
293  Caracazo Merits, supra note 25, ¶ 39. 
294  Id.; Caracazo Reparations supra note 291, ¶ 19. In a subsequent declaration during 
the reparation stages the regime even stated that it “accepted the case law of the Court 
regarding reparations” and that it “could provide whatever necessary information was 
requested by the Court and would ‘in good faith, accept the truthfulness of all information 
submitted by the applicants or their representatives, with prior sworn statements that the 
content of said information is truthful, so as to accelerate this case inasmuch as possible.’” 
Id. 
295  Caracazo Merits, supra note 25, ¶ 39; Caracazo Reparations supra note 291, ¶ 19.  
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investigations in military tribunals.296  The IACtHR also ordered a reform of the 
criminal code, the military code, and any other regulation or measure that prevented 
the state from investigating and prosecuting those responsible for the acts 
committed.297  
After the decision of the Court, a new constitution was adopted in 
December 1999 by national referendum.298  The new constitutional text contained 
a set of provisions that gave constitutional hierarchy to human rights treaties signed 
and ratified by Venezuela (Article 19 and 23).299  Moreover, Article 31 recognized 
the right of any Venezuelan to bring claims against the state in supranational human 
rights bodies. 300  The IACtHR’s decision also helped President Chavez reform the 
Military Justice Code so that the President could exercise exorbitant powers in the 
ambit of military jurisdiction.301  Human rights covenants and the proceedings 
before the IACtHR became two of the instruments of the incoming Chavez regime 
to reform the state, control the military institutions that had been loyal to the 
previous regime and establish his Bolivarian revolution. This same government in 
2013 denounced the American Convention and the jurisdiction of the Court. 302  
                                                            
296  Caracazo Reparations, supra note 291, ¶ 66.12. 
297  Id. ¶¶ 119–20. 
298  REPÚBLICA BOLIVARIANA DE VENEZUELA CONSTITUCIÓN [CONSTITUTION], Dec. 30, 
1999. See also Michael A. Lebowitz, Venezuela: A Good Example of the Bad Left of Latin 
America, 59 MONT. L. REV. 38 (2007) (discussing the contradictions of the Chavez 
Constitution). 
299  REPÚBLICA BOLIVARIANA DE VENEZUELA CONSTITUCIÓN [CONSTITUTION], supra 
note 298. “The State shall guarantee to every individual, in accordance with the progressive 
principle and without discrimination of any kind, no renounceable, indivisible and 
interdependent enjoyment and exercise of human rights. Respect for and the guaranteeing of 
these rights is obligatory for the organs of Public Power, in accordance with the Constitution, 
the human rights treaties signed and ratified by the Republic and any laws developing the 
same.” Id. art. 19. “The treaties, pacts and conventions relating human rights which have 
been executed and ratified by Venezuela have a constitutional rank, and prevail over internal 
legislation, insofar as they contain provisions concerning the enjoyment and exercise of such 
rights that are more favorable than those established by this Constitution and the laws of the 
Republic, and shall be immediately and directly applied by the courts and other organs of the 
Public Power.” Id. art. 23. 
300  Id. art. 31 (“Everyone has the right, on the terms established by the human rights 
treaties, pacts and conventions ratified by the Republic, to address petitions and complaints 
to the intentional organs created for such purpose, in order to ask for protection of his or her 
human rights. The State shall adopt, in accordance with the procedures established under this 
Constitution and by the law, such measures as may be necessary to enforce the decisions 
emanating from international organs as provided for under this article.”). 
301  Caracazo Merits, supra note 25, ¶ 39; Caracazo Reparations, supra note 291, ¶ 
44. 
302  Press Release, Organization of American States, IACHR Deeply Concerned over 
Result of Venezuela’s Denunciation of the American Convention (Aug. 1, 2009) (on file at 
http://www.oas.org/en/iachr/media_center/PReleases/2013/064.asp); Diego German Mejia-
Lemos, Venezuela’s Denunciation of the American Convention on Human Rights | ASIL, 
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This happened after the Chavez regime faced several cases brought against it by the 
opposition. 303  The decision to abandon the system was also fueled by a series of 
bad experiences with the Commission.304  For example, the Commission failed in 
2002 to order immediate provisional measures to ensure the safety of imprisoned 
Chavez officials during a three-day coup attempt against the regime.305  
Two more detailed examples will be discussed in the following 
subsections, but the case of Venezuela shows how even the most politically radical 
governments, when entering into power after facing long periods of a pre-existing 
political regimes, can use the system to their advantage and dismantle previous 
constitutional and political understandings. 
 
 
C. Chile as a Case of Study: The Last Temptation of Christ Case 
 
1. The 1980 Constitution and Transition 
 
From 1973 to 1990, Chile was governed by a military junta under the 
leadership of General Augusto Pinochet. During the authoritarian times, the 
judiciary “capitulated to, and in some ways colluded with, the Pinochet 
dictatorship.”306  According to recent studies and reports of the Truth Commission, 
judges denied around 8,000 habeas corpus claims during the dictatorship.307  This 
judicial passivity allowed the military to continue their practices of forced 
disappearance, torture, and extrajudicial executions.308    
Due in part to international pressures and social opposition, in 1980 the 
regime adopted a new constitution, but allowed Pinochet to remain in power until 
1989.309  After a series of negotiations between the existing military government 
and the opposition coalition of center-left and Christian Democrats, the 
concertación, Pinochet agreed in 1988 to a poll on whether he should stay in power 
as the President of the Republic.  The concertación coalition won the referendum. 
In 1990, Patricio Aylwin, one of the leaders of the concertación, became the first 
                                                            
ASIL INSIGHTS (Jan. 9, 2013), https://www.asil.org/insights/volume/17/issue/1/venezuelas-
denunciation-american-convention-human-rights;  Oquendo, supra note 258. 
303  Oquendo, supra note 258. 
304  Letter from Nicolas Maduro, the President of Venezuela, to the Secretary General 
of the OAS (Sept. 6, 2012) (on file at http://www.minci.gob.ve/wp-
content/uploads/2013/09/Carta-Retiro-CIDH-Firmada-y-sello.pdf). 
305  Id. at 5. 
306  Huneeus, Judging from a Guilty Conscience, supra note 111, at 100. 
307  Id. 
308  Id. 
309  Jan Eckel, “Under a Magnifying Glass” The International Human Rights 
Campaign Against Chile in the Seventies, HUMAN RIGHTS OF THE TWENTIETH CENTURY 321, 
321 (2010) (describing how the bloody takeover of the military in Chile “gave rise to one of 
the longest and most intense human rights campaigns ever rise to be waged against a single 
regime. It stretched over the entire sixteen years of the military junta’s existence, from 1973 
to 1989, flaring up every time new shocking details reached the media.”). 
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transition president of Chile.310  This coalition ruled for the next ten years. Although 
some elements of the 1980 Constitution were amended in 1989 after the fall of 
Pinochet, its structure remained very close to what the military regime had 
approved.  Moreover, regarding structure and appointments, the judiciary remained 
untouched by the transition of power.311  As part of the transition agreement, the 
new administration maintained an Amnesty Law passed in 1978 (1978 Amnesty 
Law) by the Pinochet regime for all the crimes committed during the first years of 
the military coup by both army officers and the opposition. 312   Instead of 
prosecutions, President Aylwin created a truth commission.313 
The fact that the 1980 Constitution was adopted by the Pinochet military 
regime does not mean that it lacked the essential elements of what the progressives 
would consider a modern constitution, mainly the incorporation of an elaborate 
system of judicial review of legislation and administrative acts.314  The constitution 
established a mixed or disseminated system of control of the constitutionality of 
laws and administrative acts.  On the one hand, the Constitutional Court exercised 
an abstract control, or preventive control, of the constitutionality of legislation or 
executive decrees before they enter into force.  On the other hand, the Supreme 
Court and the Appellate Courts exercise a regular judicial review, or concrete a 
posteriori review, of all laws, decrees, and administrative acts in force that violate 
individual rights.315  
                                                            
310  Javier Couso, The Politics of Judicial Review in Chile in the Era of Democratic 
Transition, 1990-2002, DEMOCRATIZATION AND THE JUDICIARY 1, 75 (2004). 
311  Garoupa & Maldonado, supra note 263, at 623. 
312  Ruiz-Chiriboga, supra note 248, at 212; Huneeus, Judging from a Guilty 
Conscience, supra note 111, at 103; Almonacid Arellano et al. v. Chile, Merits, Reparations, 
and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 154, ¶ 82.10 (Sept. 26, 2006).  
313  Huneeus, Judging from a Guilty Conscience, supra note 111, at 103. 
314  Couso, supra note 310, at 72 (“The history of judicial review in Chile is relatively 
new, effectively dating from 1980. The new charter incorporated a complex system of 
judicial review of both legislation and administrative acts. This represented a significant 
change in the country’s legal tradition, which had lacked a meaningful system of judicial 
review of the constitutionality of laws.”). 
315  Id. at 72–73 (“Chile’s system of judicial review is peculiar. It consists of a number 
of mechanisms spread among different constitutional bodies, representing what Chilean legal 
scholars call a ‘mixed’ or ‘disseminated’ system of control of the constitutionality of laws 
and administrative acts. The system is thus characterized by a division of labor between a 
Constitutional Court (Tribunal Constitucional) in charge of the ‘preventive’ control of the 
constitutionality of laws and executive decrees; the superior courts of the regular judiciary 
(the Cortes de Apelaciones and Corte Suprema), with jurisdiction over a newly devised 
constitutional injunction, the writ of protection (recurso de proteccion); a rarely used writ of 
non-applicability of laws (recurso de inaplicabilidad); and a special body endowed with the 
power to exercise control of the constitutionality of administrative acts (Contraloria General 
de la Republica). According to this scheme, the Constitutional Court performs an ‘abstract’ 
(or a priori) review of the constitutionality of legislation, that is, the review of bills approved 
by Congress but not yet promulgated, while the regular judiciary performs the ‘concrete’ (or 
‘a posteriori’) review of already existing laws and executive decrees violating individual 
rights thought the writs of protection and non-applicability.”). 
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Regarding the hierarchy of human rights treaties in the constitutional 
system, the Constitution of 1980 only stated in Article 5 that the “the exercise of 
sovereignty recognizes as a limitation the respect for the essential rights which 
emanate from human nature.”316  In 1989, as part of the negotiations of the transition 
into democracy, a second paragraph was added to include that “it is the duty of the 
organs of the State to respect and promote those rights, guaranteed by this 
Constitution, and by the international treaties ratified by Chile and which are in 
force.”317  There is nothing in the Constitution that clarifies the hierarchy of rights 
in the Constitution vis-à-vis those in international treaties. It was left to the Chilean 
courts to decide how to solve a conflict among them.318  Moreover, there is nothing 
in the Constitution that forces the Chilean judges to consider as binding the 
interpretation of international courts as binding.  
 Article 19 of the 1980 Constitution recognized, among other rights, the 
right to protect the privacy and honor of the individual and the family, especially 
against defamation from public media. 319  The same article protects freedom of 
expression.320  In order to regulate freedom of expression, the Constitution also 
established a “system of censorship for the exhibition and publicity of 
cinematographic productions.”321  The system was regulated by Decree Law No. 
679, which authorized the Cinematographic Classification Council of the Ministry 
of Education to supervise the exhibition and classification of films in Chile.322  
 In 1988, when the military junta was still in power, the Cinematographic 
Classification Council refused to allow the exhibition of the film “The Last 
Temptation of Christ.”323  The decision was appealed and confirmed by the Chilean 
judiciary in 1989.324  In 1996, with the election of President Eduardo Frei from the 
concertación coalition, the Council revoked its previous decision and allowed the 
exhibition of the film.325  A group of Catholic lawyers filed a remedy of protection 
                                                            
316  CONSTITUCIÓN POLÍTICA DE LA REPÚBLICA DE CHILE [CONSTITUTION] Oct. 24, 
1980, art. 5.  
317  Id. 
318  The Last Temptation of Christ Merits, supra note 26, at 18 (citing the opinion of 
expert Francisco Cumplido: “With the exception of the modification concerning artistic 
entertainment that goes beyond the American Convention, the position was adopted that the 
human rights embodied in the international treaties ratified by Chile in force should be 
incorporated into the Constitution. Cinematographic censorship was left in force and the 
possibility of establishing norms on the public expression of other artistic activities was 
eliminated. It was argued that, should there be a contradiction between a right established in 
the Constitution and a right established in an international treaty, the courts would resolve 
it.”). 
319 CONSTITUCIÓN POLÍTICA DE LA REPÚBLICA DE CHILE Oct. 24, 1980, art. 19; The Last 
Temptation of Christ Merits, supra note 26, at 21, ¶ 60.  
320  The Last Temptation of Christ Merits, supra note 26, at 21, ¶ 60. 
321  Id. 
322  Id.  
323  Id.  
324  Id. 
325  The Last Temptation of Christ Merits, supra note 26, at 21, ¶ 60(d).  
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in the Court of Appeals of Santiago against the Council’s decision.326  The Court of 
Appeals admitted the remedy of protection and annulled the Council’s decision 
based on a balancing test between the right to freedom and the right to protect 
honor.327  This decision was then appealed to the Supreme Court of Chile and 
reaffirmed by this body in 1997.328  The Chilean judges found that the Constitution 
gave higher priority to the protection of privacy and honor because they were linked 
to the dignity of the human being, while the right to freedom of expression was not 
absolute and subject to constitutional restrictions.329  This conclusion was supported 
by jurisprudential criteria of the Chilean superior courts in previous cases in which 
the judges gave predominance to the right to honor over freedom of expression.330 
The Chilean Supreme Court’s reasoning did not take into consideration human 
rights treaties or the jurisprudence of the IACtHR. In reaction to the decision made 
by the judiciary, President Frei submitted a draft constitutional reform to the 
Chamber of Deputies that would eliminate the prior censorship of the exhibition 
and publicity of cinematographic production.331  The draft was adopted in 1999 by 
the Chamber of Deputies, but due to the constitutionally required amendment 
process it remained in discussion on the Senate floor.332  In Chile, a constitutional 
amendment can take up to seven years to be fully adopted.333  
The facts surrounding the case show all the elements described in the 
previous section: an incoming governing coalition controlling the executive faced 
the opposition of the preexisting constitutional understanding—in this case, 
embedded in the Constitution of 1980 and the reasoning of the Supreme Court of 
Chile. The Executive then tried to modify the constitutional understanding through 
legislative power, but politics and constitutional amendment requirements halted 
the process. As it will be explained below, the Inter-American system helped the 
executive advance its agenda and bypass the decision of the domestic judiciary.   
 
 
 
                                                            
326  The Last Temptation of Christ Merits, supra note 26, at 21, ¶ 60(e). 
327  See generally id. at 17 (citing the opinion of expert Francisco Cumplido). 
328  Id. at 21, ¶ 60(f). 
329 Id. at 17 (quoting the opinion of expert Francisco Cumplido: “[t]he difficulty that 
arose with the Supreme Court was due to a problem of interpretation, inasmuch as that Court 
gave preference to applying the right to honor over freedom of opinion, following the trends 
of some foreign courts and doctrine that makes a distinction between human rights that 
correspond to the dignity of the individual such as the right to life, to honor and to intimacy, 
and human rights concerning means, such as freedom of opinion and information.”). 
330  The Last Temptation of Christ Merits, supra note 26, at 13 (citing the opinion of 
expert Humberto Nogueira Alcala). 
331  Id. at 24–25, ¶ 62. 
332  Id. at 16, 24–25, ¶ 62. 
333  Id. at 16 (quoting the opinion of expert Francisco Cumplido: “[s]ome reforms have 
taken two years, others seven. Some have required extensive negotiations. Negotiations and 
agreements have been necessary for most constitutional reforms, owing to the integration of 
the political majorities.”). 
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2. The Inter-American Process: Declining to Defend the Decisions of the 
Judiciary and the Constitution 
 
After the Supreme Court of Chile reaffirmed the decision to ban the 
screening of the film, a group of lawyers brought a complaint on September 3, 1997 
before the Inter-American Commission.334  A year later, the Commission issued its 
report.335  It made reference to both the initiative of the executive to amend the 
Constitution and the decision of the Chilean Supreme Court.336  Regarding the 
Supreme Court’s decision, the Commission found its reasoning “incompatible” 
with the American Convention and that Chile should abolish the censorship over its 
exhibition.337  Moreover, it argued that the Chilean constitutional provisions on the 
restriction of the freedom of expression were also “incompatible” with the 
Convention. 338   The Commission also explicitly “evaluat[ed] positively the 
democratic Government of Chile’s initiatives aimed at the adoption by the 
competent organs of the necessary legislative or other measures . . . to make 
effective the rights to freedom of expression.”339  The Commission was describing 
the Supreme Court of Chile as the actor responsible for the international 
responsibility of the state for balancing the conflicting rights incorrectly.  Yet, the 
Commission was also giving a positive classification to the executive power for 
sharing the same view as the Commission on how to balance the same rights. The 
representatives of the state, as opposed to defending the government’s efforts to 
comply with and explain to the Commission the legislative process that was 
underway, failed to submit any information on how they were planning to comply 
with its recommendations.340  The lack of response from the government triggered 
the Commission to bring the case before the IACtHR in January 1999.341 
In the early stages of the proceeding, the IACtHR constantly requested and 
granted extensions to the state to present any objections to the application made by 
the Commission.342  In several instances the state failed to present any brief, and 
when it finally decided to do so, the Court rejected their brief because the statutory 
time limit had expired.343  Notwithstanding this fact, the records in the decision 
show that the state did not contradict the Commission’s report. 344   The state 
explicitly alleged in its brief that “it ha[d] no substantive discrepancies with the 
                                                            
334  The Last Temptation of Christ Merits, supra note 26, at 24, ¶ 5. 
335  Id. at 3, ¶ 10.  
336  Id. 
337  Id. 
338  Id.  
339  The Last Temptation of Christ Merits, supra note 26, at 3, ¶ 10 
340  Id. at 3, ¶ 11. 
341  Id. 
342  Id at 4–7, ¶¶ 13, 18, 19, 24, 25, 30, 41.  
343  Id. at 4–6, ¶¶ 18, 19, 20, 24, 25, 28, 30. 
344  The Last Temptation of Christ Merits, supra note 26, at 24–25, ¶ 62. 
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Commission.”345  Its only response to the Commission was an effort to clarify who 
was the appropriate actor to blame at the domestic level for the violation.346  The 
state argued that:  
 
[i]n a message to the Congress, President Eduardo Frei ha[d] 
indicated the Chilean Government’s position against prior 
censorship . . . [and that] the government [did] not share the 
jurisprudence of the Supreme Court of Chile that gives preference 
to the right to honor over freedom of expression . . . [a]n act of 
the Judiciary that is contrary to international law may engage the 
State’s international responsibility, provided that the State as a 
whole assumes the criteria issues by the Judiciary; . . . the 
acquiescence of the organ responsible for international relations, 
which is the Executive Power, is required, and this ha[d] not 
occurred in the instant case.347  
 
In other words, the state did not present a defense on the arguments being 
made by the Commission.  Its defense rested on the fact that the President was in 
general agreement with the Commission, and that there was no “acquiescence” from 
the executive regarding the actions of the Judiciary.348  As such the President should 
not be blamed for the violations committed by the judges.349  As mentioned above, 
the main arguments against the state were not related to the actions taken by the 
administration that was in power at the time, but rather were all related to the 
domestic judiciary and the 1980 Constitution of the military junta. The 
administration of President Frei had political reasons to not defend the judicial 
actions and the constitutional provisions in the case.  This same governmental actor 
was fighting in the domestic political arena to leave both the decision of the local 
high court and the constitutional provision without effect.  
On February 5, 2001, when the Court issued its ruling, it had only taken 
into consideration the brief presented by the Commission praising the efforts of the 
Chilean executive branch and arguing that the Constitution and the decisions of the 
Chilean Supreme Court were contrary to the Convention.350  In fact the Court 
recognized that “the State did not submit any type of evidence in answer to the 
[Commission’s] application” and that “[d]uring the public hearing on the merits of 
the case, Chile concentrated its defense on the argument that it had submitted a draft 
reform to article 10(12) of the Constitution.”351  The expert opinions presented by 
the Commission emphasized this fact by constantly making reference to the “good 
faith of the State of Chile” with regard to its efforts to reform the constitution, and 
                                                            
345  The Last Temptation of Christ Merits, supra note 26, at 24, ¶ 62 
346  Id. at 24–25, ¶ 52.  
347  Id. 
348  Id.  
349  Id. 
350  The Last Temptation of Christ Merits, supra note 26, at 19, ¶¶ 52, 53.  
351  Id. 
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the Chilean domestic judiciary’s “evident” disregard of international law due to its 
lack of sophistication and understanding of international law.352  This critique was 
stark, notwithstanding the fact, as mentioned above, that the Chilean Constitution 
of 1980 does not establish a constitutional rank to human rights treaties in relation 
to domestic constitutional law.  
In this context the IACtHR had to ultimately decide whether the Supreme 
Court of Justice of Chile had violated the Convention by delivering a judgment 
consistent with its own constitutional traditions but contrary to the Inter-American 
System. The IACtHR concluded that the prohibition established in the judicial 
power’s decision “constitut[ed] prior censorship in violation of Article 13 of the 
Convention.”353  It clarified that “the international responsibility of the State may 
be engaged by acts or omissions of any power or organ of the State, whatsoever its 
rank.”354  It also recognized that the origin of the violation rested in the text of the 
Constitution that allowed the prior censorship because the text “determined the acts 
of the Executive, the Legislature and the Judiciary.” 355   Yet, the Court also 
“valuate[d] and underline[ed] the importance of the Government’s initiative in 
proposing the constitutional reform, because it may lead to adapting domestic laws 
to the content of the American Convention.”356  As a remedy, the Court ordered the 
State to modify its Constitution in order to comply with the Convention, eliminate 
prior censorship, and allow the film’s exhibition.357    
Judge Cançado Trinidade’s concurring opinion was even more explicit on 
the role that international courts should play regarding domestic jurisprudence that 
contradicts the Convention and the decisions of the IACtHR.358  To him, it was the 
duty of the Court “to keep insisting on the [State’s] legislative and judicial 
obligations, besides the executive ones.”359  Recognizing the separation of powers 
issues that could arise, Judge Trinidade explicitly stated that “[a]though 
independent from the Executive Power, the Judicial Power is not independent from 
the State, but quite on the contrary, it is part of the State, for international purposes, 
as much as the Executive Power.”360  To him, “the question of the distribution of 
competences, and the basic principle of the separation of powers, are of the greatest 
relevance in the ambit of constitutional law, but in that of international law they are 
                                                            
352  The Last Temptation of Christ Merits, supra note 26, at 11 (citing expert Report of 
Jose Zalaquett Daher). 
353  Id. at 27, ¶ 71. 
354  Id. at 27–28, ¶ 72. 
355  Id. at 27–28, ¶ 72. 
356  Id. at 33–34, ¶ 89. 
357  The Last Temptation of Christ Merits, supra note 26, at 36, ¶ 103. 
358  "The Last Temptation of Christ" (Olmedo-Bustos et al.) v. Chile. Merits, 
Reparations, and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 73, ¶ 6 (Feb. 5, 2001) (J. 
Cançado Trindade, concurring) [hereinafter Opinion Cançado Last Temptation]. 
359  Id. at 4, ¶ 10. 
360  Id. at 7, ¶ 18. 
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nothing but facts, which have no incidence on the configuration of the international 
responsibility of the State.”361 
A few years later, after the decision of the IACtHR, Congress passed the 
amended bill as presented by President Frei.362 The amendment substituted the prior 
censorship mechanism for a system of cinematographic classification in order to 
protect the rights of children to not be exposed to films that are not appropriate for 
their age.363  Yet, films could not be forbidden from being screened in Chile.364  In 
the end, the decision helped the legitimacy of the new governments to modify the 
constitution, and also helped to send a signal to the domestic high courts that they 
could be, through their interpretation of the constitution, internationally responsible 
for human rights violations.  
  
 
D. Costa Rica as a Case of Study: The Artavia Case Saga 
 
1. The Constitutional Balance of Powers in Costa Rica  
 
In contrast with the previous two cases, in the case of Costa Rica the 
democratic system of government has not been affected by recent military coups. 
The last time the constitutional order was threatened was in a failed military coup 
in 1949.365  In fact, after the orchestrators of the coup were imprisoned the President 
and the National Assembly modified the constitution to officially abolish the armed 
                                                            
361  Opinion Cançado Last Temptation, supra note 358, at 9, ¶ 22. 
362  “The Last Temptation of Christ” (Olmedo-Bustos et al.) v. Chile, Monitoring 
Compliance with Judgment, 2003 Rep. Order of the Court, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. 4 ¶19 (Nov. 
28, 2003) (“The fifth report of the State of March 19, 2003, in which it declared that ‘on July 
10, 2001, the National Congress adopted the draft constitutional reform designed to establish 
the right to freedom of artistic creation and the elimination of cinematographic censorship, 
substituting this by a classification system which w[ould] be regulated by law’; this draft was 
promulgated and incorporated into the Constitution [Carta Fundamental ] on August 25, 
2001, by publication of Act No. 19,742 in the Official Gazette of Chile. Chile also advised 
that Act No. 19,846 (the Classification of Cinematographic Production Act) was published 
and entered into force on January 4, 2003; its first article established a system to classify 
cinematographic productions by age groups, designed to guide the adult population with 
regard to the contents of cinematographic productions and to protect children and 
adolescents, pursuant to the contents of various international treaties concluded by the 
State.”). 
363  Id.  
364  Id. 
365  Rodolfo Cerdas Cruz, Costa Rica since 1930, 7 CAMBRIDGE HISTORY OF LATIN 
AMERICA 357, 385–86 (1990). The failed military coup was orchestrated by the Minister of 
Security, Edgar Cardona, with a group of military officers who took the Bellavista Fort. Id. 
They demanded the destitution of President Jose Figueres, the elimination of the 10% income 
tax and the nationalization of the banks. The President, with the help of loyal military 
officers, was able to regain control the same day that the coup started. Id. 
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forces, making this country one of the few around the world without an army.366 
 Despite the fact that Costa Rica, unlike most of Latin America, did not 
have a military regime during the 1960s and 1970s, the country has had internal 
political conflicts regarding the existing constitutional understandings.367  Costa 
Rican political parties have had deep political and ideological divisions since the 
1940s.368  The biggest division has been between the National Liberation Party that 
has a long history of center-left oriented policies (i.e. nationalization of banks, 
enabling women and illiterates to vote, welfare legislation, constitutionally 
guaranteed public education for all, guaranteed citizenship to black immigrants’ 
children) and the center-right party, the Social Christian Unity party, that is 
traditionally connected with the coffee oligarchy and has an open Christian 
democratic ideology (i.e. the party supported neoliberal economic reforms in the 
late 1990s, it is in favor of the reduction of government’s spending, and it is openly 
against abortion rights and same-sex marriage).369  
The political polarization of Costa Rica has translated into four key 
characteristics that affect presidential power, its relationship with the National 
Assembly, and its ability to implement policy objectives. 370   First, there is a 
constitutional prohibition on reelection for legislators, which also included the 
presidency until 2003.371  Second, legislators are not elected directly by voters, but 
rather by a proportionality system that allocates seats to the parties depending on a 
formula linked to the overall percentage of votes received in the election.372  Third, 
there is a limitation on the president’s veto authority over the budget law.373  Fourth, 
the president is barred constitutionally from legislating by decree.374  Any type of 
legislation must be negotiated with the Legislative Assembly, and as a consequence 
“the most significant policy changes require legislative action, especially if they are 
to be sustained over the long term.”375  
Another consequence of these formal requirements is that congressional 
                                                            
366  David P. Barash, Costa Rica’s Peace Dividend: How Abolishing the Military Paid 
Off, L.A. TIMES (Dec. 15, 2013), http://articles.latimes.com/2013/dec/15/opinion/la-oe-
barash-costa-rica-demilitarization-20131208. 
367  Fabrice Edouard Lehoucq, Costa Rica: Paradise in Doubt, 16 J. DEMOCR. 140, 
140–42 (2005). 
368  See generally Cerdas Cruz, supra note 365. 
369  Id. 
370  John M. Carey, Strong Candidates for A Limited Office: Presidentialism and 
Political Parties in Costa Rica, PRES. DEMOCR. LAT. AM. 199, 202 (Scott Mainwaring & 
Matthew Soberg Shugart eds., Cambridge Univ. Press 1997) (“The constitution of 1949 
provides the Costa Rican president with complete authority over creation and maintenance 
of the executive, but scant formal authority to influence legislation.”).  
371  Id. at 205–06. 
372  Lehoucq, supra note 367, at 144. 
373  Carey, supra note 370, at 202–03. 
374  Id. at 202. 
375  Id. 
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and presidential relations depend highly on partisan relations.376  The fact that 
legislators cannot be reelected makes it easier for them to aspire to careers outside 
the legislature, and hence, it reduces their responsiveness to party leaders. 377  
Moreover, the Legislative Assembly, due to the proportional system of election, 
will always tend to be divided; the president’s party will not have full control of the 
legislative body because the formula will always ensure that the opposition has 
some proportional representation.  Presidents will tend to face divided governments 
and at the same time have few constitutional tools to force the legislative body into 
adopting its policy objectives.378 
 
 
2. Human Rights and the Constitutional Order.  
 
The Inter-American system has a strong presence in Costa Rica. San Jose, 
Costa Rica is where the IACtHR holds its regular sessions and the headquarters of 
its staff. It is also the place where the American Convention was negotiated and 
signed in 1969.  Hence, it is of no surprise that the provisions of the Constitution 
and the interpretation of the Supreme Court for the most part have been consistent 
with the Latin American human rights movement of the late 1980s and early 1990s. 
For example, Article 7 of the Constitution states that all international treaties that 
have been duly approved by the Legislative Assembly have “authority superior to 
that of the laws.”379  Moreover, Law No. 6889, adopted in September 1983, states 
that the decisions of the IACtHR, once they have been transmitted to the domestic 
judicial and administrative authorities, will have “the same executive force” as the 
decisions of the Costa Rican courts.380  
According to a 1995 decision of the Constitutional Chamber of the 
Supreme Court, human rights treaties have the “same normative force” as the 
constitution.381  This Chamber has also recognized that “Human Rights treaties in 
                                                            
376   Carey, supra note 370, at 205 (“The effectiveness of presidents or any other party 
leader to shape policy is largely dependent on their ability to influence the actions of 
legislators. This influence, in turn, is based on the ability to control the political careers of 
legislators.”). 
377  Id. (“[P]rohibitions on presidential reelection, which exist throughout most of Latin 
America, undermine presidential authority over legislative copartisians, because legislators 
know that incumbent presidents will not continue to hold their current position and so will 
exert less control over legislator’s career prospects after a specified date.”). 
378  Id. at 200 (“The shape of modern Costa Rican presidency is the result of a series 
of events at midcentury: activist presidents, a brief civil war, and the subsequent Constituent 
Assembly that codified strict limitations on presidential power.”). 
379  CONSTITUCIÓN POLÍTICA DE LA REPÚBLICA DE COSTA RICA, Artículo 7, 7 November 
1949, translated in CONSTITUTIONPROJECT, COSTA RICA’S CONSTITUTION OF 1949 WITH 
AMENDMENTS THROUGH 2011, https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Costa_Rica_
2011.pdf?lang=en. 
380  Artavia Monitoring Compliance, supra note 27, at 5. 
381  Sentencia de 9 de mayo de 1995 emitida por la Sala Constitucional de la Corte 
Suprema de Justicia de Costa Rica. Acción Inconstitucional. Voto 2313-95 (Expediente 
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force in Costa Rica, not only have a similar value to the Political Constitution, but 
also, when they give broader rights or guarantees to the person, they are above the 
Constitution.”382  On the relationship between the powers of the Constitutional 
Chamber and the powers of the IACtHR to interpret the American Convention, the 
Chamber stated in 1995 that it is just “natural and absolutely consequential” that the 
reasoning of the IACtHR is binding on its own interpretation when it analyzes 
violations to constitutional and universal human rights.383  Years later this was 
confirmed by the same Constitutional Chamber by arguing that “the decisions of 
the [IACtHR] have full effect in our country.” 384   In sum, the Constitutional 
Chamber of the Supreme Court of Costa Rica in the early years of the Inter 
American System gave full force, even constitutional effects, to the American 
Convention and the interpretations of the IACtHR. 
The constitutional system forbids the president from regulating rights 
through executive decrees in order to force him to reach a compromise with the 
legislative assembly and ensure that there is no overreach of executive power. 385   
The two provisions could be considered acceptable controls of presidential 
authority and a positive engagement with international law and human rights 
treaties. 386   As it will be explained below, this positive engagement backfired 
recently in Artavia v. Costa Rica, in which instead of strengthening the role and 
work of the Constitutional Chamber, the interaction ended up weakening the local 
court’s discretion and expanding the power of the Costa Rican executive branch.  
  
 
3. The Constitutional Chamber and the Right to Life 
 
In 1995, President Jose Filgueres Olsen (1994-1998) from the center-left 
National Liberation Party passed an Executive Decree regularizing the medical 
practice of in vitro fertilization.387  After the executive decree entered into force a 
group of conservative organizations challenged it on several grounds, including that 
the president was regulating rights by decree and that they considered that the 
technique did not protect the life of the embryos being used in the procedure.388  
The case reached the Costa Rican Supreme Court in the year 2000. By then the 
country had been ruled for two years by the center-right party, the Social Christian 
                                                            
0421-S-90), considerando VI, http://www.acnur.org/t3/fileadmin/Documentos/BDL/2012/
2844.pdf?view=1.  
382  Id.  
383  Id. at considerando VII. 
384  Artavia Monitoring Compliance, supra note 27, at 5. 
385  Carey, supra note 370, at 202. 
386  See generally Koh, supra note 146; Harold Hongju Koh, Trasnational Legal 
Process, 75 NEB L. REV 181 (1996) (arguing that international law, by being integrated into 
the domestic legal system, can reach high levels of positive engagement). 
387  Artavia Merits, supra note 129, ¶ 68. 
388  Id. ¶ 71. 
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Unity party.389  
The Constitutional Chamber of the Supreme Court first declared that the 
executive decree was unconstitutional because by regulating rights through an 
executive decree it exceeded its constitutional powers.390   Secondly, the Court 
applied a “conventionality test” and held that the decree was unconstitutional on an 
additional ground: it violated the American Convention.391  According to Article 4 
of the Convention, life “shall be protected by law and, in general, from the moment 
of conception.”392  After analyzing conflicting medical reports, the Constitutional 
Chamber concluded that there was no clear answer to whether the embryos created 
in the laboratory were human beings and whether the medical procedure in the 
laboratory could be analogized to the moment of conception. 393   Following a 
progressive interpretation of rights, which implied always looking for the most 
expansive protection, the Court concluded that the right to life meant extending the 
protection to all those embryos created in the laboratory.394  It was safer to assume 
                                                            
389  THE STATESMAN’S YEARBOOK 2017: THE POLITICS, CULTURES AND ECONOMIES OF 
THE WORLD, 364-65 (Pelgrave Mcmillan, 2016). This was not the first time the party had 
ruled Costa Rica; it had done so from 1990 to 1994, yet this time it was able to remain in 
power until 2006. Id. 
390  Artavia Merits, supra note 129, ¶ 72; Corte Suprema, Sala Constitucional 
[Supreme Court, Constittuional Chamber], Mar. 15, 2000, Sentencia: 02306, Expediente: 95-
001734-0007-CO, Considerando III. [hereinafter Costa Rica Constitutional Chamber 
Sentencia 02306]. 
391  Artavia Merits, supra note 129, ¶ 72; Costa Rica Constitutional Chamber Sentencia 
02306, supra note 390, Considerandos V, VI, VII. 
392  American Convention on Human Rights, art. 4, Nov. 22, 1969 (“Every person has 
the right to have his life respected. This right shall be protected by law and, in general, from 
the moment of conception. No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his life.”). 
393  Costa Rica Constitutional Chamber Sentencia 02306, supra note 390, 
Considerando V. 
394  Id. (“The question on when does life begins has a transcendental importance in the 
issue being discussed here, because it forces us to define when a human will be subject to the 
legal protection of our system. [A] person, the moment it has been conceived, is a person and 
we are in front of a living being, and has to be protected by our legal system”) (my 
translation); Costa Rica Constitutional Chamber Sentencia 02306, supra note 390, 
Considerando VI (“Person is every human being (article 1.2) and ‘every person has the right 
to recognition as a person before the law’ (article 3), both norms are of the [American 
Convention] . . . . There is no other category for human being, we are all persons and the first 
thing that our legal recognition as person demands is the recognition to the right to live, 
without it there is no way to exercise our personality). Costa Rica Constitutional Chamber 
Sentencia 02306, supra note 390, Considerando VII (“[F]rom the quoted norms and 
especially from articles 21 of the Constitution, 4.1 of the American Convention on Human 
Rights and 6.1 of the Convention of the Right of the Child it is clear that human life is 
protected from the moment of conception, this has already been confirmed by this Chamber 
in its earlier jurisprudence (674-90). This is the second premise [the first was the legality of 
the executive order] on which we will analyze the constitutionality of the Decree on the 
Technic of In Vitro Fertilization and Embryo Transfer (FIVET). The cited norms impose an 
obligation to protect the embryo against any abuse to which it could be subjected to in a 
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that there was life in the embryos until scientific tests could unanimously agree on 
the question. 395 The state had an international obligation to “protect the embryo 
against any abuse to which it could be subjected to in a laboratory, and especially 
the gravest one of them, the possibility of eliminating its existence.” 396  Under the 
Constitutional Chamber’s construction, the in vitro fertilization technique as 
regulated by the decree did not provide those appropriate protections.397 To the 
contrary, the medical reports analyzed by the court showed that the existing in vitro 
technique jeopardized the life and dignity of the human being by subjecting the 
embryos to a process of selection, experimentation, and by exposing them to a 
disproportional rate of mortality.398  The objectives pursued by the regulation, to 
give a child to a family, were not justified because the “technique implie[d] an 
elevated loss of embryos . . . whose life is first induced and then is frustrated in the 
process.” 399  
Having determined that the decree was unconstitutional, the Constitutional 
Chamber nonetheless recognized that “science and biotechnology is rapidly 
evolving and that the technique could reach a more effective procedure, and the 
problems identified here be solved.” 400  Yet the conditions in which it was being 
practiced at that time, led the Constitutional Chamber “to conclude that the 
elimination or destruction of the conceived beings—voluntarily or as a consequence 
of the malpractice of someone who employs the technique or out of its inaccuracy—
violates the rights to life.” 401  
Regardless of the normative position that one can have on the substance of 
the decision, one cannot fail to recognize that in the eyes of the Constitutional 
                                                            
laboratory, and especially the gravest one of them, the possibility of eliminating its 
existence.”) (my translation). 
395  Costa Rica Constitutional Chamber Sentencia 02306, supra note 390, 
Considerando VIII (my translation). 
396  Id. at Considerando VII (my translation). 
397  Id. at Considerando VIII. 
398  Id. at Considerando IX (my translation). 
399  Id. 
400  Costa Rica Constitutional Chamber Sentencia 02306, supra note 390, at 
Considerando IX (my translation). 
401  Id. (determining that “not even by enacting legislation, is it possible to authorize 
legally the application of IVF, at least, as long as its scientific developments have not evolved 
in the way that this decision has already explained and entails a conscious damage to human 
life.”) (my translation). A minority of two Justices, Arguedas Ramirez and Calzada Miranda, 
voted against the decision and presented a joint dissenting opinion. Costa Rica Constitutional 
Chamber Sentencia 02306, supra note 390, Votos Disidentes Magistrados Arguedas Ramirez 
y Calzada Miranda. They did so because, although they agreed that life in the Costa Rican 
and Inter American system is recognized from the moment of conception, they considered 
that the technique was the only way in which life could be protected when the parents had a 
physical impossibility to have children. Id. The parents had a right to procreate, and they 
considered that the technique did not violate the right to life of the embryos as long as they 
are only used for the purposes of transferring them into the mother’s uterus. Id. The rights to 
procreation to them, was a right to life in itself; and those who seek to give life, should be 
able to do so by using all available techniques, including those that science offers them. Id. 
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Chamber of Costa Rica, the court was exercising a progressive control of 
conventionality.  It was using the international treaty in its constitutional reasoning 
to protect in the most expansive way the interest that it believed had to be protected. 
The text of the American Convention was key for its identification of the moment 
at which life is to be protected. Moreover, in the view of the Constitutional 
Chamber, by recognizing that science could eventually protect the embryo in an 
effective way, it construed the right to life in the most protective and progressive 
way possible.402  It is safe to argue that the Court was not ignoring international 
treaties or sticking to formalist interpretations to avoid resolving the issue; rather, 
the court was being “progressive” by including additional sources like human rights 
treaties and medical reports.  Yet, it reached what some would classify as an 
ideologically conservative conclusion. 
 
 
4. The Proceedings Before the Inter-American System 
 
A group of families that suffered from infertility alleged that the decision 
of the Constitutional Chamber violated their right to procreate and their rights to 
privacy.403  They brought a claim to the Inter-American Commission of Human 
Rights in 2001. After a long period of discussions among the state, the victims, and 
conflicting medical reports from witnesses, the Commission issued its merits report 
in July 2010.404  It explained that the absolute prohibition of in vitro fertilization 
established by the decision of the Constitutional Chamber was a violation of the 
rights to privacy and to found a family.405  It then recommended that the state, 
among other things, enact legislation that would allow the practice.  
By the time the state was notified of the merits reports in 2010, after almost 
a decade of being out of power, the center-left National Liberation Party had 
regained control of the presidency under the leadership of President Oscar Arias 
(2006-2010).406  His party won control of the Legislative Assembly; it obtained 25 
of the 57 seats.407  In 2010, President Arias presented a bill to the Legislative 
Assembly to comply with the recommendations of the Commission.408   In an effort 
to address the concerns of the Constitutional Chamber, the bill included a 
                                                            
402  See generally Álvaro Paúl, Controversial Conceptions: The Unborn and the 
American Convention on Human Rights, 9 LOY. UNIV. CHIC. INT'L L. REV. 209, (2012) 
(arguing that the IACtHR committed several interpretative mistakes in order to impose a 
particular protective view, but that the same arguments made by the court could yield to 
another protective result in favor of the embryos).  
403  Artavia Merits, supra note 129, ¶ 126. 
404  Id. ¶ 1. 
405  Id. ¶¶ 1–2. 
406  Oscar Arias, Two-time President of Costa Rica and 1987 Nobel Peace Laureate, 
HUFFPOST, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/author/oscar-arias (last visited Nov. 2, 2017). 
407  Inter-Parliamentary Union [IPU], COSTA RICA Asamblea Legislativa (Legislative 
Assembly): Elections in 2006, Doc. 01.01.2008 (Feb. 5, 2006), http://www.ipu.org/parline-
e/reports/arc/2073_06.htm. 
408  Artavia Merits, supra note 129, ¶ 84. 
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prohibition of experimenting with and freezing embryos, and required all fertilized 
eggs to be implanted without allowing the doctor to make a selection.409  The bill 
received criticism from the legislative opposition and from the Pan-American 
Health Organization (PAHO), which argued that the proposed regulation, by 
forcing the doctors to implant all the embryos, would “increase the risk of 
spontaneous abortions, obstetric complications, premature births and neonatal 
morbidity,” thus endangering “the woman’s right to life, and even cause a 
therapeutic abortion which, in turn, negatively affects the enjoyment of the rights 
to health and other related human rights.”410  The bill was rejected by the legislative 
body leaving the Constitutional Chamber’s ban in force.411 
In light of the failure of the state to allow for the practice to take place in 
Costa Rica, the Commission then took the case to the IACtHR.412  The Commission 
argued that the victims’ suffering “[was] a fundamental and decisive consequence 
of the Constitutional Chamber’s judgment.”413  It further described the result of the 
Constitutional Chamber’s decisions as a prohibition of an “absolute nature” that 
constituted a restriction of the rights to found a family.414  In terms of remedies, the 
Commission requested the Court to order, among other things, “lift[ing] the ban on 
in vitro fertilization”415  and that “the Constitutional Chamber of the Supreme Court 
of Justice carry out a public act in order to apologize to the victims for the violation 
of their human rights and for the pain and suffering caused to them, acknowledging 
publicly that, because of its judgment, this judicial organ thwarted the life project 
of the victims.”416  
The State designated two officers of the Attorney General’s Office 
(Procuraduría General de la República) as its representatives. 417   The State’s 
response to the claims by the Commission were mainly based on the medical reports 
analyzed by the Constitutional Chamber and their conflicting results on the 
plausible health effects on both the mother and the embryos.418  On the issue of the 
ruling of the Constitutional Chamber, the state argued that the decision was a 
“relative ban” on the practice because it “did not annul definitely the possibility of 
practicing in vitro fertilization in Costa Rica, [but] only banned a specific technique 
that had existed since 1995.”419  It further added that as soon as the “state considers 
that a technique is compatible with those parameters [the ones set by the 
Constitutional Chamber on reducing percentage of failure cases], it may permit and 
                                                            
409  Artavia Merits, supra note 129, ¶ 156. 
410  Id. ¶ 84. 
411  Id. 
412  Id. ¶¶ 126–7. 
413  Id. ¶ 127. 
414  Artavia Merits, supra note 129, ¶ 152. 
415  Id. ¶ 330. 
416  Id. ¶ 342. 
417  Id. ¶ 8. 
418  Id. ¶ 128–9. 
419  Artavia Merits, supra note 129, ¶ 155. 
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regulate it.”420  In sum, the State did not defend the fact that the Constitutional 
Chamber was arguing for a more extensive protection of the right to life than the 
one considered by the Inter-American Commission.  
The IACtHR agreed with the Commission’s assessment that the case 
rested on determining “whether [the] decisions by the Constitutional Chamber 
entailed the State’s international responsibility,” 421  and “resulted in a 
disproportionate restriction of the rights of the presumed victims.”422  It even argued 
that there was no need to review the evidence presented by the State regarding the 
scientific and medical consequences of the technique because the merits of the case 
were based on the effect of the decisions of the Costa Rican Supreme Court.423  That 
is, it was a procedure focused on analyzing whether or not the Constitutional Court 
had correctly interpreted the American Convention in light of the facts presented to 
it.  Yet, the State did not present a full defense of the Constitutional Chamber’s 
reasoning. The IACtHR reviewed the ruling of the highest court of Costa Rica as 
an appellate court would review the work of a trial court.  
The IACtHR first stated that the Constitutional Chamber’s standard 
implied that for the technique to be constitutional it would need to ensure that there 
was no embryonic loss whatsoever.424   In practice, this would entail “a prohibition 
of IVF, because the evidence in the case file indicated that, to date, there is no option 
for practicing IVF without some possibility of embryonic loss.”425  In other words, 
“it would be impossible to comply with the condition imposed by the Chamber.”426 
The IACtHR criticized the decision of the Constitutional Chamber for not having 
“sufficient precision” and making it difficult for the plaintiffs and other authorities 
to follow.427  
The IACtHR first reviewed the definitions of the term “conception” as 
established both in scientific affidavits and in the dictionary of the Spanish 
language.428  It concluded that conception should be understood as the moment in 
which embryos are implanted, not when they are created as argued by the 
Constitutional Chamber. 429  The Convention could not extend its protection to the 
embryos in the laboratory.430  The Court could have stopped its analysis there but it 
                                                            
420  Artavia Merits, supra note 129, ¶¶ 155-6. 
421  Id. ¶ 26. 
422  Id. ¶ 171. 
423  Id. ¶ 26 (“[I]n order to analyze their merits, the Court will only take into account 
the evidence and allegations related to the arguments explicitly used in the reasoning of the 
Constitutional Chamber’s judgment.”). 
424   Id. ¶¶ 76, 157–59. 
425  Artavia Merits, supra note 129, ¶ 159. 
426  Id.  
427  Id. ¶ 160. 
428  Id. ¶ 178. 
429  Id. ¶ 189 (“[T]he Court understands the word ‘conception’ from the moment at 
which implantation occurs, and therefore considers that, before this event, Article 4 of the 
American Convention cannot be applied.”). 
430  Artavia Merits, supra note 129, ¶ 189. 
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then reviewed the level of protection that the Convention gives to the right to life.431  
It took the position that the Convention does not give an absolute protection to 
life.432  It eventually reached the conclusion that “it is not feasible to maintain that 
an embryo is the holder of and exercises the rights established in each of these 
articles. Also, taking into account, as indicated previously, that conception can only 
take place within a woman’s body [through implantation].”433  Consequently, “the 
direct subject of protection is fundamentally the pregnant woman, because the 
protection of the unborn child is implemented essentially through the protection of 
the woman.”434  
The IACtHR then applied a proportionality test to the decision of the 
Constitutional Chamber of Costa Rica. It explained that it was not admissible that 
the chamber argued in its decision that its constitutional norms “grant a greater 
protection to the right to life and, therefore, proceed to give this right absolute 
protection . . . this approach deni[ed] the existence of rights that may be the object 
of disproportionate restrictions owing to the defense of the absolute protection of 
the right to life, which would be contrary to the protection of human rights.”435  On 
the issue of the risks of high embryonic death, the IACtHR argued that it was 
“disproportionate to aspire to an absolute protection of the embryo in relation to a 
risk that is common and even inherent in process where the IVF technique has not 
been used.”436  The IACtHR found that the decision of the Constitutional Chamber 
was an “arbitrary and excessive interference in private and family life” because it 
had failed to take into consideration other competing rights.437   
The Artavia decision is a clear example of a conflict of interpretation 
                                                            
431  Artavia Merits, supra note 129, ¶ 189 (affirming that “the term ‘in general’ infers 
exceptions to a rule.” At points in the decision the IACtHR seemed to imply that the original 
intent of the drafters of the American Convention was to let the state decide the scope of this 
protection). 
432  Id. ¶ 220 (referencing further the fact that the Inter-American Commission had 
previously declared in two cases brought against the United States’ Supreme Court’s 
decisions to legalize abortion in the sense that “the protection of the rights to life was not 
absolute.”). 
433  Id. ¶ 222. 
434  Id.  
435  Id. ¶ 259. 
436  Artavia Merits, supra note 129, ¶¶ 311, 313–14 (“[T]aking into account that 
embryonic losses that occur in a natural pregnancy and in other reproduction techniques 
permitted in Costa Rica, the protection of the embryo sought by banning IVF has a very 
limited and moderate scope . . .  a weighting up of the severity of the limitation of the rights 
involved in this case as compared to the importance of the protection of the embryo allows 
it to be affirmed that the effects on the rights to personal integrity, personal liberty, private 
life, intimacy, reproductive autonomy, access to reproductive health services, and to found a 
family is sever and entails a violation of these rights because, in practice, they are annulled 
for those persons whose only possible treatment for infertility is IVF. In addition, the 
interference had a differentiated impact on the victims owing to their situation of disability, 
gender stereotypes and, for some of the victims, to their financial situation.”). 
437  Id. ¶ 189. 
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between courts.  This was not a case in which a domestic court was ignoring human 
rights and the international court needed to enforce them; rather, this case 
exemplified a conflict between courts on what was the best way to interpret human 
rights and the most effective way to protect them.  The IACtHR disagreed with the 
highest Court of Costa Rica on how to interpret the Convention in the most 
protective way possible.  For the highest court of Costa Rica, the most expansive 
protection included the embryo; for the IACtHR the most expansive interpretation 
could not entail “absolute” protection, but rather balancing the right to life with 
those of other victims.  
The IACtHR ordered state authorities to “take the appropriate measures to 
ensure that the prohibition of the practice of IVF is annulled as rapidly as 
possible.”438  As part of its remedies, the Court ordered the Costa Rica Social 
Security Institute to “make IVF available within its health care infertility treatments 
and programs, in accordance with the obligation to respect and guarantee the 
principle of non-discrimination.”439   
When the decision of the IACtHR was issued in 2012, Costa Rica was still 
governed by a president from the center-left party, Laura Chinchilla (2010-2014), 
and the Legislative Assembly remained divided (President Chinchilla’s party had 
only 24 of the 57 seats in the Assembly).  In the two years after the decision of the 
IACtHR, President Chinchilla presented several drafts to the Legislative Assembly 
to regulate the in vitro fertilization procedures.440  All of those projects failed to 
become legislation. 441   Moreover, the victims presented several local judicial 
amparo proceedings to have the decision of the IACtHR recognized by the judiciary 
and requested them to leave without effects the 2000 decision of the Constitutional 
Chamber. 442   A majority of the Constitutional Chamber rejected the amparo 
requests. 443   In a clear departure from its previous attitude towards the Inter-
American system, the Constitutional Chamber argued that it was not its duty to 
order or supervise compliance with the IACtHR’s decisions.444  
In June 2015, the President decided to enact another executive decree to 
regulate the IVF technique.445  This time, the executive argued that the decree was 
the only available means for the State to comply with the decision of the IACtHR.446  
The decree was once again challenged in the Constitutional Chamber with similar 
arguments to the ones expressed in the 2000 decision, and the decree was declared 
as unconstitutional.447  The Constitutional Chamber recognized “the effort of the 
                                                            
438  Artavia Merits, supra note 129, ¶¶ 336–37. 
439  Id. ¶ 338. 
440  Artavia Monitoring Compliance, supra note 27, at 9. 
441 Id. 
442  Id. at 7. 
443  Id.  
444  Id. 
445   Artavia Monitoring Compliance, supra note 27, at 9. 
446 Id.  
447  Id. The Constitutional Chamber argued that the executive decree “violated and/or 
threatened the fundamental right to life of the unborn” and it also exceeded the powers of the 
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Executive Power to give full compliance to the decisions of the IACtHR” but noted 
that “the means are not justified by the ends, especially when these means breach 
in an open and manifest way values, principles and nuclear norms of [the Costa 
Rican] republican order.”448  The inter-branch political conflict was clear from this 
decision. The Constitutional Chamber was asked to modify the constitutional rules 
that balanced the political forces’ powers.  Setting a precedent in which the 
president can regulate rights through decrees was more dangerous for the 
constitutional order than ignoring the decisions of the supranational human rights 
court.  
 
 
5. Imposing an Unconstitutional Executive Decree 
 
 In February 2016, the IACtHR monitored the compliance with the 
decision and found that its orders had not been fully implemented.449  It criticized 
the Constitutional Chamber for not taking the opportunity to reverse its own 
decisions when the victims requested an amparo to execute the IACtHR’s 
decision.450  It further argued that the Constitutional Chamber, as the highest court 
in Costa Rica, has “the important role of complying or implementing the decision 
of the IACtHR.”451  The IACtHR noted the different attitudes from local powers 
towards the supranational system.  It “value[d] positively the effort of the Executive 
Power to leave without effect the IVF prohibition through the emission of a legal 
norm, and consider[ed] that that effort represent[ed] a clear and concrete will to 
comply with the decision of the IACtHR.”452 
In its latest decision, the IACtHR left without “any legal effects” the 
decision of the Constitutional Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice of Costa 
Rica. 453  Moreover, it affirmed that: 
                                                            
executive by regulating rights in executive orders, a power only granted to the legislative 
assembly. Id. It even argued that the American Convention by stating that the rights to life 
should be regulated “in general by law” confirms the view that it cannot be regulated thought 
an executive decree.  Acción de Inconstitucionalidad Presentada en contra del Decreto 
Ejecutivo No. 39210-MP-S, (Sept. 21, 2015); Artavia Monitoring Compliance, supra note 
27, at 9. 
448  Artavia Monitoring Compliance, supra note 27, at 10. 
449  Id. 
452  Id. at 7–8. 
451  Id. 
452  Id. at 9. 
453  Artavia Monitoring Compliance, supra note 27, at 12–13 (“According to what was 
declared by this Court in its resolution, the prohibition to practice IVF is manifestly 
incompatible with the American Convention due to the fact that it violates those rights [to 
privacy and family], and as such, it cannot have any legal effects in Costa Rica nor constitute 
an impediment for the exercise of such a right protected by the Convention. Consequently, 
in accordance with the American Convention and the remedies ordered in the Decision, it 
must be clear that IVF from now on is authorized in Costa Rica and, in an immediate way, 
the exercise of the right to decide to have biological sons or daughters through the assisted 
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it must be clear that FIV from now on is authorized in Costa Rica 
and, in an immediate way, the exercise of the right to decide to 
have biological sons or daughters through the assisted technic 
must be allowed, both at the private and public level, without the 
need to have any additional legal act or decision.454  
 
With regard to the executive decree that regulated the practice, the 
IACtHR ordered to “keep in force the Decree so that there is no illusory exercise of 
the rights . . . this does not imply that the legislative power could enact eventually 
some type of regulation that complies with the standards of the decision of the 
IACtHR.”455  
Eduardo Vio Grossi was the only dissenting judge in the decision.456  He 
argued that the IACtHR had very limited powers to monitor compliance with its 
decisions and that in this case it was exceeding them by signaling concrete 
responsibilities to domestic actors.457  He even made reference to the need to give a 
“margin of appreciation” to the domestic authorities to comply with the state’s 
international obligations. 458  Without the “margin of appreciation,” the court would 
be invading the scope of domestic legal actors in a way contrary to international 
law.459  Moreover, Judge Vio Grossi identified the risk of getting the Court involved 
in a separation of powers issue between the local high court and the executive 
power. 460  In practice, the international resolution classified local courts as human 
rights violators, and at the same time, legitimized the acts of the executive.461  In 
his view, the IACtHR should not be in the business of resolving internal struggles 
among powers on how best to comply with international decisions.462 
 
 
                                                            
technic must be allowed, both at the private and public level, without the need to have any 
additional legal act or decision that recognizes this possibility or that regulates the 
implementation of such a technique. No one can impose a penalty to engage in the practice 
of IVF.”) (my translation). 
454  Artavia Monitoring Compliance, supra note 27, at 12–13. 
455  Id. at 15 (arguing that the Decree should stay in force because neither the victims 
nor the Commission had argued that the decree violated any rights and that in fact it was an 
appropriate way to comply with the IACtHR decision). 
456  I/A Court HR. Case of Artavia Murillo et al. ("In vitro fertilization") v. Costa Rica. 
Monitoring Compliance with Judgments. Order of the Inter-American Court of Human 
Rights of February 26, 2016. (Only in Spanish), Dissenting Opinion Eduardo Vio Gorssi, at 
1 [hereinafter Artavia Monitoring Dissent]. 
457  Id. at 2–3, 8. 
458  Id. at 6. 
459  Id. 
460  Id. at 9–10. 
461  Artavia Monitoring Dissent, supra note 456, at 9–10. 
462  Id. at 10. 
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VI. LESSONS FROM THE UNITED STATES AND INTER-AMERICAN 
EXPERIENCE 
 
The comparative analysis presented in the previous sections between the 
US system of adjudication and the Inter-American system of human rights confirms 
the claim that judicial supremacy has not only resulted from courts’ doctrinal 
interpretations, but also from political actors’ incentives to recognize and promote 
it.463  High courts at the domestic level and international tribunals rely on political, 
social and economic actors to enforce their decisions. At the international level, the 
lack of a political entity or a strong economic integration process, such as in the 
European Union, lowers the costs for presidents to dismiss the authority or ignore 
the opinions of supranational courts.464  
The first lesson from the comparative analysis is that the expansion of the 
IACtHR has been possible in some Latin American states because recognizing such 
an authority has been politically beneficial to executive powers and their political 
coalitions.  The IACtHR’s authority has helped presidents overcome a variety of 
political dilemmas inherent in emerging democracies.  It has helped to dismantle 
conservative judiciaries, bypass gridlock in congresses, impose agendas on pre-
existing coalitions, and generally divert the political costs of certain decisions into 
the international system as opposed to facing them directly.  
This lesson does not imply that all domestic judiciaries have been passive 
in this process.  There are several examples of constitutional judges who have 
contested the conventional authority of the supranational court.465  They have had 
to grapple simultaneously with both the requirements of the Constitution and of the 
Convention; in some cases they have tried to reach an understanding with the 
supranational court.  The IACtHR is not the only voice that speaks in the name of 
human rights, and for some judiciaries the IACtHR has failed to be an adequate 
voice.  The example of the Chilean Supreme Court and the Constitutional Chamber 
of the Supreme Court of Costa Rica presented in previous sections serve as 
testimonies to these tensions.  
The second lesson that emerges from the comparative findings of this 
paper is that the use of the supranational adjudication system to expand executive 
powers brings into question existing assumptions on the need to make international 
law directly enforceable at the domestic level. 466   In the context of the US 
constitutional system, this lesson is a call for caution to the proponents of giving 
self-executing power to decisions of international courts in the domestic legal 
system.467  If the decisions from international courts are given direct legal effect, 
                                                            
463  WHITTINGTON, supra note 11, at 27, 285. 
464  See generally SHAPIRO, COURTS, supra note 16 (United States). See generally 
Alter, supra note 19 (Europe); Burley & Mattli, supra note 20 (Europe); STONE SWEET, supra 
note 113 (Europe). 
465  See generally Huneeus, supra note 138.  
466  See generally Koh, supra note 386; Koh, supra note 146.  
467  Supra note 466; Carlos M. Vázquez, Treaties as Law of the Land: The Supremacy 
Clause and the Judicial Enforcement of Treaties, 122 Harv. L. Rev. 599–695 (2008) (arguing 
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like the Costa Rican case, they can substantially affect the balance of power among 
governmental actors. Just as the US Supreme Court’s judicial supremacy can be 
used by actors to bypass politics and advance agendas, so too can the decisions of 
international courts be used to impose policies on Congress, the highest court of the 
land, the states, and federal agencies. In the context of comparative law and new 
democracies, existing theories argue that supranational adjudicative institutions can 
help domestic judiciaries become more independent and enhance their role in 
governance.468  To reach this conclusion, they build on studies focused on the 
experience of the European Court of Justice and European Court of Human 
Rights.469  In the case of Europe, scholars argue that the fragmentation of judicial 
authority between national and supranational courts made it difficult for 
governments to “retaliate” the expansion of judicial power at the domestic level.470  
The commentators of this literature insist that international institutions are a 
structural factor that helps expand judicial power by “protecting and fostering 
democracy and expanding human rights.”471   Yet, as the comparative analysis 
between the United States and the Inter-American system shows, supranational 
judiciaries can also have the opposite effect. 
When a domestic political coalition or incoming political leaders disagree 
with the existing constitutional understandings or the policy preference of the 
domestic court, they may use the supranational proceeding to steer the direction of 
the domestic court. The new government can use the IACtHR’s expansive 
jurisprudence as a tool to impose a different understanding coated under the 
narrative of international judicial supremacy, and avoid criticism for expanding 
presidential powers. Cloaked by a human rights narrative is an assailment of judicial 
discretion and an expansion of presidential power.  The European based literature 
has failed to recognize this fact. By relying exclusively on the experience of 
European countries and their interaction with the European Union institutions, they 
generally see an ally of domestic judiciaries in the supranational system.472  
In the view of the European-centered literature, when courts and the 
political coalitions in power do not have the same policy agenda, political actors 
                                                            
that the Supremacy Clause of the US constitution should be interpreted as establishing a 
default rule that treaties should be directly enforceable in domestic courts like other laws).   
468  See generally L.R. Helfer, Redesigning the European Court of Human Rights: 
Embeddedness as a Deep Structural Principle of the European Human Rights Regime, 19 
EUR. J. INT'L. L. 125, 132 (2008); Helfer & Slaughter, supra note 19; Helfer & Slaughter, 
supra note 253; Laurence R. Helfer et al., Do European Court of Human Rights Judgments 
Promote Legal and Policy Change? (Working paper 2011); Karen J. Alter et al., How 
Context Shapes the Authority of International Courts, 79 LAW & CONT. PROBS. 1 (2015); 
Burley & Mattli, supra note 20. 
469  Supra note 468. 
470  CONSEQUENTIAL COURTS, supra note 11, at 24. See generally Weiler, supra note 
18; Weiler, supra note 20; Helfer & Slaughter, supra note 19; Helfer & Slaughter, supra note 
253; Slaughter, supra note 19. 
471  CONSEQUENTIAL COURTS, supra note 11, at 25. 
472  See generally Helfer & Slaughter, supra note 19; Burley & Mattli, supra note 20; 
Alter, supra note 19. 
632 Arizona Journal of International & Comparative Law      Vol. 34, No. 3        2017 
 
will downplay the role of domestic courts by replacing judicial personnel, altering 
appointment procedures, or introducing changes in the court’s jurisdiction.473  The 
conclusions presented in this paper contradict this view in two ways.  First, there 
might be cases in which the conflict between the existing judiciary and an incoming 
political coalition is not one of judiciaries expanding their role in politics, but rather 
regards a substantive disagreement on which agenda to pursue.  This is not an attack 
on judicial power itself, but rather an attack on the use of judicial activism to impose 
a squarely progressive or conservative agenda.  Secondly, as mentioned in the 
previous sections, it might be politically costly for the new coalitions to constrain 
judicial powers in regions where hyper-presidentialism or a history of 
authoritarianism is still present in the minds of the general population. NGOs, 
political opposition, and political parties, among others, would reject an upfront 
attack to the judiciary.  Moreover, in cases in which the government is divided there 
might be some domestic political actors that are in line with the court’s policy 
position.  The other political coalitions or leaders might have a harder time using 
these traditional mechanisms to downplay the role of domestic courts.  
The final lesson that can be learned from this paper’s comparative analysis 
is that allowing other branches of government to express their concerns in the 
judicial system does not necessary lead to negative results.  In the United States, the 
possibility of allowing some type of participation, even if it is only in the form of 
an amicus brief, leads the court to consider all the interests of the parties that are 
affected by its decisions.  In the long run, this makes the court a more conscientious 
institution regarding the limits of its powers.  In the words of former Attorney 
General Griswold, the “judicial system presupposes that the clash of arguments 
presented by professional adversaries is the most reliable process for determining 
the legality of any activity.”474  Courts reach better decisions when more arguments 
are considered, and especially when the voices of everyone involved in the process 
are heard.  
One of the critiques of the Inter-American system is its lack of sensitivity 
regarding the local political, legal, and social realities,475 especially through its 
remedies orders.476  Perhaps listening to all of the government actors involved in 
the case would enhance the Court’s sensitivity and invite it to make decisions more 
attuned to the realities of the state.  Today, the IACtHR judges are only getting to 
know the country through the lenses of the NGOs representing the victims, the 
Inter-American Commission, and the executive powers.  We must recognize that 
                                                            
473  CONSEQUENTIAL COURTS, supra note 11, at 26 (“[G]overnment and political 
leaders—driven by immediate political desires—can move aggressively to prevent, 
discourage, or limit judicial role expansion. Beyond overriding high court rulings that do not 
match their policy preferences in hopes of swatting back judicial reach into political affairs, 
they may seek to replace judicial personnel or alter appointment procedures, or introduce 
changes in a court’s jurisdiction.”). 
474  Griswold, supra note 3, at 528. 
475  Oquendo, supra note 258, at 27; Neuman, supra note 144, at 346; Neuman, supra 
note 9. 
476  Neuman, supra note 9, 106. See generally, Neuman, supra note 144. 
To Speak with One Voice                                                    633 
 
 
these are only depicting the story that serves their strategic interests.  The rest of 
state actors, including the high courts, are left without a defense.  
 
 
VII. CONCLUSION 
 
This paper considered an assumption about contemporary international 
adjudicatory proceedings involving governmental acts, which government 
representatives will always defend the state in the best way possible, and found it 
to be contradictory, or at least uneasy.  The comparison of the defense of the US 
federal government before the Supreme Court and of the Latin American states in 
the IACtHR shows that the assumption only holds true when the interest of the 
executive aligns with the interest of the other branches being defended.  In many 
occasions at the international level, this has not been the case.  Today the interest 
of the state is composed of diverse agendas and it is not clear how to synthesize and 
reconcile them, particularly in the face of salient cases that define key constitutional 
understandings.  
As this paper explained, the US constitutional litigation system has 
developed a set of strategies to mitigate advantages that come with the monopoly 
of the executive power over the defense of the state.477  The US Supreme Court has 
not been prevented from hearing diverse interests involved in the cases. Congress 
has filed amicus briefs, granted litigating authority to independent federal agencies, 
and pressured the DOJ to include its interests.478  Moreover, in some cases, private 
litigants have framed their claims against executive authority using arguments that 
defend congressional powers.479  In other cases, the litigation strategies of the DOJ 
have also reflected an effort to represent the interest of all branches.480  This office 
has presented the views of different branches in briefs or in footnotes or in oral 
argument.  However, as this paper explained, in salient cases it has also been 
persuaded by the White House to decline to defend other branches, confessed errors 
in court, or argued directly against the acts of other branches.  The latter consists of 
few cases in the life of US constitutional adjudication, yet they reveal the impact 
that the authority to present arguments in court has for inter-branch politics.    
Once the analysis is broadened to include the political effects of the 
litigation strategies, it becomes immediately clear that in the contexts of divided 
government, presidents can use the judicial process to expand their agenda.481  In 
the face of congressional opposition these presidents can try to modify political 
                                                            
477  See generally Waxman, supra note 13; Devins & Prakash, supra note 13; Devins, 
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understandings by seeking an alliance with the judiciary.482  The monopoly over the 
defense of the government in constitutional adjudication and the reaffirmation of 
judicial supremacy by the court can be used to expand the power of the executive.  
As this paper explained, this does not always happen, as there are some mitigation 
mechanisms available to Congress.v Yet, the potential for the expansion is clear.   
This paper also made the case that supranational adjudication in the Inter-
American System of Human Rights shares some of the characteristics of the US 
system of constitutional adjudication.  This paper discussed how the IACtHR is 
assuming constitutional functions, especially through its assertion of judicial 
supremacy over human rights litigation in the region. 483   This assertion is 
manifested when it strikes down domestic legislation, constitutional norms and acts 
of different branches; it is also manifested by the decisions in which it reviews the 
work of constitutional courts as if they were lower courts and it affirms the superior 
hierarchy of its decisions over domestic constitutional doctrines.  This supranational 
judicial expansion runs contrary to the original vision of the institution to cooperate 
with domestic judiciaries, and to foster the empowerment of domestic high courts.  
There are many reasons why this doctrinal expansion has been possible, 
including the fact that Latin American constitutions have given the highest 
deference to human rights covenants.  Yet, there is also a political variable on the 
expansion of the court.  There has been a willingness of some executives to use the 
monopoly of the defense of the state and the IACtHR’s assertion of judicial 
supremacy to impose policy agendas in scenarios of dived governments, and against 
previous political coalitions.  
In sum, just as in the US domestic system the Supreme Court can be used 
to expand executive powers over Congress or independent agencies, the IACtHR 
can be used to expand Latin American executive powers over local judiciaries.  The 
centralization of the defense of the state is one of the political tools that allow this 
to happen.  The centralization takes away the power of certain branches or agencies 
to uphold their agenda before a judicial body.  In the most extreme cases, the 
executive could decline to defend the interest of the other branches of government 
when the issues discussed in court can help this branch expand its own powers, 
ignore the constitution, or impose its policy agenda.  Note the paradox here. In the 
US system, the acquiescence of the executive serves also the Supreme Court 
because it reaffirms its judicial supremacy over the Constitution.484  When we add 
to the adjudicatory process a supranational court, the power of the domestic high 
court is supplanted by the supremacy of an international body.  Constitutional courts 
lose their control over the content of the constitutions and of rights litigation, a 
control than now is asserted by a supranational court.  
The IACtHR’s experience shows the success and tragedy of the assertion 
of international judicial supremacy by a supranational court.  As the international 
human rights adjudication system expands its influence, behaving more as a 
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constitutional court than as a dispute resolution body, the political actors that control 
the judicial process are the ones who can manipulate it on their behalf.485  The rest 
of the state actors, including the high courts, are left without a defense, and the 
expansion of the international judiciary has the potential of expanding the agenda 
of the domestic executive instead of the power of local high courts.   
This conclusion contradicts liberal international law scholars who would 
predict that the expansion of international judiciaries would come hand in hand with 
the expansion of domestic judiciaries’ powers and discretion.486  In this scholarly 
literature, independent local judiciaries are supposedly a precondition for an 
effective international judiciary. 487   The story of the IACtHR shows that the 
expansion of the international judiciary has the potential of expanding the agenda 
of the domestic executive instead of the power of local high courts.488  Instead of 
engaging in a dialogue in which the domestic and the international courts nurture 
each other, a process of imposition and submission is emerging in which the 
domestic high court loses independence and discretion in rights interpretation.489  
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